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Abstrat
We propose 'Cognitive Bootstrapping' as a blanket term for all instanes the
proess by whih the pereptual apparatus of an autonomous agent is oneptu-
ally extended and experimentally validated. Bootstrap tehniques are neessary to
transend the paradox inherent in validating pereptual ategorisations via the ob-
jets of pereption. Pereption may thus beome self-founding only within ertain
ruial a priori limits required to maintain referentiality and provide a validation
riterion for the proposed pereptual updates. We hene survey the subjet areas
in whih this mehanism ours, ultimately advoating a hierarhially open-ended
pereption/ation approah to artiial ognition in order to objetively ground
pereptual updating.
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Part I
0.1 The Relevane of Bootstrapping to Artiial Cognition
0.1.1 The Central Coneptual DiÆulty of Artiial Cognition
It has been a well established priniple, dating from the oneption of omputing, that a
human-equivalent intelligene is not to be straightforwardly designed by human means;
to do so would to involve, as a rst step, knowing exatly one's own mental strutures,
and hene embraing the fundamental foundational paradox of Bertrand Russell. This
paradox, as signiant for the development of mathematis as it was for omputing
siene, arises when the permissibility of sets ontaining as members other sets (in
partiular the permissibility of set self-membership) is granted as logially aeptable
1
.
In so far as mental representations may be modelled by set-theoreti onstruts, Russell's
paradox has thus to be addressed within the domain of artiial intelligene.
From this paradox, and others derivative of it (for instane, those surrounding putative
algorithmi solutions to the Halting problem [137℄, or the possibility of omplete, nite
axiomatizations of natural number theory [46℄), we have beome used to questioning
the possibility of a nite system (suh as the human brain) enompassing a omplete
self-representation within itself, partiularly one that is demonstrably suh (within that
system). Of ourse, partial or temporally-retrograde self-models are permissible, so
that it is hene possible for a human-being to use a linguisti token 'I' meaningfully and
aurately, or, on a omputationally level, to build mobile robots apable of building
aurate models of their position in spae, if not of their full internal state-spae. How-
ever, absolute and immediate self-models would appear to be ruled-out ompletely (see
for instane [13℄ for a disussion of the limits to self-observation under nite, Markovian
and innite state-spae assumptions, and [12℄ under quantum-physial assumptions).
It would thus appear that the mehanis of human ognition, if indeed suh a notion is
permissible, ould not be knowingly expressed in a nite and formally omplete manner
by any human being, and ould not therefore be implemented via onventional methods
of omputational engineering, wherein a set of a set of funtional goals are rst speied
before being algorithmially implemented (for an extended disussion of this notion f
[74℄). This is, in eet, to transpose the negative onlusion of the Hilbert programme
(the attempt, in the 1920s to onstrut, in advane, a formal axiomatisation of all
mathematis) from a mathemati ontext to that of ognitive siene, where the laws of
ognition are hene the quantity that is inapable of a provably - ie knowingly- omplete
analyti formulation.
0.1.2 The Bootstrap Solution
Clearly, though, human-level ognition exists in a repliable fashion throughout the
world, reprodued through well understood biologial and hemial mehanisms. The
1
In the stritest sense, paradox only ours when onsidering sets of non-self-membering sets; self-
membership alone auses only problems of innite regress. However, formal ompleteness requires that
the existene of the latter onstrut implies the existene of the former onstrution, and hene the
paradox annot easily be evaded; we have at the very least to deal with expliit innities in any suh
domain.
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idea of reating artiial ognitive entities is not therefore ruled out in advane by the
laws of physis. The diÆulty lies only with the algorithmi speiation of the problem,
whih is neessarily not aessible to human thought. As early as the 1950s [49℄ it had
been realised that an embodied, mahine-learning approah provides the only obvious
resolution of this problem, wherein a mahine is onstruted apable of reprogramming
its own, originally human-speied low-level pereptual ode (onstituting a partial hu-
man self-model), in terms of learnt higher-level oneptual perepts deriving from the
lower level ode. However, the ombined mehanial and omputational requirements
of suh an endeavour were suh that it is only in the latter part of the 20th entury
that this approah to the reation of artiial ognitive systems has been attempted;
traditional attempts at artiial ognition have rested on well understood, rigorously
dened mathematial foundations, whih, if not (via the above arguments) onstitutive
of omplete theories of human ognition, have had the advantage of being both know-
ably appliable and eetive. The emerging researh eld of self-determining artiial
ognitive systems then represents the goal of repliating human-like ognition at both a
hardware and software level, with the dynami link between the two being as essential
to this endeavour as the individual omponents. Charting the development of these
systems will form a entral omponent of this survey, whih will also need, to an extent,
to assess historial developments in the eld of lassial xed-form artiial ognitive
ageny in order to appropriately ontextualise the open-ended alternative.
This paradigm for artiial ognitive systems, the reprogramming of lower-level per-
eptual ode in terms of learnt higher-level oneptual perepts might itself appear
paradoxial; indeed it is a version of the lassial omputational 'bootstrap' whereby
(for instane) the ompiler for a new omputational language is written within that
same language. The key requirement that prevents this notion from being as paradox-
ial as the legendary attempts of Baron Munhhausen to y by 'pulling himself up by
his own bootstraps' (from whene we get the expression), is that the ore terms of the
new language must rest on a pre-existing (a priori) omputational-linguisti foundation,
even if the nal form of the ompiled language retains no expliit trae of its origins.
We would hene like to propose the term Cognitive Bootstrapping to desribe this 'self-
programming' form of solution to the entral diÆulty of artiial ognition, partiularly
in so far as it refers to the updating of the pereptual mahinery of ognition, and not
simply the updating of an environmental model in terms of xed pereptual ategori-
sations. A entral diÆult of ognitive bootstrapping is thus that environmental and
pereptual model renement must be arried out simultaneously despite their mutual
interdependeny.
In fat, ideas of equivalent funtional form to that underlying the above denition of
ognitive bootstrapping have a long historial pedigree, arising in many dierent forms
within many dierent subjet areas. For instane, it ours in Statistis (where it is
formalised as a partiular subset of Bayesian updating [eg [5℄ ℄), Philosophy (in the
form of Rioeur's notion of the hermeneuti ar [114℄), Cognitive siene (where it
ours in both the symbolist and onnetionist theories of mind), Cybernetis (where it
ours within mehanisms suh as simultaneous loalisation and mapping), Linguistis
(where it ours in Pinker's model of language aquisition [105℄) and, nally, Pure-
mathematis (where it an be found at the ore of foundational theories of mathematis,
suh as Chaitin's work on empirial axiom seletion [21℄, that imposes what Hofstadter
[55℄ might desribe as a 'tangled hierarhy' of axiom/theorem relations). The entral,
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paradoxial notion of ognitive self-assessment and modiation impliit in ognitive
bootstrapping might even be seen in more diverse areas, suh as literature
2
. For the
requirements of this survey, we therefore propose that the term ognitive bootstrapping
further serves as an umbrella term for all manifestations of this idea in the various elds.
Cognitive bootstrapping is hene muh more than merely unsupervised ognitive learn-
ing; this would not involve overoming the hiken-and-egg paradox inherent in an
agent with unlimited apaity for forming novel perept ategories with whih to view
the world, nonetheless being able to pereive whether these ategories are representative
or not of the world. (Unsupervised ognitive learning would not require the learner to
interpret sensory data in terms of its lassiation of that same data, and to evaluate
that interpretation in the light of new data gained via that interpretation; unsupervised
ognitive learning has an externally-imposed suess riterion, and an treat the sen-
sory data as being, in a sense, it own ground truth - ognitive bootstrapping, on the
other hand, must treat its own urrent representations as the nearest approximation to
a ground truth, sine these are all that are relevant to it as an embodied and ative
agent, and ondut ognitive updating in terms of these ungrounded representations).
Utilising bootstrapping to overome this paradox requires that we rst obtain an initial
set of low-level perept ategories that we know are 'orret' (whih is to say, represen-
tative) a priori, and only then progressing to higher-levels of the pereptual hierarhy.
This initial ategory set, we shall argue, is the set of Kantian syntheti a priori ognitive
ategories that provide a framework in whih Popperian falsiation of perept ategory
hypotheses an be meaningfully formulated, with high-level perepts onstruted as a
hypothesised onjuntion of low-level perepts. Validation of novel perept hypotheses
is ahieved by 'projeting' them bak into the environment as perept-ation linkages
prediated on the assumption of their representativity. These onjetures hene aumu-
late in omplexity from the initial bootstrap hypothesis, with the bootstrapping agent
alternating between hypothesising and exploration phases in the same manner that an
autonomous mobile robot progressively builds-up and renes its environment map by
utilising the partial maps to further explore the areas of the objetive environment in
whih the map is not yet adequately determined.
The onept of ognitive bootstrapping is thus analogous to the mehanism of semanti
learning that we employ as infants, in whih we must rst obtain a suÆient (bootstrap)
sub-set of words and word-meanings in order to be able to formulate questions onerning
meaning of new words, and thus expand our voabulary indenitely. For an investigator
who observed only the later querying phase of language learning, and inferred that words
and word denitions were only learned through being dened in terms of query-responses
onstruted from other words, the presene of language in any individual would appear
paradoxial (sine the language learner would have had to self-referentially ask for the
2
For instane, in one interpretation of Shakespeare's The Tempest, the key protagonist Prospero
also ats, at a meta-level, as the play's author, determining all of his own and the audienes pereptions
of events within the play. Only by writing himself into the play as an agent, ated upon by the plays
events, rather than simply being their omnipotent initiator and interpreter, is he nally, in the last at,
able to view his narrative pereptions for what they are; merely limited representations of an objetive
world. By testing his pereptions as an embodied agent, Prospero is thus able to overome the paradox
involved in determining the appliability of his own self-determined pereptual ategories and to enter
reality (to the point of addressing the audiene diretly), thereby beoming both author of and ator
within the world (Prospero is hene ommonly identied with Shakespeare, who had both of these
ro^les).
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meaning of query-related words like 'ask' and 'meaning'). The resolution of the paradox
relies, of ourse, on the fat that the initial bootstrap word-set has meanings grounded
both in pereptual orrelations (suh as onomatapeiism) and on priniples of referene
and hypothesis-formation that are 'hard-wired' into the human brain; in eet, an a
priori ategory of word meanings.
0.1.3 The Underlying Argument of the Survey
It is thus evident that, as well as begin a survey of the various ontexts in whih the
ognitive bootstrap mehanism ours, this artile must also serve as an argument for
its appliation to artiial ognition, as well as an argument for the partiular form
that it must take within the eld. Exposition of this argument will our throughout
the whole of the artile, as the requirements imposed upon artiial ognition by the
diering disiplines beome apparent.
In the broadest terms, however, this argument an be speied from both the philo-
sophial and ognitive siene perspetives, and may be summarised briey as follows.
1. The Philosophial Argument As we have indiated, the philosophial argument
of the survey revolves around a entral paradox: how an a ognitive agent apable of
hanging its pereptual ategories (that is, its way of seeing the world) ever validate one
partiular set of pereptual ategories over another? The onept of validation involves,
at the very least, the pereption of the inadequay of one pereived entity in relation to
another; but how an pereptual ategories ever be objets of pereption?
This is not soluble in terms of either the Cartesian or Classial Empiriist shools of phi-
losophy, sine the rst laims ognitive agents annot absolutely validate the existene
of anything beyond their own perepts, and the seond does not reognise the possibility
of the pereptual mediation of the objetive world (objets present themselves as they
are 'in themselves' diretly to ognition).
Kant, however, provides an alternative oneptual framework, asserting that an objet is,
by a priori ognitive neessity, that whih exists outside of an agent's perept domain,
being rather that to whih perepts refer. Perepts hene serve to mediate between
agent and objet, being ruial to their distintion as separate entities. Objets are
thus never pereived by ognitive agents as they are in themselves (being required to
onform to the a priori requirements of pereption): however, nor are they simply
reduible to perepts. Instead, objet onepts are aessible to ognition as ordering
onepts imposed on intuitions (singular, low-level sensory perepts), rather than being
themselves singular perepts: they are (in Kant's jargon) syntheti unities.
These objet onepts are thus of an inherently hypothetial nature, existing beyond
the ertainty of the urrent sensory impressions, serving instead as proposed linkages
between those impressions. Were they onrmable to ognition, however, these objet
onepts would themselves have the status of singular, higher-level perepts, whih
ould in turn serve as the basis for further synthetially unied objet-onepts. Objet
hypotheses thus link lower-level perepts together in a onjetural unity (suh as, for
instane, non-simultaneous perspetives on a disrete three-dimensional objet suh as
a building-brik), and have the apability, if suÆiently validated, to form hierarhies
with the objet hypothesis then referring only to its highest level (for instane, partiular
10
lasses of building made from briks, if the ertainty of the oneption of 'brik' is
suÆiently well established observationally).
However, perepts are (partiularly in the philosophial shool of phenomenology),
linked together via ations. Ations thus inherently have the apability to test ob-
jet hypotheses, falsifying those that do not have pereption-ation results equivalent
to those proposed by the objet hypothesis. Thus, in the above example, we would
need to walk around a building in order to establish whether the entity present to the
senses onforms to our lass oneption. We hene also see that the earlier semanti
bootstrapping example an be made to onform to this framework by imposing the
equivalenes: pereption=word; objet hypothesis=word denition; hypothesis-testing
ation=querying. Ations thus test the onsisteny of observed perept linkages with
respet to the underlying a priori objet onjeture that serves to give unity to our
pereptions (omplementing the a priori unity of the pereiver).
In the Kantian/phenomenologial framework it is thus possible, via this onsisteny
ondition (whih is again, a priori), for an autonomous ognitive agent to update and
validate its own pereptual ategories (whih is to say, engage in ognitive bootstrap-
ping), but only by proeeding via a bottom-up pereption-ation hierarhy built on the
assumption of the a priori referentiality of the lowest level of the agent's perept domain
with respet to the transendental objet, and the a priori onsisteny and relevane of
the lowest-level of the agent's motor spae (so that, for instane, an autonomous robot
is not meaningfully free to query the topology of its motor-spae independently of its
pereptual-spae).
2. The Cognitive Siene Argument From the perspetive of ognitive siene it is
possibly to give an entirely dierent argument for the form that ognitive bootstrapping
must take from that above, but to arrive at exatly the same onlusion. This time, the
argument is framed in terms of the problem of symbol grounding, whih is partiularly
apparent in the onstrution of autonomous artiial agents. An autonomous ognitive
agent is, by denition, one apable of adapting to its in environment in behavioural
and representational terms that go beyond those implied by its initial set of 'bootstrap'
symboli assumptions, in order to nd representations more suited to the partiular
environment in whih the agent nds itself. Doing so neessitates the use of mehanisms
of generalisation, inferene and deision making in order to modify the initial pereptual
symbol set in the light of novel forms of sensory data.
Any representation that is apable of abstrat generalisation is impliitly governed by the
laws of prediate logi. As suh, the generalised entities must observe stritly formalised
laws of interrelationship, and onsequently, in abstrating the symbol set away from the
original set of innate perept-behavioural pairings, are apt to beome detahed from
any intrinsi meaning in relation to the agent's environment. A related diÆulty, known
as the frame problem [82℄, also arises in suh generalised formal domains; it is by no
mean lear whih partiular set of logial onsequenes (given the innite number of
possibilities) that the generalised reasoning system should onern itself with.
There is hene a problem of symbol relevane and 'grounding' unless additional meha-
nisms an be put in plae to form a bridge between the formal requirements of logial
inferene as applied to visual symbols, and the further onstraint of the relevane of this
symbol set to the agent within the ontext of both its goals and the intrinsi nature
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of the environment in whih these goals are to be fullled. In terms of the philosophy
of ognition, this neessitates a move from a Quinean [110℄ to a Wittgensteinian [150℄
frame of referene, in whih symbolmeaning is intrinsially ontextual, and environment-
dependant, rather than being a matter of arbitrary ontologial assumption.
For ognitive agents in the animal kingdom the grounding of symbols is guaranteed by
the mehanism of Darwinian natural seletion; representations that do not meaningfully
and eÆiently represent the survival prerogatives of the agent in the ontext of its envi-
ronment inrease the likelihood of its extintion and geneti removal from the heredity
of future generations [87℄. This mehanism, however, is not readily available to artiial
ognitive agents other than in the ontext of self-repliating agents within a simulated
environment (see eg [127℄ for an overview of this sub-eld).
For artiial ognitive agents embodied within the real world (that is to say, robots), the
form that this symbol grounding framework must take is, by an inreasing onsensus
(eg [78℄, [40℄, [47℄, [63℄), one of hierarhial stages of abstration that proeed from the
'bottom-up'. At the lowest level is thus the immediate relationship between perept
and ation; a hange in what is pereived is primarily brought about by ations in the
agent's motor-spae. This hene limits visual learning to what is immediately relevant
to the agent, and signiantly redues the quantity of data from whih the agent must
onstrut its symbol domain by virtue of the many-to-one mapping that exists between
the pre-symboli visual spae and the intrinsi motor spae [76℄. Thus, for example,
a hypothetial mobile robot engaged in simultaneous loation and mapping (SLAM)
(eg [135℄) might build up a stationary stohasti model of any environmental hanges
that our when not engaged in any diret motor ativity, but swithes to a Markovian
transitional model when engaged in motor ativity, thereby forming a sequene of 'key-
frame' transitions driven by its motor impulses.
The rst level of abstration in the hierarhy thus represents a generalisation of the
immediate, pre-symboli perept-ation relation into the symbol domain. There are
many approahes to ahieving this primary generalisation, for instane: unsupervised
lustering [76℄, invariant subspae fatoring [48℄, onstrutive solid geometry shematis
[22℄. Progressive levels of abstration an be added by similar means, or they might
instead involve higher levels of inferential mahinery, for instane rst order logial
indution for rule inferene, if expliitly asending the Chomsky hierarhy [24℄.
At some level of abstration, ritially, is the onept of objets, haraterised by their
persistene with respet to the agent's ations. Representations above this level are
then haraterised by their objet-entri, rather than agent-entri desriptions (so we
hene move from a perept-ation spae into a region in whih desriptions with formal
equivalents to English terms suh as 'on', 'under', et, an form part of the environment
desription).
We hene end up with a set of high-level, abstrated symbol generalisations whih
are nevertheless grounded in the perept-ation spae by virtue of the intermediate
hierarhial levels. We might thus, for instane, envisage a tennis-playing robot that
has the segmentation of the ball from the bakground at its lowest representative level,
leading into a series of asending representations that umulate in the formal logial
rules of the game of tennis at the most abstrat level of representation.
Suh a hierarhial struture has the further harateristi that higher-level ation im-
peratives (suh as, in our example, 'serving the ball') at to reinfore learning at the
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lower-levels (by providing additional tennis-ball segmentation statistis at the lowest-
level, for instane). When this learning is intentional (suh as when a mobile robot
utilises an inferred high-level environmental representation as a default pereptual hy-
pothesis for interpreting further environment data in order that it an explore poorly
mapped areas, and thereby drive the low-level data olletion proess by whih further
pereptual and environmental model renement is aomplished), the system is then
inherently one of ognitive-bootstrapping.
It is thus apparent that lassial A.I. approahes to artiial ognitive were of limited
suess in that they attempted to build a high-level environmental desription diretly
from the perept spae before going on to onsider agent ations within this model,
rather than allowing this representation to evolve at a higher hierarhial level of the
perept-ation relation [16℄. Representative priorities were thus speied in advane
by the system-builder and not by the agent, meaning that autonomous ageny had to
build its goals and higher-level representations in terms of the assumed representational
modes, with all the redundany that this implied. Furthermore, novel modes of represen-
tation were frequently ruled out in advane by this pre-speiation of sene-desription.
It is hene possible to provide an argument in favour of a hierarhial, bottom-up,
pereption-ation-based approah to the onstrution of artiial ognition from a purely
ognitive-siene-entri perspetive that impliitly inorporates ognitive bootstrap-
ping, but whih is independent of (and therefore omplementary to) the preeding
philosophial argument.
0.2 Organisation
As regards the purely surveying aspet of this artile, we shall nd it worthwhile to
investigate all of the assoiated subjet areas indiated above in some detail, and at an
individual level, in order to summarise relevant bootstrapping researh in the eld of
ognition, artiial and otherwise. This is partiularly so as eah of the areas addresses
very muh the same underlying oneption, but from within the oneptual language of
their respetive underlying elds. It may thereby prove possible to rene our means of
addressing the onept of ognitive bootstrapping further; indeed this proess of arriving
at the entral notion via a series of partial formulations is itself reminisent of ognitive
bootstrapping. The researh proess itself an thus perhaps be onsidered our most
universal exemplar of the ognitive bootstrap tehnique.
Hene, the four priniple parts into whih this survey is divided onern the Philosophi-
al, the Cognitive, the Mathematial and the Computational Siene ontexts of ogni-
tive bootstrapping theory. Later setions of eah of the part-divisions are thus onerned
with examining previous and ongoing eorts to onstrut self-founding artiial ogni-
tive systems within the diering oneptual frameworks. It will be neessary, where
appropriate, to outline artiial ognitive researh that falls into the 'xed-funtion',
non-bootstrapping mould, insofar as it sheds light on our entral onern of self-founding
open-ended ognitive arhitetures.
The overall doument struture, Philosophial: Cognitive: Mathematial: Computa-
tional, is hene one of inreasing speiity, the earlier parts outlining the idea of ogni-
tive bootstrapping in the most abstrat and general terms, with the later parts dealing
with atual issues of implementation. This struture is also, as indiated, imposed out
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internally within eah hapter, giving a onsistent overall ontinuity of format.
Inevitably, boundaries between these subjet-divisions are porous to an extent, with
eah division inluding some elements of the others. We shall therefore, in adopting
the hosen four-fold partitioning, onern ourselves prinipally with the ore ideologial
progressions of the respetive shools, treating any partiular areas of overlap within
their single most representative sphere. The survey is thus far from exhaustive, but
seeks rather to give a representation of the sope of ognitive bootstrapping tehniques
aross the range of aademi disiplines in so far as they have a bearing on the problem
of artiial ognition.
The onlusion setion will draw together these strands, summarising the a priori and
empirial neessities of ognitive bootstrapping, and propose a heklist of elements
neessary to a ognitive arhiteture in order to qualify as one of ognitive bootstrapping.
0.3 A Note On Terminology
In order to onvey as muh as possible to the non-speialist reader, we shall use the
term 'perept' to refer to singular and basi sensory impressions, whether qualia or
more omplex onstruts. The ritial dening aspet of a perept is sensory immediay
and pereived singularity. The term 'perept ategories' shall then denote groupings of
perepts into olletive entities in suh a manner that it an further serve as a singular
perept (by the above denition). Perept ategories are thus pereptual partiulars
existing at hierarhial levels above that of the innate sensory impressions. Hene,
a set of individual perepts onsisting of lled retilinear faets might be olletively
resolved as the perept ategory 'brik', whih in turn might be olletively resolved (as
individual perepts) into the perept ategory 'building'. This may also happen on an
abstrat level, whereby the olletivity of perepts is logial, rather than set theoretial
(as in the above examples). Hene, the perept ategory 'objets whih appear above
other objets' ollets all partiular instanes of the ordered perept pairs x; y where
there exists a relation heightfxg > heightfyg. The terminology is thus general enough
to allow for mehanisms of unsupervised perept lustering as well as logial inferene
in determining new perept ategories.
However, it should be noted that some of the argument of the following artile exists
within an expliitly Kantian framework, where the use of some of these terms is rather
dierent. Speially, in Kantian terms, onepts atively ensure that pereptions on-
form to the ategories, so that objet representations an exist for ognitive agents
in general relationships (spatial, temporal et). A ategory is thus the most basi form
of onept, examples being; quantity, unity, plurality, totality, relation, and ausality.
Intuitions are the passive form of objet representation, onsisting of the partiulars of
sensations. Conepts are thus generalised groupings of intuitions. Of entral importane
is the onept of a transendental objet, whih is an a priori neessity for ognition.
It represents the possibility of an objetive unity of experiene, and is the omplement
of the subjetive unity of experiene, the transendental unity of appereption. It
is not thus a spei objet ('table', hair, et), but rather that whih underlies their
possibility.
Exept for the word 'ategory', whih we reserve for the former and not the latter use,
we shall employ Kantian meanings of terms when within an expliitly Kantian ontext,
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and the ommon, non-speialised meanings of terms when within a general ontext.
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Part II
1 Cognition and its Relation to the Objetive World
The notion that the form of our onsious pereption of the external world is inu-
ened by, or further, is delineated within the terms of the ations that we onjeture are
suessfully performable within it, is ommon to both a number of Twentieth-Century
philosophial shools and to ertain shools of ognitive siene. The last of these we
shall explore in the survey division dealing with the ognitive siene ontext for og-
nitive bootstrapping. The urrent onern shall then be to diretly relate this priniple
to the notion of ognitive bootstrapping in philosophial terms.
Of the philosophial shools that are relevant to our enquiry, it is most partiularly
the areas of phenomenology and ontology (respetively, the study of the relationship
between mental ats and the external world, and the study of the basi ategories
of existing entity), along with their meeting point in hermeneutis (the study of the
interpretation of meaning), upon whih we shall hoose to fous. This latter area of
onvergene is signiant in that it provides a methodologial apparatus for disussion
of the interpretation of symboli mental representations of the underlying physial reality
within the ontext of the projeted ations of the pereptive agent. We are onsequently
able to forge a onnetion between pereption-ation theories of ognitive ageny, and
the nature and grounding of symboli representation.
Hene, we will seek to provide a philosophi grounding for disussion of ognitive boot-
strapping by providing a desriptive basis of the internal and external (or equivalently
subjetive and objetive, or mental and physial) aounts of a ognition in terms of the
interation between the distint ontologial realms. In this way, it beomes possible to
envisage ognitive bootstrapping as providing a onvergent mehanism for meaningful
ognitive ageny within the world, without having to invoke an a priori orrelation be-
tween mental representations and the physial world (a position known historially as
the 'Correspondene Theory of Truth', rst formulated by Aristotle in theMetaphysis).
Following this, the disussion will proeed to attempts by reent thinkers suh as Wino-
grad and Mallory to relate the above onsiderations speially to the eld of artiial
ognition, both in terms of the theoretial possibility of artiial ognition, as well as in
pratial proposals for the implementation of artiially ognitive systems.
Prior to this elaboration it is neessary to give an aount of the lassial view of
ognition as it existed for twentieth-entury philosophers following Kant's 18th entury
revolution in metaphysis. In partiular, we shall fous on the relationship between a
priori knowledge and ognition in the Kantian system, and what impliation this arries
for the possibility of a self-founding pereptual system.
1.1 The Kantian View of Cognition
Kant's philosophial struggle [64℄ was to unite the Enlightenment history of rationalism
with the emerging empirial siene of Newton as outlined in his Prinipia. David Hume
[58℄, representing the Enlightenment tradition, had previously argued that knowledge is
essentially empirial, that is, derived from a ognitive entity's experiene. This stane,
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however, substantially ontradited several entral tenets of Newtonian physis whih
postulated the existene of absolute notions suh as innitesimally divisible partiulate
matter, ausality, xed temporal and spatial dimensionalities and so on, all of whih
were deemed apable of persisting independently of ognition.
Hume had therefore reognised that there must therefore be a distintion between knowl-
edge of partiular ognitive patterns and knowledge of the onepts underlying those
patterns, whih (following Kant) are dubbed 'a priori'. For Hume this knowledge was
derived purely by logial reasoning from absolute priniples; they are, in Kantian terms,
analyti and thus, nally, tautologial, in the sense of being true by virtue of the deni-
tions of the terms involved. Hume's position (though not elaborated in preisely these
terms), was that all a priori knowledge is analyti
3
.
Kant sought to overturn this notion in his Critique of Pure Reason [64℄ by that arguing
the ritial onepts underlying our ognition, suh as the law of ause and eet, were
not analyti but rather syntheti. That is, the laws underlying pereption are neither
logially true nor logially false; they are, in a sense, onstruted and must simply be
assumed to be true in order for ognition to take plae at all. (This notion was to later
resonate with post-Galoisian mathematiians, who noted that the axioms in terms of
whih mathematial reasoning must proeed are impliitly hosen by mathematiians,
and not derived by any prior logial proess).
Kant's quest thus beame one of assessing how a ognitive agent may have syntheti
knowledge that does not nd its basis in empirial observation, in other words how og-
nition omes to inorporate syntheti a priori truths. His answer was essentially that
of post-Galois mathematis, but applied to material reality; we annot ever know the
world as it exists in itself, independently of observation, beause the faulties underlying
ognition ditate the nature of our possible experiene. We annot, to employ one of
his more famous examples, meaningfully oneive of an objet that exists outside of
our neessarily presupposed ognitive ategories of time and spae. Suh an objet may
exist, but its being or non-being ould never be empirially determined, only analyti-
ally onjetured. Sine Kant regarded analysis as a form of tautology; a mere empty
rearrangement of axioms, this was tantamount to denying metaphysis as an area of
enquiry (metaphysis being the study of objets that exist beyond experiene).
This has important impliations for the extent to whih ognition an freely experiene
the world, it that it denies the possibility of a pure, transparent empirial response to
external objets (hene the title of Kant's major work; 'Critique of Pure Reason', where
the 'Pure Reason' in question was Desartes's ogito that ould dedue the absolute
nature of the world from the basi fat of its existene; ogito ergo sum, 'I think therefore
I am'). Human beings may well be apable, in Kant's view, of learning many aspets
of the ontology of the world, but the basi a priori ategories suh as the rule of ause-
and-eet, or the topologial onnetive harater of temporal and spatial events ould
not ever be established by empirial experiene, being rather their preondition.
There is, however, one important sense in whih the Kantian ognitive entity resem-
bles Desartes's; the logial neessity of self-awareness as being prior to, and impliit
in, awareness of any kind. Sine self-modelling is impliit, at some level, in the auto-
updating apabilities of ognitive-bootstrapping, and has also proved demonstrably use-
3
Twentieth entury followers of this position were termed logial positivists, and enjoyed a short-
lived owering, representing the main stream of opposition to Kantian thought in that entury.
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ful in ertain areas of autonomous artiial intelligene (partiularly agent-based A.I.,
for instane [30℄), it is useful here to disuss the nature of self-awareness and its relation
to self-modelling in Kantian terms:
1.1.1 Transendental Unity of Appereption
We have noted that non-analyti onepts not onstrutible from an agent's a priori
ognitive assumptions are ategorised by Kant as metaphysial, and therefore beyond
any meaningful disussion. However there is one important exeption this rule; the
phenomenon of self-awareness.
Hume had previously argued that the self is nothing more that the sum-total of its
pereptions (the bundle theory of the self), in other words, that the ognitive self ould
never be experiened as a single pereption, sine the ognitive-self must neessarily
enompass all of the possibilities of pereption.
Kant's onept of the noumenal world of things-in-themself not aessible to ognition,
but nonetheless extant, gave him the sope to attribute a more substantial nature to
the Humean totality of all (possibilities of) pereptions, with a greater emphasis on its
harater as a unity. Kant named this unity the 'Transendental Unity of Appereption',
the term transendental referring to its, non-pereptible, noumenal nature. This unity
of appereption he deemed to be prior to all other onsiderations in the onstrution
of a ognitive entity, a requirement without whih no form of ognition ould exist.
It is thus even prior to the syntheti a priori onstrutions that ditate the nature of
possible pereption. It should be noted that Kant does not rule out the possibility
of a phenomenal, empirially disoverable 'self', suh as a oneption of ourselves as
oupying a ertain volume and being at a ertain position, he rather asserts that there
is a requirement in all ats of ognition that the self-sameness of the ogito (the 'I am')
be disoverable aross all possible uniations of the experiene.
A strong reading of this priniple would appear to deny any possibility of artiial og-
nition derived by means other than the evolutionary (a self-aware agent ould not in
priniple be onstruted by another self-aware agent beause of the neessarily tran-
sendent nature of the onditions for self-awareness). However, it does not rule out
the building of a self-modelling mahine, whih would, to an observer, be behaviourally
onsistent with the notion self-awareness. For Kant, the issue of its atual self-awareness
ould not, even in priniple, be resolved empirially, and has rather to be regarded as a
metaphysial assertion.
At a weaker and more applied level, this priniple would imply that a roboti agent with
ations governed by, for instane, a nite-state transition model, and apable of learned
responses ould not, even in priniple, disover that ertain of its perepts orresponded
to its own internal state-transition model, unless the apability to distinguish internal
from external states was 'hard-wired' at the outset. Even then, the self-model so gener-
ated ould not be fully isomorphi, given Russell's limits on set self-membership. The
issue is thus somewhat analogous to the halting problem for universal Turing mahines,
in whih it is impossible for a mahine that is emulating itself to be able to disover this
fat, sine this fat exists at a meta-logial level with regard to the logi utilised by the
universal Turing mahine.
The a priori and transendental nature of the unity of appereption thus implies that
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an artiial entity without a pereptual unity speied outside the immediate pereptual
domain annot even appear aware, let alone self-aware, with respet to a transenden-
tally unied observer oupying the same pereptual domain. Instead it would appear
as a onneted ausal sequene of reative events in spae and time without any ausal
unity other than for the observer. Given, however, that suh a speiation does exist,
we an now look more losely at the implied relationship between the ognitive agent
and its ognitive objet.
1.1.2 Objethood
It is not enough for Kant that pure sensory impressions are united in ognition by virtue
of its prior unity, rather it must additionally be the ase that there exists an objetive
orrelate of the subjetive unity of appereption. That is, there must be syntheti
onepts apable of desribing the objetive world that exists outside of ognition, and
to whih ognition refers; that is there must exist objets.
Kant argues that we annot disover the possibility of objethood (whih is to say, the
trans-temporal unity underlying the hanging pereptions of the objet) by observation
alone - this an only be oneived a priori. Hene, ognition must inlude onept of
objets (or at the very least the onept of the temporal persistene of identity) at
the outset. We do not therefore pereive disonneted objet impressions, but rather
unied objets from a partiular perspetive. The objet is then 'transendental' sine
it an never be pereived in its entirety, being rather the unity behind the totality of
perspetives.
It is onsequently notable, and of entral importane for the onstrution of artiial
ognitive agents, that the objet onept, as a unier of disparate pereptions without
being simply their summation (whih would not be an expliit unity), serves to at as
a ompression mehanism for perepts. The a priori requirement of ompat general-
isation of sensory data in a oneptual (and hene non-singularly pereivable) objet
hypothesis is thus also a minimal a priori requirement of for artiial ognition; indeed
any artiial agent employing a many-to-one sensory mapping, or perept lassiation
sheme, fulls this requirement. However, Kantian theory suggests that there must also
be a transendental subjetive unity, whih further requires that the objetive unity tells
us something spei about the subjet. This is only possible if the agent deems itself
to have a partiular relation to the objet onept by virtue of its atual and immediate
subjetive experiene. That is, the agent's pereption must be relative to the proposed
objet unity; in this way the totality of agent perspetives has an a priori unity orre-
sponding exatly with the unity of the objet-onept: agent ations then serve to link
the individual perspetives together.
We illustrate this point shematially in gure 1 by way of ontrast with the Humean
model of ognition; here the Kantian positing of an a priori syntheti transendental
objet impliitly serves to embody the ognitive subjet as a perspetive at a partiular
loation, allowing the ognitive subjet to pereive itself as an a priori unity (the spae
of possible perspetives), in a way that is not possible in the Humean oneption (it is in-
strutive to ompare this gure with that of gure 6 in Granlund's ognitive arhiteture
overview [47℄ for omparison with an artiial ognition-motivated viewpoint).
The priniple of the transendental unity of appereption therefore regards the ontinu-
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Individual realisations of cognitive possibles
LOCATE cognitive subject as a particular
perspective on the transcendental object.
=> Kantian subject is aware of itself implicitly 
     in its representation of the object.
Humean Cognition Kantian Cognition
Individual cognitive realisations Individual cognitive realisations
suggest nothing about cognitive subject
Individual realisations of cognitive possibles
experiencing them.
Cognitive possibles are unified in the transcendental object.
it cannot be perceived as a single percept)
(the object is transcendental because as a UNIFIER of percepts
Both envisage the cognitive
subject in terms of the totality 
of its cognitive possibles.
individual cognitive possibles
cognitive subject
individual cognitive possibles
cognitive subject
 (= non−synthetic unity of cognitive possibles) (= synthetic unity of cognitive possibles)
Figure 1: A Representation of the Distintion Between Humean and Kantian Cognition
in Terms of Spatial Attributes
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ity of perspetives on a transendental objet as itself a transendental objet, and one,
moreover, that is neessarily prior to all ognition. Cognition is therefore inherently
experiened as a loalised, embodied perspetive, that an neither pereive itself nor
its totality of possibilities other than as an abstrat onept. The unity of perspetival
pereptions is thus always a transendental a priori, but one that must nonetheless exist
and give rise to the possibility of objets and perspetives. Kant hene sets out a frame-
work in whih it is possible for a ognitive agent to view the world only in terms of its set
of prior pereptual assumptions but whih nonetheless realises the possibility of obje-
tively validating higher-level ognitive ategories built on these pereptual assumptions
in a manner not available to either the lassial empiriists or to the Cartesians.
Kant's world, in summary, is thus dened by two realms, the phenomenal world of
experiene and the noumenal world of things-in-themselves, inaessible to experiene,
but whose existene (if not nature) is guaranteed a priori by the fat of ognition. Thus,
in ontrast to the Cartesian model in whih they are absolutely distint, the Kantian
oneption of ognition allows for a subjetivity and objetivity that are o-dependant,
and in whih the ognitive subjet is neessarily dierentiated from, but embedded
within, the objetive world. This must then be the starting point of our understanding
of the embodiment of ognition, and the minimal oneptual requirement in terms of
whih we approah the subjet of artiial ognition and ognitive bootstrapping.
1.1.3 Kant and Cognitive Bootstrapping
It might rst appear that the strong Kantian emphasis on prior syntheti knowledge
leaves little room for the ontologial learning required of ognitive bootstrapping. How-
ever, this is not the ase; ertainly an a priori ontology of objet-ognition relations must
be assumed by Kant before more detailed perept ategories an be experiened. These
perept-ategories, though, if suÆiently law-like (suh as, for instane, the tendeny of
spatial perepts to retain their internal morphology under translation) an then, in turn
be used to derive a more omplex ognitive ontology on an empirial basis - a ognitive
ontology, in this ase, of objet relations. Thus a reasoning entity apable of embodying
novel analyti and and syntheti ategories is, in theory, onstrutible, provided that
a minimum underlying a priori ontology has been assumed. The very possibility of
empirial validation of perept/ation ategories thus rests on an a priori foundation of
syntheti ategories; it is these that embody the agent ation potentialities involved in
postulating a perept-ation hypothesis validation experiment of the form:
If pereptual hypothesis H
1
is true then performing ation A
1
will result in observation
O
1
.
If pereptual hypothesis H
2
is true then performing ation A
2
will result in observation
O
2
.
(where the O
n
are the observational states, or perhaps stohasti distributions over
observational states.)
Thus, while it is, in priniple, possible to doubt the urrent perept hypothesis H
1
, it it
not possible in priniple to doubt the ausality impliit in the meta-notion 'performing
a partiular ation results in a partiular pereption'; this is a priori and must be
assumed before the possibility of empirial validation omes into being. Thus, in general,
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while an autonomous ognitive agent may be free to reinterpret the world in the sense
of being able to make an arbitrary hoie of hypothesis, H
n
, by whih the world is
to be interpreted, it is not free to hoose an alternative set of ation primitives to
fA
0
n
g, or an alternative set of sensory primitives to fO
0
n
g, upon whih the higher-level
fA
n
g and fO
n
g are based, and in terms of whih the pereptual validation riterion
is onstruted (and without whih the pereption-ation mapping would be of entirely
arbitrary onstrution)
4
.
For Kant, ognition is thus logially prior to ognitive bootstrapping. However, philoso-
phy following Kant in the Construtive Empiriist [139℄ shool has tended to modify the
above position with respet to the perept-ation relationship, noting that the noumenal
world is apable of being dened existentially and phenomenally in terms of the oa-
sional failures of the perept-ation mapping. In other words, the world as it is in-itself
expresses its nature in terms of the 'resistane' it supplies to our ations (and their
expeted pereptual orrelations). The perept-ation orrelation is thus a translation
between diering ontologial frameworks, in the form of ongoing dialogue of identity
between the ognitive and the environmental that is apable of virtually endless re-
nement. Thus, for the onstrutive empiriists, ognitive bootstrapping is logially
o-equal with ognition.
Further evidene for this position from the ognitive siene eld omes from Winograd
and Flores [146℄ who argue, in ommon with Mead [84℄, that onsious attention omes
about when the already fully automated pereption-ation yles fail to ahieve their
aim. Self-ognition, in the form of a self model is hene also required in order to be
able to asses whether one's pereption-motivated ations have resulted in the expeted
pereptions: a ognitive agent must be able to pereive its ations and pereptions from
a 'third-person' perspetive. As Modayil and Kuipers [92℄ put it; 'bootstrap learning [is
required℄ to move from egoentri ... sub-symboli desriptions to symboli objet-based
desription'.
In other words, the trend has been to make the impliit possibility of ognitive boot-
strapping present in the Kantian system an expliit neessity. Cognitive bootstrapping
in this sense is thus the 'feeding-bak' of an inferred ation hypothesis into the perept
spae in order to rene the hypothesised perept-ation relationship on the basis of the
a priori motor and perept relationships. Post-Kantian metaphysis has thus ome,
inreasingly, to resemble Bayesian statistis, a parallel that will be disussed from the
mathematial point of view in a later setion.
The rst philosophy shool in the Kantian mold, however, to fully expliate the rela-
tionship between phenomena and neumena as a ognitive bootstrap is hermeneutis, the
study of meaning, whih we are now in a position to address:
4
Obvious andidates for fA
0
n
g and fO
0
n
g in human ognition are, respetively, the motor omplex
and the spae of visually-determined body-relative positions.
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2 Hermeneutis: The Hermeneuti Cirle and Cog-
nitive bootstrapping
2.1 Textual Hermeneutis
A very full disquisition on the impliation of hermeneutis for the goal of omputer
omprehension is given in [77℄; we shall here onentrate on those aspets that are
relevant to ognitive bootstrapping.
Hermeneutis emerged initially as the branh of philosophy that deals with textual
interpretation, only later aquiring its interpretation as the branh of philosophy that
onerns the mehanism of human understanding. As regards the former phase, modern
hermeneutis an be onsidered to have begun with Wilhelm Dilthey's methodologial
hermeneutis, whih sought to plae texts within the ontext of their prodution in
order to arrive at a sienti aount of their meanings. The meaning of symboli terms
is thus dependant upon the embodiment of the symbol-manipulating agent within the
objetive world; it annot be onferred by the manipulation of symboli entities in their
own right (without desending into semanti tautology, suh as when attempting to
derive the meaning of every word via ditionary denitions).
When this methodologial approah is translated, as in later shool of hermeneutis,
from the textual domain to the more general domain of human understanding, the ne-
essary situating of the symboli understanding in the objetive world will serve as a
further refutation of Cartesianism, in partiular of the notion that ognition an be de-
ned independently of its ations in the world. Perept and ation are thus odependent
upon eah other in a manner that goes beyond even the position of the onstrutive
empiriists. However, in the former, Diltheyan, terms of referene this priniple of the
embodiment of meaning states that, in order to interpret a body of texts (for instane
the orpus of a single literary era), one must rst understand all of its omponent parts.
However, in order to orretly interpret eah of the onstituent texts one has rst to be
ognisant of the meaning of the whole orpus of texts.
This seeming paradox is reminisent to those resulting from 'tangled hierarhies' in
the domain of logi (of whih many illustrations are given in [55℄). Overoming the
paradox involved, for Dilthey, an initial postulation of individual meaning for eah of
the texts, from whih omposite meanings for a whole body of texts an then be built-
up. These omposite meanings an then be tested for mutual onsisteny, and any
inompatibilities eradiated. In the light of this new, omposite theory the original
texts an be reinterpreted to form a new set of omposite meanings, and so on.
This paradox-resolving movement, from part to whole and bak again, Dilthey hene
desribed as the 'hermeneuti irle'; the rst expliit desription of the mehanism
underlying ognitive bootstrapping. Bootstrapping is thus required in order to arrive at
a onrete theory of textual meaning given that we ould not proeed, in the onventional
logial manner, from initiatory textual meaning omponents, sine the meaning of these
omponents (the individual texts of the orpus) are themselves subjet to the nal
interpretation arrived at with regard to the entire orpus; the pereptual 'zeitgeist' of a
partiular era (as expressed by the summation of its texts) is required order to interpret
any individual text.
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The 'hermeneuti irle' of interpretation is thus to simply propose any a priori-plausible
initial set of omponent meanings (for instane, a ore set of words of known anient-
meaning with modern-day meanings attributed to the remainder), and arry out a read-
ing of the entire orpus of work in order to arrive at an overall interpretation. This
olletive understanding is then utilised to reinterpret the omponent texts in the on-
text of the whole. These reinterpreted omponent texts are utilised to arrive at a new
extrapolated interpretation of the orpus. It is hene taitly understood (though not
explained) by Dilthey that this endlessly reiterated proess will ahieve a degree of
onvergene on a nal, stable meaning set.
Dilthey thus proposes the progressive, iterative testing and renement of hypotheses
of interpretation in relation to a xed set of texts (although expliit expression of the
hermeneuti irle in these Popperian [108℄ terms was not to our until Rioeur). The
total orpus is hene understood to have suÆient onstraint information to x its own
meaning given an initially dened subset, in the same way that we an learn the meaning
of every word in a ditionary on the proviso that we have independent lexial knowledge
suÆient to understand at least a 'ritial mass' of word denitions.
It is thus understood impliitly in the interpretative proess that at least some word
meanings are known relatively well in advane; our initial meaning hypothesis should be
at least partially aurate, or else ontain a suÆient quantity of a priori orret word
meanings as to prevent divergene of the proess along arbitrary lines. Dilthey assumes
that the hermeneuti irle of interpretation is eetive beause of our partially-shared
interpretative framework (both soially and historially) with the original authors of the
historial texts.
2.2 Non-Textual Hermeneutis
In terms of the wider ontext of hermeneutis, onerned with human understanding in
general rather than merely the subset assoiated with language, the analogous problem
is how we arrive at our initial oneption of the objetive world, and moreover, how we
ome to be sure of its auray.
Kant's oneption of syntheti a priori onepts provides us with the beginnings of an an-
swer; we an be sure of the partial validity of our initial world model beause it is already
impliit in ognition; the fundamental ordering onepts of time, spae, spatio-temporal
ontinuity et, are not testable hypothetial propositions, they are rather givens in terms
of whih we onstrut our hypotheses. We may thus make onjetures about the nature
and existene of a partiular objet, whih may later prove to be false, but we annot
question the existene of the possibility of objethood.
Our initial hypothesis in any appliation of the hermeneuti irle of interpretation to
our understanding of the world in general will thus always be in terms of the guaran-
teed validity of our immediate temporal/spatial pereption omponents. Hypothetial
onjetures are thus onstruted in terms of the extrapolation of these oneptions.
(Hene, I an form onjetures about the partiular sene I would view on opening a
door, but not about the spatiality of the area on the other side of the door, upon whih
this depends). Conjetures are thus always grounded by the invariants of the a pri-
ori ognitive onstraints: onvergene of the hermeneuti irle of human ognition is
thus always a possibility; the onstraint information impliit in (for instane) a xed
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spatial dimensionality and topology is suÆient to prevent divergene in the range of
possible hypothetial onstruts. It is hene in this sense that the hermeneuti irle
(as an ativity rather than a tangled hierarhy of denition) is a mehanism of ognitive
bootstrapping.
Within these later shools of hermeneutis that deal with the wider eld of human un-
derstanding, two distint branhes, in partiular, are evident: ontologial hermeneutis
and phenomenologial hermeneutis (whih relate to their two respetive philosophial
shools). Ontology, the study of things as they exist in themselves, we have disussed
in Kantian terms above. Phenomenology, in ontrast to ontology, purports to study the
essene of things as they appear to ognition. First introdued by Edmund Husserl in
his 'Ideas: A General Introdution to Pure Phenomenology' [60℄, phenomenology thus
seeks to intentionally 'braket' the problem of the nature of atual existents in order to
arrive at the pure study of sensation).
In regard to hermeneutis these two shools of thought are exemplied by the respetive
gures of Heidegger and Rioeur. They both seek to omprehend the relationship be-
tween mental representation and the world in terms of their interation: however they
dier in terms of the nal grounding of the interation.
For Rioeur, in refutation of the Cartesian aount, ognition is essentially embodied in
the world as a onsequene of its self-hood; ognition requires both self-identity aross
spae and time as well as ausal poteny in order to exist at all. These onditions an
only be fullled by an agent onstruted of the same matter with whih it interats.
Rioeur thus identies a hermeneuti ar (f [41℄) that extends the notion of the hermeneu-
ti irle introdued by Dilthey. This ar is then a two-fold movement that inorporates
the hermeneuti irle of Dilthey as its rst moment, orresponding to the transition
from internal representation to objetivity. As the seond moment of the ar, represent-
ing the transition from objetivity to subjetivity, he identies the struturalist aount
of the (not neessarily just linguisti) world whih that relies on the pre-understanding
(ie a priori understanding) of the agent for its interpretation. Thus a purely positional
aount of the distribution of matter in a room only gains meaning when interpreted in
terms of an agent with ertain potentialities. For instane an objet suh as a srew-
driver gains it meaning by virtue of being a tool that may (via an embodied ausal
agent) at upon other objet in a partiular manner. An agent with a very dierent
asual apaity (for instane one laking hands) would neessary pereive the srew-
driver in a dierent fashion. By taking the objetive desription of the world (as near
as we an approximate it) as a starting point, we an arrive at a desription of ourselves
as an embodied perept-ation omplex (of the kind that is neessarily not apparent
to us in purely perept terms). The hermeneuti ar is thus an alternating movement
between perept-ation hypothesis formation/testing, and self-modelling in terms of the
'objetive' world in order to arrive at a desription of our asual apaities for further
hypothesis formation.
This is hene, one again, a true ognitive bootstrapping theory; however, unlike the
hermeneuti irle idea of Dilthey, self-modelling is absolutely entral to the proess.
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2.3 The Neessity of Embodiment
For Heidegger [53℄ this tendeny to regard pereptions as being supervened upon by
ation possibilities reahed its apotheosis. He proposed, in his ontologial hermeneutis,
that one's sensations are ompletely dened by one's ats and one's possibilities.
Heidegger thus envisaged our immediate sensation as being based on instrumentality
(Vorhanden), in whih for instane, our pereption of a pen would be fully determined
by our possibilities of using it, in partiular our possibility of using it to write, with
further soial and ontextual signiation resting on what we may hoose to write.
Thus, the entirety of our being is employed in the pereption of the pen, rendering
the notion of an abstrat mental plane of representations outside of pereption entirely
superuous.
This notion also extended to the derivation of the objets of siene (Zuhanden) from
the praxial knowledge of ation. Objetive knowledge is thus abstration from pratial
knowledge, and not its preursor. Relative to Rioeur, Heidegger's position is hene the
stronger of the two, in that it argues that the totality of performable ations represents
the fundamental mode of being of the intelligible world, rather than merely its appear-
ane. In asserting that knowledge is intentional, there is hene a omplete rejetion
of the notion that knowledge is representational; this is merely an artifat of dualis-
ti Cartesian thought that falsely separates the body from the self in order to build a
theoretially sound model of the world originating in the ogito ergo sum.
Ultimately, like his followers Sartre [119℄ and Merleau-Ponty [85℄, Heidegger was lead
by this reasoning to deny the possibility of braketing a pereptually independent onto-
logial existene altogether. The agent's being, as opposed to the world's thus beomes
the fundamentally irreduible entity from whih everything else (both their existene
and their essene) is derived (being's orollary, non-being, or absene, being responsible
for the neessarily non-present possibilities that give sensations their overall pereptual
ontent). Only when ation hypotheses fail to aount for our perepts, do we, as it
were, 'stand bak' from our pereptions and form a onept of objetive existent inde-
pendent from our selves; in the usual run of things objets are transparent to us - we
only pereive our own potentialities unless these fail to be realised as expeted.
There is hene in Heidegger's work, an impliit ontologial hermeneuti irle, in whih
the phenomenologial pereption of our possibilities an be transended in order to arrive
at a pseudo-objetive aount of the world. However, unlike in Dilthey's aount, this
proess an never be fully ahieved in order to arrive at the absolute ontologial existent
(suh a nal sienti aount); we must still dene objetivity in terms of our failed
ation hypothesis (or perepts). Thus, in Heideggerian terms, we would dene matter
as that whih resists our attempt to move it, giving it a degree of independene from our
potentialities. In no way, however, is it possible to eliminate all aspets of the immedi-
ate presentation of the objet to our ation-potentialities from the objet's desription
(as might, for instane, be terminologially diserned in the apparently sientially-
objetive desription of objet inertia as being resistane to ation, whih is to say the
onept of inertia is inherently agent-relative). The bootstrap proess of aounting for
the world objetively must thus begin with our own immediate sensations, the end-point
of our endeavour being hene to eliminate this immediay and agent-entriity at some
(inevitably innitely reeding) point.
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The ontologial hermeneuti irle may thus only be asymptotially onvergent: we an
arrive at progressively more objetive desription of the world, but we never arrive at
a fully objetive ontology (whih would, for Heidegger, equate to a desription of pure
being). Transendene of the subjetive view-point (suh as onstitutes the endeavour of
siene) is thus possible, but never fully ompletable. In Nagel's deliberately paradoxial
terms [95℄ the nal, but unahievable, goal of any objetive aount of the world is to
desribe the 'view from nowhere', that is, an agent-entri desription without agent-
embodiment.
It is lear that these philosophial aounts of ognitive bootstrapping in terms of the
hermeneuti irle have a bearing on the nature and possibility of open-ended artiial
ognition. We would therefore, in the next but one setion, like to determine preisely
what form these limitations take. First, however, we would like to onsider the possibility
of ontology-free ognitive bootstrap models.
2.4 Ontology-Free Views of Embodied Cognition and the Pos-
sibility of Cognitive Bootstrapping
The ognitive models we have addressed thus far have been haraterised by their on-
tologial assumptions; they have all been required to make a presumption as to the
underlying nature of reality in order to either to aount for the existene of ognition,
or to posit a spei ognitive mehanism. This underlying nature must then onstrain
the possibilities of what ognition an be of.
Other shools, however, have rejeted this notion and sought to build ognitive mod-
els without signiant a priori ontologial struture, two signiant exponent of this
strategy being Quine and Wittgenstein.
2.4.1 Quine
Quine proposed a form of ontologial relativism [109℄ in whih it is impossible to fully
onstrain the underlying nature of reality by empirial or sensory data (sine an innity
of equally valid interpretations or onsistent theories are possible for a given sensory
input). Quine therefore views ognition's positing of external objet-entities as hav-
ing no neessary orrelation with realty (as Kantian theory insists upon), being rather
onvenient assumptions that have served to link sensory data together in the past, and
whih have no guarantee of utility in the future.
Part of being a ognitive agent is thus to aknowledge the endless potential falsiability
its oneptions, whih are thus a matter of historial ontingeny serving to favour one
set of ategorial assumptions over the innity of alternatives. For a ognitive agent to
hold any oneption of the world is thus merely for it to have had a partiular history;
there is no possible priniple underlying the formation of general priniples from spei
examples (suh as Oam's Razor). If any suh method has had any suess in the past,
this is purely a produt of the ognitive agent's partiularly irumstanes (for example,
there is no a priori reason why the world should be, at base, simple rather than omplex,
and hene no a priori reason why Oam's Razor should always be eetive).
Embodiment of the agent at a partiular time and plae is thus, for Quine, the only
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possible basis for ognition (ognition being the holding of generalised oneptions of the
world). A ognitive entity without a history has no means for distinguishing between
possible ontologial onepts.
Quine's view is hene, to a degree, inompatible with the idea of ognitive bootstrapping,
sine, without an a priori method of onstraining possible ognitive ategories in the
light of sensory data, no non-arbitrary method of ahieving a nal onvergene of the
pereptual model is possible. Arguments against Quine's view are given at various points
in the Cognitive Siene and Mathematis survey divisions. We thus, for instane, argue
with Millikan [87℄, [88℄ and Levin [72℄ that there is an a priori argument to be made for
Oam's Razor, and hene with Kant for the existene of prior (non-empirially justied)
ontologial struture. We thereby provide a grounding for the onvergene mehanism
that onstitutes a ritial aspet of ognitive bootstrapping, whih, otherwise, would be
groundless and the mehanism onsequently divergent.
2.4.2 Wittgenstein
An ontologially neutral approah to philosophy that is ompatible with ognitive boot-
strapping is that outlined in Wittgenstein's Philosophial Investigations [150℄. Here
Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of any word is exatly its use in the language.
Coneptions of mind, onsiousness, ognition, et should not involve the postulation of
entities that are beyond atual experiene, but rather refer to the way in whih we use
the terms in daily life. Meaning is hene dependant on the environmental ontext; a
partiular disposition of neurons in the brain, or even symbols within an abstrat mental
spae annot, in themselves, aount for it. It is hene not thus possible to have a private
language, sine word meaning is established only by prior agreement between diering
linguisti agents; indeed the onept of meaning (signiation) as separate from the word
(as sign) refers only to this wider soial ontext of word usage by mutual agreement.
Our understanding of a language hene grows and modies with our understanding of
the way people at in relation to it; what Wittgenstein alls the 'language game'. A
prior, formal abstration of the rules of language (syntax, grammar) et is thus not
possible.
The proess of learning a language is hene a ognitive bootstrap, in that we arrive
at meanings only by performing experimental ations within an environment. The only
way we know that our oneption of the word 'bridge' is the same as another agent's is to
establish whether they at exatly as we would in relation to sentenes that use the term.
Only by repeated hypothesis formation and testing (whih is to say by ommuniating)
an we beome ondent that this is the ase. Any initial language onjeture an be
used to bootstrap the proess; we might subsequently disover that our use of the word
'bridge' orresponds to that of 'rossing' in the other agent's usage, but, beause of the
similarity in meaning, this an only be established after onsiderable interation in a
variety of situations.
This bootstrapping proess an reasonably be alled ognitive in Wittgenstein's 'lan-
guage game' onjeture beause the notion of a private sensation is just as inadmissible
as that of a private language. All apparently mental sensations (suh as thoughts, feel-
ings et) are, for Wittgenstein, as muh a matter of ontextual denition as are words.
There is hene, as anti-Cartesians have termed it, no 'Cartesian Theatre' in whih exter-
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nal impressions are presented to onsiousness. Cognition is hene only ever a linguisti
bootstrapping proess between agents embodied within a ommon world.
2.5 Impliations for the Ahievability of Artiial Cognition
2.5.1 Theoretial Impliations: The Very Possibility Of Artiial Cognition
The aount of ognition given by Heidegger and Sartre might thus appear to rule the
possibility of artiial ognition, seeing ognition as something irreduible, related to
(or even equivalent to) existene, and thus prior to any partiular existents (suh as
neuronal strutures). Both also see self-awareness as inseparable from awareness in gen-
eral, having an a priori relationship with it. This latter relationship, however, should
be suseptible to simulation via the more ontologially-neutral onept of self-referene.
We might thus not be able, even in priniple, to reate an awareness along the lines pro-
posed by the phenomenologists (or at least the existential phenomenologists), but we
might, at least, be able to emulate its behaviour via formal self-referene. An extended
disussion of the relationship between self-referene, dened in formal (Godelian) terms,
and self-onsiousness, dened in the existential phenomenologial terms of Heidegger
and Sartre is given in [142℄. Wittgenstein, we have seen, would not regard this dis-
tintion between onsiousness and onsious behaviour as linguistially (and therefore
metaphysially) signiant.
More reently, one of the more persistent ritis of the idea of artiial ognition is
Dreyfus [28℄, who argues that the Representational Theory of Mind (in whih the mind
performs permutations of representations of the outside world) fails to take aount of
the ontextuality, relevane and holism of pereption. Disrete, atomi symboli om-
putation annot aount for the immediay of the the ognitive situation (in a similar
vein to Searle's famous Chinese Room ounterargument [123℄ to the proposal of strong
A.I.). He suggests that only embodiment an provide a semantis of ordinary meaning,
whih left to symboli omputation alone would ollapse into merely empty syntati
onsiderations. Moreover, this syntax, even if it existed, ould never be available to
ognition without involving problems of innite regress. Thus, there an be no 'algo-
rithm' underlying ognition whih we ould isolate and implement; only the situated,
symbol-manipulating agent with an atual, sensible onnetion to the world an be truly
ogent. The world, in eet, provides the 'being' behind the insubstantial formal ate-
gorisations of mind. Artiial ognition might thus exist, but not in any systematially
per-formalisable way.
Suber [132℄ makes the argument that if mind an be expeted to emerge from ompu-
tation alone, then we should reasonably expet that semantis an emerge from syntax
alone. However the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem of the branh of mathematis known
as model theory demonstrates that even syntati speiations with an innite ar-
dinality are inapable of uniquely determine a onrete, existing model. A very large
degree of semanti ambiguity would therefore appear to be assoiated with any nitely
formalisable set of syntati rules, with the orresponding diÆulty that this implies for
the grounding of any putative 'laws of ognition' without a orresponding embodiment.
A similar view is given by Winograd in [147℄ who argues that the fallay of ognitive
objetivism (the view that ognition an be tangibly formalised) is aused by overly
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formal logial struture of early attempts at simulated ognition (for instane his own
SHRLDU algorithm, whih is apable of passing the Turing test for intelligent behaviour
provided queries are restrited to the very limited but omplete ontology of it's inter-
nally represented world of Platoni solids and their transformations). Winograd argues
that formal ompleteness of the logial system in whih an agent is embodied is never
available to that agent as a demonstrable fat (this would, in eet, onstitute a Godel
proposition [46℄). Instead the embodied agent an only alloate nite and partial re-
soures to omprehending the world. This naturally leads him to abandon the notion
of formally losed ontologies in any world desription given by an agent; world desrip-
tions have only to be (and indeed an only be) loally, and not globally, valid. Thus
an artiially onstruted ognitive agent is feasible in pratise, but must neessarily
be of an open-ended design (although he was later with Flores to rejet this possibility
[146℄, arguing, in ommon with Smythe [128℄, that any physially existing devie for
formal symbol manipulation annot have any intrinsi meaning outside of that given to
it by a subjetive, situated agent; hene a omputer program a performs a 'task' with
'goals' only if we so designate it. He does not, however, disuss the possibly that goal-
diretedness might originate mehanistially via Darwinist imperatives: feeding, mating
et - eg. [87℄, [88℄).
Hermeneuti onsiderations would thus appear appear to rule out the possibility of for-
malisable ognition, any apparent mental semantis attributed to artiial ognition
atually relying upon inanalyti or meta-theoretial notions of meaning. However, both
of the preeding objetions to the notion of artiial ognition may be met by on-
sidering only roboti systems equipped with ognitive bootstrapping mehanisms. The
fatual embodiment of the robot in the world meets Dreyfus's objetions on the se-
manti grounding issue, and the inlusion of ognitive bootstrapping serves to overome
Winograd's objetion on the grounds of logial losure. (While the initial stage of the
ognitive bootstrap would of neessity be logially systemati, for instane a pereptual
ontology built-up from Platoni solids, there is no impliit neessity that it would re-
main so during the iterative phase. Cognitive bootstrapping requires that we subjet the
initiatory hypothesis to empirial onrmation: relative to the level at whih we speify
the a priori ognitive struture, whih must be logially losed, higher-level hypothesis
an, if neessary, relax the onditions of model onsisteny. For example, it might prove
useful for an embodied robot to employ separate, only partially onsistent environment
maps for dierent aspets of a navigation problem: the topology of spae in whih the
map-hypotheses are tested must be a formally onsistent one, however).
Given, then, that it is possible, in priniple, for artiial systems to overome the para-
doxes of embodied ognition via the hermeneuti irle, it shall be instrutive to survey
extant mehanisms for ahieving this expliitly. (Other setions are, of ourse, also on-
erned with the utilisation of the hermeneuti irle as a mehanism for rening meaning
in the generalised, pereptual, sense; we here limit our attention to those implementa-
tions that onern hermeneutis diretly).
2.5.2 Pratial Impliations: Real World Implementation of the Hermeneu-
ti Cirle
A diret appliation of the hermeneuti ar theory within a omputational environment
may be found in [143℄. This work onerns the onstrution of a software system, CIRAS,
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for the logging and analysing of ondential aident reports with a view to extrating
the signiant risk fators. As suh, it involves a transition from the qualitative to the
quantitative realm, from the subjetive individual aounts to an objetive quantiation
of risk (at no stage is there any plausible aess to a 'ground truth' fatuality beause
of lient ondentiality). CIRAS hene initiates a ognitive bootstrapping proess by
whih an aident investigator is presented with an aident report and asked for an
initial aident summary in terms of ertain pre-existing asual lasses (for instane
'ignoring a danger signal'), onstituting an objetive!subjetive phase. These lasses
are dened so as to be to be mutually exlusive and exhaustive.
The hermeneuti ar then moves into its subjetive!objetive phase by instigating a
'struturalist' aount of proeedings and dening asual struture on a word-by-word
level. Thus, at the software's prompting, the report is broken down (enoded) into
individual subjet/objet/ation substrutures ('lose-reading') relating to the overall
ategorisations, and impliitly supplied with a subjetive 'probability' assessment that
individual elements may be so ategorised. The douments are then reread within this
format as a whole and the overall lassiation sheme reevaluated in this light. If it is
indeed found neessary (through a umulative impression of the subjetive probabilities)
to modify the lassiation struture, a new set of riteria is seleted and the proess is
repeated. The user an then determine at what stage onvergene is ahieved. Proof that
that these onvergenes are objetive rather than subjetive is supplied by onordane
data between fully independent CIRAS users; the agreement rate is found to be 71.73
perent in empirial trials.
CIRAS might thus best be desribed as a 'omputer-aided' ognitive bootstrapping
methodology, whih still, nonetheless requires humans as the mediating agent within the
hermeneuti irle. The possibility of a fully physial implementation of the hermeneuti
irle is a entral onern of Bitbol [8℄, who argues that the ounterintuitive qualities of
quantum mehanisms an be explained in terms of a partiular variant on the hermeneu-
ti irle, the 'epistemologial irle'.
Here, situated agents instead of freely forming symboli representation of external re-
ality as in lassial physis, enter rather into a omposite relational system. Symbol
representations exist only in so far as the agent an unvaryingly sustain them. However,
the only invariant of quantum-mehanial ognitive agents is their own self-sustaining
dynamial organisation. Thus, their ognitive domain is not a representation of what is
external and pre-existing, but rather a fration of the environment that is o-eval with
them, within whih their organisation an persist.
Self-organised agents (whih an be ompared with the non-quantum autopoeti agents
of Maturana and Varela [80℄ below) do not, then, possesses a faithful piture of the world,
but rather only pereive notions relating to maintaining their internal self-onsisteny
in relation to environmental disturbanes. Eah individual is thus, in Bitbol's usage,
an eigenbehaviour, or an attrator (in the non-linear systems sense) for the dynamis of
the autopoeti unit.
Hene, a lassially embodied system implementing Newtonian physis and Boolean
logi (suh as those onstitutive of onventional robotis) ould not properly implement
the epistemi irle of ognition (sine its internal ordering is externally speied); only
a fully quantum-mehanial ould ever ahieve this. Classial systems, Bitbol argues,
annot thus be onsidered truly ognitive beause they impliitly assume an unbridgably
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dualisti relationship between subjet and objet, whereas quantum theory is inherently
monadi
5
.
Thus, while suh a ognitive entity may oneivably evolve, it annot neessarily be
onstruted, given quantum-mehanial unertainty relations. As we have seen, however,
it is important to realise that this, and other theories similarly pessimisti with regard to
the possibility of building ognitive entities, does not neessarily prelude the possibility
of ahieving a behavioural isomorphism between ognitive and non-ognitive entities.
The goals of artiial ognition might thus be more modestly formulated in terms of
onrete behavioural attainments, rather than the abstrat one of ahieving 'ognition'.
This is the mentality underlying the Turing Test [138℄, whih sought to move away from
arguable and abstrat riteria of ognitive ahievement in preferene to human-supplied
behavioural assessments (we know when we observe intelligent behaviour, even if we
annot dene it in the abstrat). Given Wittgenstein's 'ordinary language' oneption
[149℄ of meaning, this may in fat onstitute the only meaningful option for ognitive
assessment.
Other researhers, however, do not see any neessity for invoking quantum mehanis in
order to implement the hermeneuti irle; ompare the previous quantum mehanial
desription of ognitive bootstrapping with that of Varela's (not expliitly ognitive)
desription of Autopoiesis in a Newtonian, biologial environment:
\Autopoiesis attempts to dene the uniqueness of the emergene that produes life in
its fundamental ellular form. It's spei to the ellular level. There's a irular or
network proess that engenders a paradox: a self-organising network of biohemial
reations produes moleules, whih do something spei and unique: they reate a
boundary, a membrane, whih onstrains the network that has produed the onstituents
of the membrane. This is a logial bootstrap, a loop: a network produes entities that
reate a boundary, whih onstrains the network that produed the boundary. This
bootstrap is preisely what's unique about ells. A self-distinguishing entity exists
when the bootstrap is ompleted. This entity has produed its own boundary. It
doesn't require an external agent to notie it, or to say, "I'm here." It is, by itself, a
self- distintion. It bootstraps itself out of a soup of hemistry and physis."
(in [14℄)
Cognition in autopoieti agents is hene self-derived, and reets the distintion of agent
and surroundings impliit in the autopoieti proess.
Other lassially realisable implementations of the hermeneuti irle inlude that of
Winston [148℄, who proposes a textual system that learns by formal analogy (rather
than strit dedution on the basis formal ontent). Furthermore, it learns rules on basis
of its prior experiene (onstraint desription in understood domains being utilised to
onstrain desriptive possibilities in unexplored domains). Novel hypothesis are hene
suggested by the analogial proess and submitted to the experimental environment for
5
Penrose [101℄ also gives arguments against Newtonian models of ognition in favour of quantum og-
nitive models on the grounds of our apparent, (though generally disputed), super-Turing omputational
abilities onneted with our ability to omprehend Godel's theorem. A ounter argument employing
similar meta-logial argumentation but asserting that Newtonian (or Newtonian-like) physis an an
implement ognition is given by [99℄. In this ase, the requisite hyper-omputation is made possible by
the exeption of the Newtonian lass of physial models from standard set-theoretial onstraints, suh
as in postulating the existene innite elds of real numbers.
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testing. Flexibility in the degree of mathing insisted upon between the novel experi-
mental domain and the previously experiened and understood domains are essential to
the learning proess; an analogy is only an analogy to the extent that it is not an isomor-
phism. Hypotheses hene serve, as muh as anything else, to onstrain the parameter
freedom of the novel domain's searh spae.
Hene, in so far as this proess involves an initial (possibly arbitrary) assumption of
formal ategorisation, and furthermore has the apaity to reevaluate its initial ategor-
ial assumptions on the basis of new knowledge developed in other domains via analogy
with this initial domain, the system may be regarded as implementing a hermeneuti
irle (although Winston does not desribe it in these terms). Critially, the system is
apable of evolving toward a onvergent world understanding irrespetive of the prior
assumptions with whih it is initiated by virtue of having the possibility of questioning
those assumptions in the light of later knowledge (even though this knowledge is built
on those assumptions).
Like all true hermeneuti irles, it is the existene of ontologial interdependene be-
tween part and whole (or in this ase, form and ontent) that permits the possibility of
bootstrapping an 'objetive' set of pereptual states.
A somewhat similar approah is proposed by Bobrow and Winograd in [10℄ who, in
addressing the onerns highlighted in the previous setion, propose Knowledge Rep-
resentation Language as a mehanism for apturing relations in human speeh. Here,
entities are desribed in terms of their relationships to other entities (prototypes), whih
an be understood as providing a perspetive on the item under onsideration. Typi-
al properties of prototypes (whih are eetively lass medians) are assumed in the
absene of observational information; however further observational information serves
to reevaluate the prototypes in terms of whih the observations are themselves made,
thereby implementing a bootstrap ognition proess. The system thus attempts to al-
loate nite omputational resoures eetively in order to determine an appropriate
non-formal logi for a situated agent, whih may thus be onsidered to onstitute an
embodied instantiation of the hermeneuti irle.
2.6 Summary of Division
We have thus, in this survey division, determined that the hermeneuti irle of per-
eptual meaning onstitutes a partiular instantiation of our notion of ognitive boot-
strapping, in whih the originary assumptions behind pereption are subjet to reinter-
pretation in terms of pereptual experiene built upon those same assumptions, subjet
to the onstraints imposed on ognition by the a priori Kantian laws that underly the
possibility of meaningful, and onvergent, ognitive reassessment. We have also looked
at the feasibility of implementing partiular instanes of the hermeneuti irle in the
real world, detailing several spei approahes.
In the next part we take a more applied view, and look at ognitive bootstrapping from
the perspetive of ognitive-siene.
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Part III
3 General Cognitive Siene
3.1 Introdution
Cognitive siene may be dened as the division of siene speially onerned with
mehanisms of ognition; as suh, it touhes upon ognitive psyhology, ognitive lin-
guistis, omputer siene, neurosiene and the philosophy of mind (in so far as it is
empirially veriable). The entral notion that distinguishes this part of the survey from
the others is hene this notion of empiriism, speially the possibility of veriation
(or at least falsiation) of spei mehanisms of mind.
In the following setions we onsequently fous on the two broad divisions within the
subjet of ognitive siene, the symboli and the onnetionist, detailing some of the
manifestly ognitive-bootstrapping mehanisms that appear within the two subjet di-
visions. We follow this with a setion fousing on the neessity and signiane of
embodiment within ognitive siene.
This will then provide the basis, in the nal setion of this division, for our predominant
onern within the eld ognitive siene; omputational linguistis, whih enompasses
both symboli and onnetionist onerns, providing models of pereption that are both
emergent and formally representational, but whih maintain empirial objetivity by
virtue of having arisen in the ontext of ommuniation between agents.
The onsequent fous in this latter setion on the apability of ognitive bootstrapping
mehanisms to generate linguisti meaning in a ontextually renable fashion is hene
intended to omplement the disussion of hermeneutis that took plae in the previous
philosophial division of the survey.
3.2 Approahes to Cognitive Siene
A entral onern within ognitive siene is to determine whether human mentation is
to be interpreted as the ation of a large olletion of individual omputational elements
(neuronal models, derived from physiologial knowledge of the human, mammalian and
reptilian brains), or whether it is to be interpreted at a higher level in terms of repre-
sentations or shema. These two shools are respetively labelled the onnetionist and
the symboli.
This distintion of approah is perhaps best reeted in their respetive attitudes to-
wards simulation of the human mind, both within the eld of ognitive siene as well
as in the orrelated engineering disipline of mahine learning. Simulation of mental
states is thus arried out either via emulation of large numbers of individual neurons, in
whih ase we expet mental properties to arise as emergent properties, or else the sim-
ulation is exeuted at the shemati or representational level, in whih ase the atual
underlying omputational mehanis are of no inherent signiane. In the former ase,
simulation is independent only of the underlying omputational substrate (a logial unit
an equally well be enated by a radio-valve as a transistor), in the latter ase simulation
is independent of the partiular omputational implementation of the representational
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algorithm.
The ognitive bootstrap mehanism identifyably exists within both of these sub-disiplines
of ognitive siene, the partiulars of whih are respetively outlined in the following
two subsetions.
3.2.1 Cognitive Bootstrapping in Symboli Aounts of Human Cognition
A entral problem for symboli interpretations of ognitive psyhology is to apture the
fat the mental formalisms must be simultaneously both omputational and represen-
tational; that is mental symbols must be manipulable by logial rules and also apable
of referring to aspets of the world. Newell and Simon [98℄ were the rst both to posit
and to propose a solution to this problem from the perspetive of ognitive psyhology,
entring on the onept of physial symbol systems. Here, physial relations (proximi-
ties, ausalities and so on) provide the referential basis for symbol strutures expressed
within the brain.
Environmental adaptation (through Darwinian natural seletion) is onsequently the
assumed ageny onstraining the formal symbol struture to mimi the physial envi-
ronment (or at least those aspets of it that are relevant to the survival of the symboli
agent) within the Newell and Simon model. This aspet of the symboli aount was
further brought out by Pinker and Bloom in the ontext of language evolution [106℄,
who argued that 'grammar is a omplex mehanism tailored to the transmission of
[physially representable℄ propositional strutures through a serial interfae', the serial
interfae being the voal ommuniation hannel.
It would therefore appear, in suh physially-based aounts of symboli ausality,
that the representativity of mental symbols is haraterised by their apaity to ensure
the ontinuing existene of the symbol-manipulating agent (or at least its genetially-
ontiguous progeny). Thus, while the symboli manipulation system may be ompletely
formal, the representativity of the symbols in the symboli aount is ontingent and
environmentally determined.
In this wider ontext, the partiular symboli model proposed by Newell and Simon an
then be onsidered expliitly one of ognitive bootstrapping in the sense that world-
model updates are ahieved via geneti variations through mutation or sexual repro-
dution (equating to the hypothesis updating stage of ognitive bootstrapping), and
are heked for their referening ability by empirial pratise in terms of the agent's
attempts to survive within the environment (the hypothesis veriation stage). The
initial a priori symbol set is thus perhaps arrived at ontingently, but the reinforement
learning of the symbol referene system will rapidly remove all traes of its random
origin, until an appropriate representation is onvergently found.
The above model assumes a relatively onstant environment in relation to whih the
organism in question evolves. Conversely, where environments are not onstant, and
are hanging at a faster rate than geneti adaptation an allow for, we would expet to
nd that the innate symbols aquire an inappropriate referene (suh as, for instane,
amongst humans, where animal threat assessments are alibrated to our hunter-gatherer
past, rather than our urban/agrarian present; notably, the human instantiation of the
primate's innate fear of the larger arnivores). It is therefore important, if Newell and
Simon's notion of physial symbol systems is to be extended to symboli inferene meh-
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anisms apable of autonomously updating themselves, that the Darwinian mehanism
of bootstrapping be replaed by a more rapidly-updating tehnique that nonetheless
retains the former mehanism's groundedness in the environmental survival imperatives
of the ognitive agent: this shall be the subjet of our setion on the ognitive linguisti
ontext of ognitive bootstrapping. We note for the present, however, that the innate,
naturally-seleted physial symbol set serves very eetively as an initial pereptual
meaning hypotheses for ognitive bootstrapping.
3.2.2 Cognitive Bootstrapping in Connetionist Approahes to Cognitive
Siene
In ontrast to the formal mehanis of the Symboli approah, Connetionist aounts
seek to omprehend meaning in terms of the aggregate information proessing abilities
of arrays of neuronal units, in intentional repliation of mammalian or reptilian brain
physiology. Cognitive properties an thus arise emergently, without expliit formal
struture.
The most signiant early demonstration of this neurosienti approah was the per-
eptron model of neuronal ativity given by Warren MCulloh and Walter Pitts in 1943,
whih set out a logial alulus impliit in nervous ativity. This was soon modied by
Donald Hebb [52℄ to inlude the possibility of strengthening the onnetion between the
neurons as a produt of ativity, giving (in Frank Rosenblatt's interpretation [116℄) the
ativation rule:
X:W + b > 0 (1)
(X the input vetor, W is a vetor of weights, b the bias).
And also the weight-vetor update rules:
8n : (2)
W (n) = W (n) + [T   O℄:X(n) (3)
b = b+ [T   A℄ (4)
(5)
T being the antiipated output and O the atual neuronal output.
This apaity of the Hebbian pereptron to iteratively update itself might appear to
permit it to be, in a limited sense, regarded as form of ognitive bootstrapping. Indeed,
in so far as the pereptron may be regarded as ognisant of it inputs, the iterative
updating of the weights and biases an be envisaged as the projetion of a partiular
pereptual ategorisation hypothesis (the urrent W and b) bak into input domain
(the objetive spae) suh that an error an be omputed from the disparity between
the known lass ategorisations of the training data and those that our under the
proposed pereptual ategorisation hypothesis. This error then determines the next
pereptual ategory hypothesis and so on.
The distintive movement between the perept and objet domain thus resembles the
more elaborate ognitive bootstrap mehanisms we have examined elsewhere, with the
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initial bootstrap hypothesis of relatively little signiane, being subjet iterative on-
vergene on the nal optimal model. However, the Hebbian pereptron is presented
with unambiguous and unquestionable feature-ategorisations (from whih hypotheses
are onstruted), whih it is not free to reinterpret (being, in eet, imposed as ex-
ternal onstraints), and thus does not having the open-ended, potentially paradoxial
apaity to assess the validity of its low-level perepts in terms of its learnt high-level
perepts, as is the ase for true of ognitive bootstrapping. This position would, of
ourse, hange were the system apable of forming additional perept hypotheses in a
hierarhial fashion; however this is not the ase for the unmodied linear pereptron.
Critial to the suess of the pereptron model, this above-mentioned ability to on-
verge upon an optimal, error-minimising W and b allows spontaneous generalisation of
input data to our; the rst demonstration of human-like learning behaviour within
the Connetionist regime, and a ruial benhmark of progress. However, Minsky and
Papert were to point out [90℄ that this neuronal form, though apable of many lassi-
ation tasks, was not yet apable of implementing the XOR Gate, and hene inapable
of attaining omputational equivalene to even basi human ognitive abilities.
The onnetionist shool of ognitive siene hene remained subdued until the 1980s,
when, via the Stone-Weierstrass theorem, it was demonstrated that multilayer perep-
trons driven by bakpropagation ould in fat approximate any omputational mapping
funtion (provided the hidden layer were large enough). This disovery substantially
renewed interest in neuronal-omputational models of artiial intelligene, and along
with this renewed interest arose the possibility of artiial ognitive models within the
onnetionist framework, and also the possibility of neural ognitive bootstrap meha-
nisms.
The most expliit suh model is perhaps that of [79℄, in whih the authors see Com-
plementary Reinforement Bak-Propagation (CRBP) as way of diretly ahieving self-
volitional behaviour in robots. Marshall et al. thus onjeture that self-direted learning
behaviour omes about as the result of ompeting tensions, suh as that between an
agent simultaneously maximising its auray of predition of future states while at the
same time being ompelled to seek out novel states. The 'homeostasis' thus ahieved
allows the network to bootstrap inreasingly omplex behaviour patterns. CRBP di-
retly models this behaviour by, in addition to allowing bakpropagation to to reinfore
internal goals in the onventional manner, also allowing the omplement of the goal
state, represented as a binary number, to serve as negative behaviour reinforement
during bakpropagation. Thus the tension between ontrary goal imperatives is diretly
modelled within the neural network struture, foring the testing of ognitive models by
deliberately seeking areas in whih they break down, and hene rening them.
More broadly, in onsequent of the hidden-layer network formulation, the now universal
generalisation apability of neural network was to see it adopted as one of a number of
default lassiers for use on arbitrary pattern reognition problems within the pattern-
reognition ommunity. The signiant issue then beame generalisation performane.
An important seondary issue for suh pattern lassiers is then assessing the auray
of suh generalisations of the training data without having rst obtaining an exhaustive
data set, whih is generally only available for idealised mathematial ases. In ommon
with the other lassiation mehanisms adopted by the pattern-reognition ommunity,
there are, in fat, a number of suh methods, one of the more ommonly employed being
37
Efron's bootstrap [31℄. This involves the resampling of the training data to generate new
lassiation generalisations suh that a generalisation error an be omputed, with this
approah rst being applied to neural networks in 1996 [136℄.
The bootstrap in the method of Efron is thus required to address the apparent paradox
of the training data being employed as both a determinant of the lassier model gener-
alisation, as well as the means for assessing its suess at generalisation. We hene, one
again, see bootstrap renement mehanisms being employed to overome diÆulties of
logial paradox assoiated with self-assessing generalisation mehanisms.
While this method has wide appliation in artiial ognition (eg [20℄), note, however,
that we reserve the term ognitive bootstrapping to refer only to bootstraps that are
utilised to arrive a set of ognitive ategories by validation methods employing those
self-same validation ategories (for instane using a onjetured environmental model
in order to manoeuvrer round that environment to hek the model's validity). Thus
Efron's statistial bootstrap method, even if applied to ognitive data, laks the feedbak
proess that reinterprets the input data in terms of the updated pereptual ategories.
Other Connetionist Cognitive Bootstrap Models Even without expliit mod-
elling of the neural substrate, onsiderable insight an be gained into the information
proessing tehniques employed by the mammalian brain by utilising the tehniques of
experimental psyhology. One suh area of investigation that involves an ative ognitive
bootstrapping mehanism is the meeting point between visual and hapti pereption (eg
[61℄, [120℄, [121℄).
When a mammalian agent interats diretly with the environment, it impliitly updates
its visual model of the environment by hapti ontat, using the a priori ertainly of
touh data to redue the amount of ambiguity present in visual data (partiularly the
ambiguities of binoular sene reonstrution). Moreover, it appears that the human
brain ahieves this in a Bayes-optimal fashion.
The ognitive bootstrap in this model is thus the use of visual pereption to moti-
vate sensorimotor ations suh as those involved in grasping for an objet in order to
test the validity of those same visual pereptions. As before, the bootstrapping of an
initial, partially representative model and the iterative onvergene between perepts
and perept-motivated ations hene ats to overome the logial paradox inherent in a
self-validated pereptual system.
More generally the onept of the pereption-ation yle (eg [122℄) impliit in these
visual-hapti models an by seen as the most tangible basis on whih to implement
a ognitive bootstrap mehanism, and one whih will underpin many of the roboti
implementations of ognitive bootstrapping listed in the Computer Siene Perspetives
portion of this survey. Pereptions are hene seen as environmental hypotheses while
ations are hypothesis validation steps, or more speially, vision is understood as a
hypothetial linkage between possible instanes of hapti ontat (suh as in 3D objet
reonstrution), and vision-motivated ations test the validity (or at least onsisteny)
of these models.
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3.2.3 Convergene of Symboli and Connetionist Shools
The Boolean-logi ompletion of neuronal models having been demonstrated via the
multi-layer pereptron model, the question of Turing-ompleteness then arises. The is-
sue preventing this being ahievable an be demonstrated to be the lak of memory as-
soiated with individual neurons (as opposed to the neuronal network as a whole, whih
does exhibit memory apability). It was hene determined by Franklin and Garzon [37℄
that the MCulloh-Pitts net augmented with expandable memory is Turing-omplete
and hene apable of arbitrary formal-language manipulation.
With this demonstration the Symboli and Connetionist approahes had, for the rst
time, ahieved a demonstrable equivalene: spei examples of the implementation of
symboli shema within a neural environment an, for instane, be found in [23℄. Some
authors were still to rejet the possibility of signiant rossover (most trenhantly
[35℄), iting the inability of onnetionist systems to express symboli ompositionality
(the onatenation of existing representations to onstrut new symboli possibilities).
Gardenfors [40℄, however, repudiated this argument via the onstrution of a proposi-
tional language system based on the theory of funtional dynamis applied to (purely
abstrat) information states. A neural network that undergoes learning generalisation
of the Hebbian kind in response to new information is thus shown to perform an in-
dutive inferene of the kind reognised in formal logi. Hene the symboli aount is
dynami and emergent, but not simply an interpretation of the the underlying neural
onnetionist model; it has atual referential apability.
On the assumption, then, that a ompatibility between onnetionist and symbolists
aounts does exist, one of the more signiant attempts to desribe how their o-
ourrene atually manifests itself is given in [78℄. Marr, asserting that an information
proessing system annot be understood without onsidering the use to whih this in-
formation is put, delineates three ognitive 'levels'; the omputational, the algorithmi,
and the implementational. Level 1 is hene teleologial 'mind' that deals with agent
intentions; level 2 is the symboli omputation layer of ognition that systematises
thought, and level 3 is the objetive, neuroanatomial distribution of material in the
brain. Interation between levels 1 and 2 thus determines how perepts are formed.
Marr hene impliitly assumes that a hermeneuti (whih is to say, a theory of mean-
ing) an only arise as a result of the embodiment of an algorithmi system within the
physial world, though without expliitly treating the notion diretly. Hene, without
a partiular imperative to reevaluate its goals in the light of material 'resistane' at the
implementational layer, Marr's 3-level interpretation is not yet a ognitive bootstrap
model; however it is ertainly not inompatible with the notion. This oneption of the
embodiment of ognitive systems as a means of grounding symboli manipulation does,
however, reeive a full treatment within ognitive siene, and will be treated in detail
in the following setions.
Hummel and Hollyoak [59℄ also provide a unied symbolist/onnetionist model within
an inremental learning ontext by supplying an instantiation of analogial learning,
LISA (Learning and Inferene with Shemas and Analogies), motivated by Hofstadter's
[56℄ assertion that all relational reasoning proeeds by analogy. In partiular, Hummel
and Hollyoak argue that a reasoning system must enode information both as spei,
loal neural onnetives as well as preserving identities of relational struture aross
the spei instanes in order to allow for generalisation and symboli proessing: they
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ahieve this via neural synhroniity whih allows the system to express variable binding.
LISA is thus a self-supervised inremental learning system that automatially infers
relationships from spei instanes (and whih hene onstitutes a partial ognitive
bootstrapping arhiteture in so far as it is apable of unlearning its initiatory weight
settings via the inferred relationships).
Another possible route of uniation for the symboli and onnetionist approahes,
involving a ommon model for both artiial neural-network lassiation funtions as
well as formal symboli onstruts suh as verbal grammar, is to view brain ognition
as a form of ompression. This approah, rst suggested by Wolf [151℄, sees the essene
of ognitive ageny within the world as being the ability to represent the varied mass of
sensory information in a portable, ompat (and thus, generalised) form. Hene, gram-
matial rules may be regarded as a ompressed version of the language, and lassiation
may be seen as a ompression of sense-data. The objet onept itself an be derived by
the redundany or ommonality between stereosopi, or multi-angular images (ompare
this with the Kantian notion of the objet onept as a unier of perspetives).
In animal ognition, the mehanism motivating this ompression is Darwinian natural-
seletion; biologial agents employing better generalisers (whih is to say, better om-
pressors) use fewer neurons to nd food by enoding suessful hunting strategies in the
most general manner possible. Sine suh agents inherently require less food to sustain
their smaller neuronal budgets, there ensues a 'virtuous irle' in whih they stand a
greater hange of surviving and reproduing than their less eÆiently-ompressing rel-
atives. Progressive generations thus inreasingly enhane the likelihood of agents with
ever more eonomised ognitive apaities (whih is to say eÆient sensory ompres-
sion mehanisms). Moreover, when the environmental requirements are not stati (as,
for instane, in the ontext of hominid evolution), the seletion pressure is towards ever
more generalised ognitive apabilities (whih is to say towards mehanisms of ever more
eÆient ompression of non-spei data).
This is hene a fully ognitive bootstrapping mehanism
6
- the ontinuous need of the
speies to whih the agent belongs to ompress general, previously unexperiened sensory
data amounts to a proess of hypothesis formation, sine the generalisability of the
ompression must be tested by feeding the hypothesis bak into environment to establish
its usefulness to the agent (in a proess of hypothesis veriation). The agent's perept
ategories hene beome self-foundational. This is also a hermeneuti irle sine, in
Marr's model, the agent derives the meaning of its ations in terms of the eet they
have on the agent's own perepts.
There is, however, a potential paradox here. We have, in outlining these biologi-
al, ognitive-siene derived ognitive bootstrapping models, furnished a sientially-
derived explanation for the existene of ognitive bootstrapping. In the philosophy se-
tion, though, we identied a ognitive bootstrapping-based explanation for siene itself
(that is, one in whih the sienti method is itself seen as a formalisation of the og-
nitive bootstrapping that onstitutes the fundamental mode of existene in ontologial
hermeneuti agents). Resolving of the paradox ultimately depends on our assumptions
6
Interestingly, Graham Cairns-Smith [19℄ argues that the origin of life itself onstitutes a bootstrap
proess in whih an initiatory system of biologial information storage and self-repliation forms the
basis for suessive systems that nally ulminate in the urrent DNA-based system that has supplanted
all previous systems. Thus there is no inherent statistial problem assoiated with the spontaneous
appearane of omplex DNA moleules.
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about the nal ground of objetive truth - whether it is the set of a priori assumptions
that are neessarily inherent in ognition but whih are neessarily not the subjet of
empirial enquiry, or whether it is the empirially-veried objets of pereption them-
selves.
The sienti method, being observation-based, is ostensibly in the latter ategory,
although sienti laws themselves (for example, the onservation of energy) must always
be oneptual (in the sense of not being aessible diretly to ognition; they at rather
as proposed orderings of pereptions, with the ordering onepts, suh as ausality
being essentially pre-sienti). The former ategory, insofar as it relates only to the a
priori laws of pereption, is potentially antipatheti toward the onept of strong A.I.
(the possibility of intentional onstrution of ognitive agents) sine in Kantian terms
is only possible to intentionally build devies in terms of a priori ognitive onepts,
rather than inlusive of these a priori ognitive onepts (though this does not prelude
ognitive mahines evolving spontaneously). Cognitive siene impliitly favours the
latter option (that the nal ground of ognition is observable, or at least in observable
in its onsequenes), and hene onsiders the sienti method and its nal objets to
be logially prior to ognition: we shall return to this point in the onlusion. For the
purposes of the remainder of this survey division, however, we shall onsider only the
latter possibility.
Having established, then, that the notion of ognitive bootstrapping is broadly onsistent
with both the major shools of ognitive siene, the onnetionist and the symboli, we
an now proeed to fous on the spei issue of ageny within ognition; in partiular,
we shall, in the next setion, fous on the entrally important notion of embodiment.
3.3 The Signiane of the Embodied Mind Within Cognitive
Siene
The notion that the form of our onsious pereption of the external world is ditated
by, or further, dened within the terms of the ations that we may perform within it,
is ommon to both phenomenology and to several long-standing shools of ognitive
siene. (Dewey had argued as early as 1896 [27℄ that pereption, thought and ation
must be onsidered as part of the same stratum. Thus, rather than rst pereiving a
sene, then thinking about its ontent, and only then performing an at, he argued that
pereption is atively modied by manipulation of the environment, in distintion to the
lassial notion that ations are ditated by pereptions).
If we were thus to divide ognitive siene into the theoretial and pratial shools,
an example of ation-based pereption in the former shool is given in the study of
aordane, a term rst oined by James Gibson [43℄, and speied in [83℄ as having the
following properties:
 1. An aordane exists relative to the ation apabilities of a partiular agent.
 2. The existene of an aordane is independent of the agent's ability to pereive
it.
 3. An aordane does not hange as the needs and goals of the agent hange.
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Aordanes, being the ation possibilities of the agent's environment, hene overome
the dualisti subjetive/objetive divide in favour of a monadi aount of pereption.
Aordanes are objetive to the extent that they are invariant to arbitrary shifts in
interpretation, however, they are subjetive in so far as they require an agent to provide
a relative frame of referene.
Other theoretial shematisations of embodied ognition along these lines inlude Lako's,
f eg [70℄, whih argues that reason far from being an abstrat logial disipline inde-
pendent of the body, is in fat patterned by the way in whih the spatial awareness of
our body's ageny is onstruted. Glenberg similarly argues in [44℄ that oneptualisa-
tion is onstrained by the struture of the environment, our bodies, and our memory
apaity. Hene, a key human skill is in forming a oneption of the environment that
is independent of the environment. Memory (of previous oneptions) is the key to
ahieving this (and may be related to our later arguments onerning the importane
of oneptualising our own ageny in eetive ognitive updating).
In having sought to nd a middle ground within the subjet/objet dualism of lassi-
al Psyhology, Lako's sheme onsequently laks a foundational ontology (ontologies
being lassially objetive), suh as those sought by fundamental siene.
On the applied side of ognitive siene are the searhes for neural orrelates of em-
bodied ognition, for instane Berluhi and Aglioti's [6℄ argument that the imitation
of movements within neonates is indiative of an impliit neural body-struture model
from whih later neural body-struture models are determined. Moreover, ruially, this
model provides a referene frame that extends to the neural determination of inanimate
objet models. The mehanism of objet understanding is thus a ognitive bootstrap
to the extent that it requires, rstly, an initial set of a priori assumptions (the impliit
model) in terms of whih the world model is dened and, seondly, a onstrutive di-
aleti between the world and agent's world-model hypothesis in order to rene this
model.
This work, and others like it, thus serve to validate Piaget's [103℄, [104℄ notion that
higher ognitive funtions have their roots in lower-level biologial mehanisms.
A similar idea is expressed by Millikan [87℄, [88℄ with regard to language and inten-
tionality. Here she argues that funtion an only be attributed to an entity within a
biologial ontext; the purpose of a leopard's spots are to provide it with amouage for
hunting. Purpose is thus not dened by a partiular agent's mental state, or even it's
immediate environmental ontext, but rather its individual and speies history.
Millikan hene proposes a biologial solution to the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox, whih
relates to the apparent impossibility (at least in Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein) of
establishing absolute oneptual or pereptual identity between agents, sine an un-
bounded notion suh as 'addition' ould never be proven to be the same for both
agents. In this example, one agent's rule of addition might hene be the 'orret' one;
8x; y z := x+ y, whereas the other agent's rule might be some near approximation suh
as; 8x; y x < 5  10
9
; y < 5  10
9
z := x + y; else z := 5. In any reasonably nite
senario these agents would falsely form the impression that they both had the same
understanding of addition. The paradox is that this impossibility would appear to re-
due individual observations to the status of ungeneralisable atomi fats, in whih ase
all onepts of mentality are illusory. Millikan's resolution of the paradox is to propose
that natural seletion serves to remove the latter formulation of the addition rule on
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the grounds of its ineÆieny; it does the same essential referring as the former rule
with regard to reasonably small numbers suh as those the agents experiene in their
biologial lifetime, but uses more omputation to do so. Hene aggregate natural se-
letion will favour the smallest generalisation onsistent with the biologially neessary
referents (thus providing a basis for Oam's Razor). Meaningful linguisti exhange
between agents of the same speies is thus possible.
Millikan's work thus overomes the lassial problem of referene, where the relation
between perept and objet appears to be arbitrary (why, for instane, do we regard a
rabbit as prinipally a single entity rather than as a olletion of organi sub-objets
or as a subpart of a speies-olletive). She argues instead that the partiular form the
perept takes in relation to the objet and the agent-objet interation has an inherent
survival value for the agent (we have traditionally hunted rabbits for food, and so regard
an individually huntable unit as a single pereptual entity). Perept models that do not
eÆiently model the survival-relative aspets of the objet in relation to the agent's
ation possibilities simply ease to exist on an evolutionary time-sale.
Anderson [1℄ also argues for the Darwinian, non-Cartesian nature of embodied ognition,
one that it is not fundamentally representative, but rather interative, sine 'the world is
its own model' and therefore needs no pereptual states distint from ation possibilities.
Drawing together the various diering strands within ognitive siene, Gallagher [38℄
provides an extensive interdisiplinary study that seeks to strike a middle ground be-
tween the physially redutionist aounts of brain ognition and Cartesian top-down
approahes, aknowledging the ognitive siene and phenomenology are inseparable
sides of the same oin.
A similarly omplete treatment of the onept of embodiment within ognitive siene is
aimed at in [42℄, whih argues that 'Cognition is what ours when the body engages the
physial and ultural world and must be studied in terms of the dynamial interations
between people and the environment'. The embodiment of intelligent behaviour thus
ats as a onstraint that gives rise to the existene of human language and human
thought.
With this in mind, we now turn to the speially linguisti aspets of ognitive siene,
with a view to establishing the entrality of ognitive bootstrapping to this area and, in
partiular, its relevane to syntati forms of symboli representation.
4 Cognitive Linguisti Context for Cognitive Boot-
strapping
4.1 Setion Introdution: The Origins of Symboli Represen-
tation in Cognitive Agents
We shall, in this setion, fous on the evidene for the assertion that symboli repre-
sentation arises as the result of ommuniation between ognitive agents (or even from
self-ommuniation in the ase of a single agent with the ability to model itself). In
partiular, we shall seek to demonstrate that the ognitive bootstrap model, in serv-
ing as the mehanism underpinning the fundamental subjet/objet division (as well as
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overoming the philosophial paradoxes that have traditionally been assoiated with it),
also provides, in the proess, a symboli and ommuniable representation of the world
in terms of an intrinsi, but evolvable, language system.
4.2 Origins of Language in the Symboli Interhange of Per-
epts
The basis for this argument is then that, in attempting ommuniation with another
ognitive entity, we must neessarily nd a representation of the simultaneous om-
monalities of our experiene. That is we must, in some way, abstrat from our personal
(perept/ation-based) experienes in order to nd that aspet of them that is aessible
to a real or putative seond entity also embodying a pereption/ation relation.
As we have seen, the possibility of the abstration of aspets of our pereption/ation
experiene into the third person is, for Kant, already impliit in our pereption of the
world. Pereptions are inherently experiened as having a ertain unifying onstany
under the transformations assoiated with agent ations; that is, we pereive objets
from perspetives, rather than pure sensory qualia
7
. The abstration of our experiene
required for ommuniation is thus impliit at the outset.
However, this rigid, predetermined ontologial struture might not initially appear to
allow for the possibility of learning a language, or for the spontaneous evolution of an
appropriate language between ognitive entities attempting to desribing their ognitive
world at a greater level of detail (suh as, for instane, onstitutes the goal of the
experimental siene ommunity). How is it then possible, in a ommuniative ontext,
for ognitive entities to establish a ommon desription of the world that goes beyond
what is neessitated a priori?
Cognitive bootstrapping supplies an appropriate solution framework that does not fal-
sify any of Kant's onstraints on the nature of the a priori ognitive ategories. We
have seen that new perept hypotheses an be formed by the ognitive agent in terms
the existing Kantian ategories, and 'projeted' bak into the pereptual environment
as pereption/ation onjetures for empirial (that is, ation-based) veriation (or
rather, onsisteny heking, sine we annot intrinsially onrm or deny the au-
ray of the representational primitives). Suessfully empirial testing of these novel
pereption/ation onjuntions an then expand the range of the agent's ognitive ate-
gories, whih in turn provides a range of new pereption-ation hypotheses with whih
to reommene the hermeneuti yle
8
of pereptual reinterpretation.
What is important to appreiate in the urrent ontext, however, is that this mehanism
onstitutes a ommuniative (or self-ommuniative) proess, in whih ommuniation
serves as the methodology by whih symbol and symbol-meaning are dierentiated and
dened. Impliit in the ognitive bootstrapping proess is thus a division between sub-
jet (the symbol hypothesising agent) and environment (the entity apable of falsifying
the symbol meaning hypotheses), both of whih must be represented within the ogni-
tive agent. The agent must therefore neessarily employ a distint model of its own
7
The immediate and irreduibly-inanalyti aspets of pereption, suh as olour.
8
The hermeneutis in question being the link between the 'semantis' of the asymptotially-
obtainable, observer-independent objet ontology and the 'syntax' of the urrently assumed perept-
ation relation.
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pereption-ation relationship (framed in terms of the urrent best perept-ation hy-
pothesis), along with any new onjetured pereption-ation hypotheses, in suh a way
that they may be falsied against the urrent best perept-ation hypothesis.
It is then in this sense that the method is a bootstrap; at no stage do we have aess to
the ground-truth objet-entri perepts - validation must instead take plae in terms of
the previous partially-representative perept hypotheses. All that prevents the method
from logial ollapse into either tautology or relativism is the guaranteed validity of
the Kantian a priori perept ategories upon whih the hypotheses are based (along
with the assumption of Oam's Razor as means of distinguishing between equivalent
perept-ation onjetures).
The nal onvergent perept-model of the ognitive bootstrap is therefore, if not the
absolute Kantian noumenal world independent of the observer, rather the objet (as
opposed to the view)-entri desription of the world that underlies the perept-ation
relation. That is, we obtain, either by ommuniation with another ognitive agent, or, in
the ase of general ognition, by an impliit ommuniation with models of one's previous
ognitive ageny, a nal, stable desription of the world independent of one's partiular
perspetive. We hene ahieve the seeming paradoxial position of transending our
partiular pereptual frame in order to arrive at a symboli desription of the world
that makes no referene to a partiular point of view, and hene whih approahes the
level of objetivity assumed by the lassial empiriists, who assumed that no form of
pereptual mediation between ognition and the world an exist. All that is required
for this to our is that the initialisation of the ognitive bootstrap partially embodies
this ideal: the a priori ategories required in order for Kantian pereption to take plae
at all are suÆient to allow this.
Justiation for the above ommuniative aount of how ognition arrives at an ob-
jetive world representation is found within the subjet of linguistis. Rohrer [115℄, for
instane, suggests that linguistis should properly be regarded as a sub-siene of ogni-
tive siene, proposing that the basis for language is the projetion of one's own ageny
model into the pereptual domain; that is, a relativising of experiene in order to estab-
lish a ommon frame of referene, and thereby arrive at an objet ontology. Perry [102℄,
Bermudez [7℄, Metzinger [86℄ and Baker [4℄, also agree that ognitive self-awareness (as
manifested by a linguisti token equivalent to 'I') requires a ommuniative domain in
whih all ommuniating parties have internal objet models of both the world and of
the various inter-ommuniating agents; in no other irumstanes an one expliitly
attribute pereptions to oneself.
Pinker [105℄ further argues that language derives from an initial ognitive orientation
(arguing, for example, that the fundamental noun/verb split mimis the perept/ation
division), whih then develops along more omplex lines via a semanti bootstrapping
mehanism. The bootstrap proeeds by alternatively hypothesiing and then (when suf-
iently established) pereiving progressively more rened ongurations of noun/verb
and pereption/ation pairings.
Language development and ognitive bootstrapping would therefore appear to be in-
separable. Critially, from the point of view of establishing suh notions on a sienti
footing, these ognitive-agent-based understandings of the proess of symbol formation
and language development lend themselves straightforwardly to empirial testing via
omputer simulation. There onsequently exists a onsiderable body of literature that
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deals with the generalised omputation arhiteture of ognitive agents in whih lan-
guage and symbol formation is onsidered at least impliitly (f eg Minsky et al. [89℄,
Edelman & Intrator [29℄ for overviews). However, in the next setion we would like to
onsider artiial embodied ognitive arhitetures that address the notion of language
formation on its own terms:
4.3 Language Evolution in Embodied Artiial Cognitive Agents
4.3.1 General Ontology Learning Mehanisms
Before ommening with a desription of spontaneous language formation experiments
in embodied artiial ognitive systems, we shall briey digress to examine the various
mehanisms for generalised symboli ontology learning that are appliable to simulated
language inferene.
Any system for learning, ab initio, the ontologial relations of abstrat symbol-forms un-
derlying pereption requires three key elements; a mehanism for generating hypotheses,
a mehanism for hypothesis veriation, and prior to both of these, a xed logial stru-
ture. The most general suh onstrution is a theorem prover.
However, given that we have, in the preeding setion, established the priniples of self-
representation and embodiment of the ognitive agent within the world that it seeks to
model as being at the origin of ontology, there then immediately arises the problem of
omputability. If, for instane, one were to take the most general ase and utilise a
universal Turing mahine
9
as the hypothesis generation mehanism in order to arrive at
the partiular Turing mahine that desribes the underlying mehanism behind every
possible perept-ation state available to the agent (generating a progressive series of
hypothetial Turing mahines of index i for empirial validation with respet to the set
of 'input' perept states, P ), we would eventually require (due to the neessity of self-
modelling) that i = j, where j is the index of the universal Turing mahine utilised by
the agent to generate the hypotheses. Assuming logial onsisteny, the system would
then fail to reah a stable output solution in onsequene of attempting to output its
own perept-ation (input-output) mapping (orresponding to the the lassial halting
problem).
It is therefore neessary to limit the range of appliation of the theorem prover in some
way, suh as imposing a restraint on the range of the hypothesis generation (dealing, for
instane, only with oarse-grained pereption-ation models, or, as disussed in the next
survey division, limiting the temporal iteration budget). Otherwise, we must impose a
restraint on the logial struture of the world model. This latter option is the most
relevant to disussing language formation within ognitive agents, where the logi is
typially limited to either propositional logi or else to rst or seond order logis. We
summarise these briey below:
9
A Turing mahine apable of simulating any other. In partiular, one that takes the input a to
a Turing mahine of index i, and produes (for a given input a; i) the orresponding output b. We
write this as T
i
(a) = b in the former ase, and U
j
(a; i) = b in the latter ase (ie for a universal Turing
mahine of index j).
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Propositional Logi A propositional alulus is a subset of a larger logial system
that determines how to form logial propositions from a set of axioms. It is thus a
olletion of inferene rules for arriving at logial onlusions given a set of supplied fats.
Consequently, it requires a formal grammar. Impliit in the grammar is a semantis, an
implied referene to world ontology indiating the signiant aspets of the dedution
(for instane the dierentiation between a logial onnetive and an atomi sentene
is assumed to be more than merely syntati). This ontology is, moreover, losed, in
the sense that propositions not provable in the language are assumed to be false, a
restrition that serves to ensure deidability.
In the axiomati (as opposed to the syntati) form of propositional logi, the single
rule of logial inferene in propositional logi is modus ponens (from the Latin, 'mode
that aÆrms'), whih permits dedutive arguments of the form: If X, then Y. X therefore
Y. (or in operator form; X;X ! Y ` Y ).
Logial inferene in an applied senario under Boolean restritions would therefore typ-
ially take the form of a syllogism of the type:
If the ground is old or the air is old or the sea is old then the weather is bad.
The air is old.
Therefore the weather is bad.
This inferene system was the rst to be formalised in a systemati fashion, being set out
in Aristotle's Prior Analytis within whih is argued (inorretly, as it later transpired)
that every dedutive argument an be expressed in this form.
What it is, in partiular, that is laking from this propositional logi form is the inor-
poration of variables. It is hene inapable of generalisation of any kind, laking the
apaity to adapt to novel situations (a key requirement for ognitive ageny by almost
all denitions of the term). To ahieve this we must turn to rst-order logis:
First-Order Logis The most immediate way to develop a more omplex logial al-
ulus is to introdue additional axioms that are appliable to the ner distintions of the
sentential entities that our in propositional logi. In partiular, if the atomi sentenes
of propositional logi are divided into terms, variables, prediates, and quantiers, they
give rise to rst-order logi, or rst-order prediate alulus. First order logi is thus
a theory within symboli logi that permits the formulation of quantied statements of
the form; "there is at least one X suh that..." or "for any X, it is the ase that...".
We ould, using rst-order prediate alulus, hene use the previous meteorologial
example to write the general rule:
For all entities X, if X is old then the weather is bad.
A rst-order logial system is thus apable of forming abstrat onepts, rather than
merely areting aggregations of spei instanes. We might thus expet an embod-
ied rst-order ognitive logial system to present a mehanism apable of adapting to
entirely novel situations in a way that is impossible under a purely propositional logi
alulus.
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We shall see that this is true to an extent. Systems for infering rst-order logi typ-
ially deal with Horn lauses, whih are impliation onjetures in whih there is a
onjuntion of multiple literals (elementary propositions and their negations) that lead
by impliation to a single literal. This is, in eet, a lass alloation, and gives rise to
the relative ubiquity of this approah within the eld of logistial pattern reognition.
Systems of this type are olletively desribed under the umbrella term 'indutive logi
programming' (ILP) (see Muggleton [93℄ for an overview).
A typial problem struture might thus be the determination of biologial speies de-
sriptors from spei examples; that is (to give one of Muggleton's examples), a deter-
mination of the general rules:
lass(A,reptile) :- has-overing(A,sales), has-legs(A,4).
lass(A,mammal) :- homeothermi(A), has-milk(A).
lass(A,sh) :- has-legs(A,0), has-eggs(A).
lass(A,reptile) :- has-overing(A,sales), habitat(A,land).
lass(A,bird) :- has-overing(A,feathers).
from spei bakground knowledge of the form:
has-overing(dog, hair).
has-overing(roodile, sales), et
in onjuntion with positive and negative examples of the type:
Positives:
lass(lizard, reptile).
lass(trout, sh).
lass(bat, mammal).
et.
Negatives:
:- lass(trout, mammal).
:- lass(herring, mammal).
:- lass(platypus, reptile).
et.
Hypotheses are therefore equivalent to PROLOG programs, and ILP involves their in-
ferene from spei examples. Generally, ILP methods will adopt either a general-
to-spei or a spei-to-general searh mehanism for rule generation. GOLEM [93℄,
employing the onept of 'least general generalisation' is an example of the former, while
FOIL [111℄ orresponds to the latter ategory.
As PROLOG meta-programs, both of these tehniques have in ommon that they ee-
tively override PROLOG's losed ontology assumption (namely that inferenes outside
of provable range of the urrent hypotheses are neessarily false), and adopt instead a
more open-ended approah to theorem building. As suh, these methods nd a number
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of appliations in real-world lassiation senarios (for instane pharmaeutial side-
eet predition), but do not, in themselves, onstitute the ideal solution to the problem
of embodied ognitive ontology learning. In partiular, they annot expliitly infer new
pereptual lasses from pre-existing prediates, and so are not, of themselves, apable
of ognitive bootstrapping.
As an example of this, suppose, for instane, that an ILP-based ognitive agent em-
bodying a pereption-ation yle is equipped with the a priori pereptual states, fP
n
g,
and motor apabilities, fM
n
g. Suppose, further, that following a series of experiments
involving randomised permutations of these ation primitives, it has had ause to infer
the novel PROLOG motor rule:
M
a
(o; x; y; z) :   P
1
(o
0
; x; y; z
0
); z
0
is z   1:
(orresponding, intuitively, to the motor rule 'Objet o an only be plaed at position
(x; y; z) provided that this position is diretly on top of some other objet o
0
.').
To an autonomously updating pereptual mehanism, inferene of this motor rule ought
also to suggest inferene of the orresponding ognitive ategory:
P
a
(o; o
0
) :  P
1
(o; x; y; z); P
1
(o
0
; x; y; z); z
0
is z   1:
(P
a
orrelating with the onept 'is on top of', suh that the originally inferred motor
rule beomes M
0
a
(o; o
0
) - intuitively, 'Put objet o on top of objet o
0
).
In essene, we require that the ognitive system enat an elimination of redundant
prediates in the inferred motor possibility in order to infer a new, higher-level perept-
ation orrespondene that is always suessful: ie, generially, we require a P(X) suh
that M(X) is always valid (M
0
a
(o; o
0
) does not require onditional satisfation in the
above). This is not possible via straightforward ILP. In order to aomplish this we
need to onsider at least the seond-order logis:
Seond-Order Logis The most ommonly utilised logi in agent-based artiial
intelligene is monadi seond-order logi. Seond-order logi diers from rst order logi
only in its ability to quantify over properties of variables. It is inapable of admitting
a proof theory, and onsequently always omputable. More partiularly, it is apable of
implementing nite state automata (of the type apable of generalising over repetitive
perept-ation yles), and non-deterministi pushdown automata (of the type apable
of modelling Markovian systems with nite memory). In terms of Chomsky's language
hierarhy [24℄, [25℄, seond order logis an, respetively, dene Type-3 regular languages
and Type-2 ontext-free grammars.
Moreover, monadi seond-order logis limited to Type-3 regular language expressions
an be optimised. That is, nding the nite state mahine with the least number of
states apable of performing a given funtion is always deidable. Cognitive updating is
therefore, for an agent employing this logial restrition on (nite sets of) observations,
always onvergent, and, furthermore, onvergent in a nite number of steps. Common
learning systems not expliitly oneived in terms of seond-order logi an also have
equivalent apabilities; Forada et al. [36℄, for instane, show that disrete-time neural
networks are apable of inferring deterministi nite automata (though, in pratise, they
would reommend disrete algorithmi methods as a solution mehanism).
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It would thus appear that onnetionist approahes an equally well implement on-
strained logial forms within ognitive updating, but yet apture patterns of pereptual
inferene rih enough to allow for inferene of abstrat pereptual forms. In general,
when searhing for a suitable logi for ognitive bootstrapping within real-world en-
vironments we have two priniple requirements. The logi should not be so powerful
that issues of non-omputability arise (unless steps are taken to disard hypothesis gen-
eration at the level of omplexity at whih non-halting hypothesis are taken to our
[ie after a ertain number of iterations℄). The logi must also not be so weak that it
fails to apture the natural omplexity of objet relations in the domain of interest (we
have, for instane, established above that simple propositional logi is not apable of
apturing the syntati requirements of generalised spatial relations ('within', 'above',
'behind' et), but may yet suitable for ertain limited forms of oneptual inferene -
see, for instane, the 'Talking Heads' experiment, below).
Given, then, that the modelling of ontologial systems in anything other than very lim-
ited senarios will involve the use of at least rst order logi, we would appear to have
a two-fold learning requirement; a syntati one (relating to the inferene of pereptual
interrelationships) and a semanti one (relating to objet interrelationships). These will
in general be oupled (as in the previous example of perept-ation inferene). However,
the potentially open-ended nature of syntati inferene means that semanti generali-
sation must our without a well-dened a priori optimisation landsape. Learning is
therefore typially more omplex than in familiar stohasti pattern reognition prob-
lems, where there exists a xed feature-spae within whih observations our; symboli
ontology learning essentially requires that we learn both the lass distributions and the
features simultaneously.
We shall hene now turn to a survey of experiments in whih spontaneous symbol
ontology formation takes plae between ommuniating (or self-ommuniating) agents
in an appropriately limited logial landsape:
4.3.2 Spontaneous Language Formation
The study of spontaneous language formation in simulated agents gains its philosophial
imperative in onsequene of the symbol grounding problem, rst enuniated by Harnad
[50℄. Harnad's thesis, in distintion to purely struturalist aounts of language, at-
tempts to demand a semanti interpretation of formal symbol systems that transends
the (merely syntati) interrelationships available to the symboli manipulation system
in question. The problem, as Harnad sees it, is analogous to the learning of non-native
languages in humans; it is muh more meaningful when attempted in situ amongst other
speakers of the language, than when learned from a ditionary of that language alone
(as the Struturalists ould feasibly envisage ourring).
Harnad onsequently proposes two forms of symboli grounding in partiular; 'ioni
representations', whih are eetively equivalent to lass pereptual medians, and 'at-
egorial representations', whih onsist of both learned and a priori feature invariants.
Higher-order symboli representations are then grounded in hierarhial ombinations
of these fundamental symbols, so that at no stage is the relationship between generated
symbols ditated by the symbol-produing agent alone.
Steels [129℄, [130℄ gives perhaps the paradigmati illustration of the importane of seman-
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ti grounding to the formation of language systems in his 'Talking Heads Experiment'.
His motivation in these endeavours is to demonstrate that 'ommuniation through
language is the main driving fore in bootstrapping the representational apaities of
intelligent agents'. Language and meaning are onsequently o-eval in this senario;
symboli syntax arises at the same time as semantis.
The talking heads experiment hene onsists in a pair of roboti agents equipped with
a video amera and a set of predetermined low-level feature desriptors. One agent
is initially designated the 'speaker', and the other the 'hearer'. The agents oupy an
environment in whih regular two dimensional objets of various olours are distributed
at random (for instane red squares, blue triangles et). The designated speaker then
hoses one item at random from this ommon ontext and attempts to desribe it using
its own internal lexion (whih it annot simply assume is shared by the hearer). The
hearer must then guess the orret item and point at it, failure to do so requiring the
hearer to update its internal lexion by generating a new word denition that suessfully
disambiguates the indiated item. The role of hearer and listener are then exhanged
over a series of language games in order that an objetive world desription be nally
obtained by both agents (as opposed to the idential, but speaker-subjetive one that
would arise if the roles of speaker and hearer were xed). Word denitions are thus
haraterised in terms of a priori feature desriptors of a visual nature; for instane,
olour, horizontal objet positions, vertial objet positions et.
As an example of a typial word-game, onsider an experimental ontext in whih two
objets A and B, a red triangle loated at the top of the eld of view and a blue square
loated at the bottom of the eld of view, are the respetive objets of interest.
These might be disambiguated by words desriptors of the form:
A: vertial position > 0.5 (positions saled to [0 : 1℄)
B: vertial position < 0.5
Or, equivalently, by word desriptors of the form:
A: red
B: blue
(Deision trees an be used to implement more omplex designations.)
There is hene no unambiguously 'orret' objet ontology in this senario, and onse-
quently no ground truth pereptual spae aessible to the agents. If these two alterna-
tive sets of lexial designations were alloated to the speaker and hearer, respetively, it
would onsequently only be within a fresh ontext that the disrepany in desription
would ome to light.
For instane, only if a third blue objet were introdued and loated towards the bottom
of the eld of view, would the speaker be required to learn to distinguish the onept
of olour as distint pereptual ategory (though it always inherently had the latent
apaity to do so), in order to distinguish every objet employed within the word-
game
10
. Equally, the hearer would need to evolve word desriptions that inorporated
spatial onsiderations only in order to distinguish all three objets within the extended
10
This perhaps orrelates with the neonatal synaesthesia hypothesis [51℄.
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senario.
Steels' ahievement is onsequently in demonstrating that, within this partiular se-
nario, lexial onvergene between speaker and hearer ours remarkably rapidly. More-
over, provided that there exists a suÆient rihness in the range of objet senarios, the
talking heads experiment demonstrates that this onvergene is objetive (in the sense
that the nal word distintions orrespond to our ground truth desriptions in terms of
the a priori features).
This result is onsequently onsistent with the hypothesis that 'third-person' ognitive
modelling lies at the origin of symbol/ontology formation. The objetivity (or subjet-
independene) of the nal onvergene of the word designations hene omes about
beause language onjetures are projeted by the speaker bak into the environment
for validation on the assumption of the presene of a hearer with a linguisti apability
similar (in a priori terms) to it own; the modelling of pereptual ageny by the agent is
thus impliit in the underlying experimental senario.
In philosophial terms, the talking heads experiment embodies the Wittgensteinian (f
[150℄) view of language as 'a word game' in whih agents invent words and meanings
during their interations, and opposes the Quinean view that sees language as a series of
indutive abstrations of the pereptual orrelations between word and objet (f Quine
[110℄).
Given that the presene of the other agent in this experiment is assumed a priori,
we may wonder how far this requirement an be relaxed in language-formation exper-
iments that take plae within the simulated agent domain. Viezzer [140℄ argues that
the symbol grounding problem an only really be solved by modelling both the agent's
world (at the pereption/ation) level and the agent's modelling of the world in order
to permitting a genuine ontologial updating by the agent. This is then in expliit
and intentional ontrast to the spontaneously arising ontology of the talking-head ex-
periment, whih Viezzer laims laks the semanti updating inherent in word meaning
renegotiation (that is, an updating of the ontology on the basis of the agent's model of
the agent/world interation). Implementation of this notion (whih would onstitute an
automated instantiation of the hermeneuti ar, as opposed to the hermeneuti irle of
Steel's talking heads), however, remains for future experimental work.
Other attempts to model the emergene of language in embodied ognitive agents util-
ising a bootstrapping mehanism have typially operated in a more obviously verbal
domain. For instane, Narayanan [96℄ has developed a omputational model that takes
the ognitive-semanti view proposed by, for example, Lako [69℄, that textual meaning
derives from a metaphori extension of agent ausality (so, for instane, textual refer-
enes to purely abstrat entities like the United Nations are envisaged as ating from
a spatial position, and being apable of deploying motive fores). Hene, the interpre-
tation of meaning within this ontext arises from sentene-by-sentene projetions of
our sensorimotor omplex (equivalent to a perept/ation mapping) into the domain of
disourse, suh that our nite memories and goal-driven behaviours are expliitly taken
into aount.
Thus (to take a simplied example), the newspaper headline 'Eonomy Falls Into A Hole'
desribes a purely abstrat state of aairs within metaphori terms. A simple word-by-
word mapping of textual denitions in to the semanti spae would be inapable of
determining the meaning of this sentene; even a ontextually sensitive parsing would
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be of little use in apturing the full nuane of the sentene's meaning.
The expliit projetion of an embodied ognitive agent's pereptual-ation omplex onto
the noun term 'Eonomy', however, gives rise to a new layer of meaning, within whih
the sentene would imply both a degree of negligene (we, as agents, falling into a hole
would not be looking where we were going), and also the undesirability of this state of
aairs and the onsequent desire to retify it (the goal-entriity of our ageny would
require our immediate exit from the hole in order to ontinue with our plans). Hene
the full meaning of the sentene is only unovered by the relativising of our individual
experiene into the objetivity of the noun struture. Lako's argument is that all
linguisti onstrutions operate in this manner (though usually less obviously), with
meaning supplied by the agent's impliit embodiment in the sentene referent.
Narayanan's omputational model of this notion therefore involves onstruting ana-
logues of high-level human sensorimotor ontrol that embody sequential, onditional,
hierarhial and onurrent ations within a generalisation of automata theory that
utilises high-level Petri net variants. A temporally extended probabilisti belief network
representing linguisti input and world knowledge is then onstrained to a onrete form
by mapping it onto this 'experiential' model in order to determine the unwritten aspets
of the disourse (suh as for instane, the impliit desire to 'get out' of the eonomi
'hole').
The method is thus profoundly ontext sensitive by virtue of the expliit modelling
of embodied ognition, eetively introduing a nite state mahine (representing the
agent's internal goal-states) into the textual interpretation. In essene, Narayanan is
employing embodied ognition to provide a semantis to omplement the syntatis of
the language proessing.
The methodology adopted by Narayanan an be onsidered to qualify as a weak form
of ognitive bootstrapping, in that it permits agent sensorimotor hypotheses to be over-
ridden by the reeipt of new target domain knowledge (whih is in turn interpreted in
asual agent terms); it does not, however, permit learning of new sensorimotor agent
struture from the linguisti target domain, whih would be required to omplete the
denition.
4.4 Summary of Division
We have, in this division, investigated the notion of ognitive bootstrapping from twin
perspetives; the onnetionist and the symboli shools of ognitive siene, and es-
tablished its potential onsisteny with both. We then turned to the issue of symboli
bootstrapping from the ognitive linguisti perspetive, and established that ommu-
niation, whether self-ommuniation, or between agents, is a suÆient ondition for
the generation of objetive symbol ontologies in pereptually self-updating agents. A
number of experimental realisations of this notion were demonstrated, in partiular Lu
Steels' 'talking heads' experiment, whih additionally served to illustrate the entral-
ity of ommuniation in overoming the potential for symboli bootstrapping to form
ungrounded and unrepresentative pereptual ategories.
From this empirial outline of the basis for ognitive bootstrapping, we shall now turn,
in the next survey division, to an overview of the mathematial underpinning of the
onept.
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Part IV
5 Foundational Context for Cognitive Bootstrapping
5.1 Formalism Verses Platonism
Of the various foundational philosophies of mathematis that have been proposed, two
distint strands are apparent; the Formalist and the Platonist, the former having arisen
as a reation to the latter. Platonism is the lassial view of the ontologial status of
mathematial entities, and assumes that they are absolutely true and self-subsisting;
the objets of pereption are, in ontrast, transient, unreal and legitimated only to the
extent that they embody the abstrat truths of mathematis. Mathematial entities are
thus absolutely real, having an existene that is independent of ognition.
Impliit in this assumption is the notion that mathematial truths ould not be other
than what they are. In modern, proof-theoreti terms, this is equivalent to arguing that
the logial axioms of mathematis are non-arbitrary.
Formalism, in ontrast, assumes no prior existene of mathematial entities at all; math-
ematis is simply a set of odied shemes for manipulating symbols. As suh it is
ontologially neutral, making no metaphysial laims beyond it own formal patterning.
From this notion arose the 'Hilbert Programme', the attempt to plae all of mathematis
on a seure footing by demonstrating its onsisteny within a formal system (showing,
for instane, that it not possible to prove both a statement and ontrary within the
hosen mathematial axioms). Russell and Whitehead's Prinipia Mathematia [117℄
presented the most signiant attempt to ahieve this.
Formalism was, in the 1930s, to run into two major philosophial diÆulties, however.
The rst was in the ontinuing suess of mathematial physis; many of the latest
developments in mathematis suh as non-Eulidean geometry and group theory were
nding diret appliation in physis, strongly suggesting that it was anything other than
an ontologially neutral subjet.
More damagingly, however, was the omprehensive undermining of the objetives of the
Hilbert Programme by Godel's theorem [46℄, whih demonstrated that for any formal
axiomati system, it is always possible to nd a statement whih is true, but whih
annot be formally proved so within the system: it must, in short, onstitute a new
axiom. The axiom system, if onsistent, is thus innite, and if nite, inonsistent.
Formalism, it thus seems, must fail both in its assumptions of ontologial neutrality as
well as in its laim to bounded systematiity. This failure was to leave Construtivism
as the predominant non-metaphysial alternative to Platonism.
5.2 The Middle Ground of Construtivism
Construtivism (or Intuitionism), as a oneptual reation to the notion of Platonist
mathematis, ontends that mathematial objets exist only is so far as they an be
onstruted. Truth statements applied to entities of innite extent are thus not permis-
sible unless they an be onstruted (the problem within formalism that gave rise to
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Godel's theorem). The truths of mathematis are thus not empty of ontent (as they
are in Formalism) and not abstrated from human experiene (as in Platonism); they
are primarily experiened by an thinking agent. The onept of truth is hene modied
to that of justiation.
Consequently, the most harateristi logial expression of Construtivism is that it
rejets the law of the exluded middle, (X _ :X), but retains the law of ontradition,
:X ! (X ! Y ) (nothing is both X and :X). In essene, to exert the existene of a
thing is to have obtained a proof of it. As suh it generalised standard Boolean logi to
intuitionisti logi by employing the Heyting algebras (eg [11℄). Here, the standard truth
values 0; 1 are extended to beome partially ordered sets (indiating dierent stages
of truth), allowing a diret isomorphism between mathematial proofs and omputer
programs to be onstruted (the Curry-Howard orrespondene). Hene, the notion of
mathematial truth gains a temporal aspet onsistent with its interpretation in terms
of embodied ageny.
Several authors have sought to make expliit this onnetion between mathematially
onstruted truth and the ognitive apabilities of humans, examples being [145℄, [124℄.
Perhaps the strongest statement of the notion that mathematis derives from speially
embodied ognition is given in 'Where Mathematis Comes From: How the Embodied
Mind Brings Mathematis into Being.' [71℄ in whih the authors seek to orrelate
mathematial struture with metaphors of human ageny, nding underlying proesses
suh as objet olletion, objet onstrution and linear measurement, from whih they
proeed to derive muh of lassial mathematis.
These ognitive models of the attainment of mathematial truth are hene resonant
of the embodied aspet of ognitive bootstrapping, but do not yet fully enompass its
notion of autonomous pereptual updating. For this we need to onsider the relationship
between axiom and proof more losely:
5.3 Cognitive Bootstrapping and Construtivism
Chaitin [21℄, takes the onstrutivist idea to the broadest onlusion, viewing not merely
mathematial proofs, but also the axioms of mathematis as being, rather than simply
assumed a priori, instead derived from our experiene, persisting ognitively as onve-
niently ompat representations of our mathematial experiene. Using the notion of
algorithmi ompressibility (whih is given a formal treatment in the next setion), he
demonstrates that it is not possible in general (in the sense of its being inomputable) to
establish the smallest possible axiom sheme apable of ompatly representing any given
mathematial agent's pereptual history (a mathematial agent being one that proeeds
from axiom to proof by arbitrary theorem onstrution). It is possible, however, to gain
partial improvement in the ompatness of the mathematial agent's proof-theoreti
experiene by adopting diering axiom shema in order to failitate future proof on-
strution (for instane, by adopting some unprovable but plausible onjeture within
the urrent axiom sheme as a novel axiom, or by adopting as novel axioms the sim-
ple results that sometimes arise from omplex proof-onstruts, suh as Fermat's last
theorem).
Given that this implies a lak of absolute validation for any proposed axiomatisation of
mathematial truth, Chaitin evolves an 'experimentalist' view of mathematis, in whih
55
mathematiians beome agents searhing (neessarily non-exhaustively) a spae of pos-
sible truths, happening upon 'interesting' axiom systems (like those underlying omplex
numbers) at random. They are in no way apable of exhausting the possibilities in
advane by appliation of any formal system (suh as that envisaged the Hilbert pro-
gram), and must onsequently update their axiom system on the basis of serendipitous
disovery and onjeture.
Mathematis as a whole is thus, in Chaitin's model, an exerise in ognitive bootstrap-
ping; we postulate an initial axiom system (suh as those underlying integer arithmeti),
and use this as an interpretative basis upon whih to make enquiries about further math-
ematial truth possibilities (for instane, real-number arithmeti), updating our axiom
system as we go, and overlooking vast swathes of alternative possibilities (whih are
neessarily non-enompassable), basing our seletions on non-formalisable notions like
'utility' or 'elegane'. Mathematis thus progresses by aident, and eventually arrives
onvergently on a reasonably stable set of axioms (suh as the Peano axioms of set-
theory) that have the required, non-formalisable properties.
This view of observer-entred axiomati ontingeny is further underlined by the notion
[134℄ that, while the total set of axiom possibilities available to mathematiians may be
innite, their total information ontent is zero (by extension of the priniple that the
set of all possible bit-strings of length n an be dened by a (meta)-string of length only
log
2
n, but a single bit-string would require all n bits). The ensemble of all axioms is
thus, in a sense, equivalent to the absene of any axioms. Favouring this notion of the
informationless totality of axiom possibilities on the grounds that it onstitutes the most
general appliation of the priniple of Oam's Razor to the question of the nal ground
of mathematial truth would therefore suggest that there is no possible 'external' view
or nal meta-level haraterisation of the axiom system from whih one ould speify a
non-observer-relative, absolute axiomatisation. The only thing that ats to onstrain our
range of possible axiomatisation is then the anthropi self-seletion priniple, the notion
that our mathematial ndings must be onsistent with our existene as mathematial
agents. This implies that the prior axioms that dene the sope of possible mathematial
theorising in advane (ie possible mathematial experiene) are themselves updated
purely on the basis of the results of this experiene: a ognitive bootstrap, in other
words.
While these onsiderations are largely abstrat, and apply only on historial time-sales,
there does exist a well-grounded way of approahing the more immediate form of og-
nitive bootstrapping within a xed mathematial framework by treating it from a sta-
tistial standpoint. Indeed, there exists an established researh eld onerning the
treatment of pereption in statistial terms (f eg [66℄) whih we shall take as our start-
ing point. The next setion will hene look into the appliation of Bayesian theory to
the notion of ognitive bootstrapping.
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6 Statistial Context for Cognitive Bootstrapping
6.1 Bayesian Updating and Cognitive Bootstrapping
We shall argue in this setion that the statistial tehnique of Bayesian updating repre-
sents the most general framework from whih to onsider the notion of ognitive boot-
strapping. Other approahes to hypothesis updating are, of ourse, possible, and are
perhaps more representative of human ognition: for instane, the modelling of agents
that make non-Bayesian assumptions has beome a major area of interest in eonomi
theory over the last few years (see for example, [33℄)
11
. However, for the present purposes
we shall regard all suh tehniques as either approximations to the ideal of Bayesian up-
dating, or else laking Bayesian updating's relative ontologial neutrality (partiularly
in relation to the possibility of determining a universal prior - f setion 6.2.3). Sine
ognitive bootstrapping is essentially the method by whih pereptual ontologies are
arrived at, this onsideration is of the rst importane.
Bayesian methods of inferene (eg [5℄) dier from lassial statistial inferene tehniques
in that probability values are interpreted, not as (asymptoti or nite) trial frequenies,
but rather as degrees of belief. Bayesian inferene is thus a formalisation of the method-
ology of siene, having the apaity to validate hypotheses or otherwise in relation to
experimental data. Bayesian updating is thus the appliation of Bayesian inferene in
relation to novel experimental data.
Where this latter method an legitimately be regarded as a preursor of ognitive boot-
strapping lies in the fat that the novel experimental data must rst be interpreted in
terms of the urrent hypotheses as to the ground-truth model underlying the experimen-
tal data, in order that, in an at of reiproation, their likelihoods an be determined in
relation to the totality of the observed data, both novel and pre-existing. The proess
is thus iteratively updated until model onvergene is ahieved (assuming that the ex-
perimental data is drawn from a singular distribution, and that the range of hypotheses
available to the hypothesising agent is suÆient to inlude, or at least approximate this
distribution)
12
.
Hene, in performing Bayesian updating, we rst alulate the probability that a par-
tiular hypothesis, H, is true given the experimental data to date, X
t
:
P (HjX
t
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P (H)P (X
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jH)
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i
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Here, P (H) is the degree of prior belief in H and
P
8i
P (XjH
i
)  P (X) is the degree
of prior belief in X; P (XjH) is hene the extent to whih H an explain X (or the
onditional probability of X given that H has ourred in non-subjetivist terms).
When H
i
is parameterised via n variables 
j
, j = 1 : : : n, the individual hypotheses, H(
~
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) form the posterior distribution of model parameters:
11
In this researh eld innate stohasti biases of the human ognitive system, suh as realised sample
bias and onformation bias, an be demonstrated to have a measurable umulative eet on eonomi
indiators suh as stok pries.
12
Note that we are not, here, making a onnetion with parametri bootstrapping (eg [57℄); the
quantity we are 'bootstrapping' into existene are the model parameters, not the sample data.
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(P (
~
) is the prior parameter distribution, often assumed to be uniform.)
Critially, even for large variations in the prior parameter probability distribution as-
sumptions, Bayesian observers will tend to nd the posterior probabilities asymptotially
onvergent.
The model parameters are hene onstrained by the observational data. It is onse-
quently possible to make quantitative preditions in relation to novel data possibilities,
X, in the light of these onstraints:
P (XjX
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) =
Z
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P (Xj
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P (
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jX
t
) (8)
(atualised data is then appended to the existing data X
t
to give the next temporal
iteration of the experimental data, X
t+1
.)
It is also possible in this framework to onsider models in whih memory resoure is
nite, in whih ase only a given, xed quantity of experimental data an be retained
at eah iteration. Sometimes the 'forgetting' implied by this an even assist the proess
of posterior onvergene, sine the impat of poor initial bootstrap priors are quikly
removed from the system.
Whihever form is adopted, at eah iteration of Bayesian updating our range of plausible
world parameterisations beomes, in a sense, the perspetive through whih we interpret
atual world data; data has a dierent meaning within the diering parameter-models
(as indiated by their diering preditive funtionalities), even though this data is itself
used to onstrain the models. This interpretive aspet is thus more expliit than in
onventional Bayesian inferene, where model inferene in relation to the experimental
data takes plae in a simultaneous bath.
It is hene in this potentially paradoxial iteration between interpretation and inter-
pretative model inferene in whih the relevane of Bayesian updating to ognitive-
bootstrapping lies, although the parallel with Dilthey's notion of the hermeneuti irle
annot yet be formally drawn. This possibility only beomes fully realised on onsid-
ering agent-based Bayesian updating (eg [45℄), wherein the model onjetures beome
the basis upon whih experimental testing, as opposed to data interpretation, proeeds
(the loal onsisteny heking of globally-attributed word-meaning hypotheses in the
hermeneuti irle of interpretation may be onsidered a form of experimental testing in
so far as it involves the seletion of a partiular hypothesis for atualisation in relation
to whih the other hypotheses are rened).
Preditive models are hene used in agent-based Bayesian updating to guide the data
seeking proess, as opposed to passively aepting novel data as is the ase in the
non-agent-based senario. Thus, for instane, a mobile robot might employ a partially-
onstrained model of wall orientations within a room in order to navigate towards hy-
pothesised orner-loations so as to provide better onstraint information for that same
partial hypothesis; unertainties an thus be made to swiftly onverge to zero in an in-
tentional fashion. We therefore now turn expliitly to the subset of Bayesian updating
known as Bayesian exploration.
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6.1.1 Bayesian Exploration
Bayesian exploration diers from onventional Bayesian updating in being ative, rather
than passive. Hene, rather than a Bayesian agent being limited to interpreting exter-
nally reeived data, Bayesian exploration involves the ative seeking of data with whih
to onrm or deny its environmental hypotheses. In this way, the method onstitutes
a onstrained realisation of the onept of ognitive bootstrapping, sine the inferred
higher level pereptual hypotheses (for instane environmental maps
13
) by whih the
agent's data-seeking ations are governed derive from low-level a priori perept-data
(for instane radar distane measurements) that themselves remain exempt from the
pereptual updating proess. In this way the potential hiken-and-the-egg paradox is
averted, in whih the agent must interpret low-level sensory data in terms of its high
level pereptual inferenes (the agent 'positions' novel inoming sensory data relative to
the urrently favoured environmental map by whih it is manoeuvring), and yet must
also build this high-level pereption from that same low-level data.
A very general mathematial realisation of this idea in terms of autonomous mobile
ageny omes from [125℄. Here, Sim asserts that when given a partiular sensor reading
z, and a 'pose' q (dened as the global parameter vetor dening the state of the agent),
the likelihood of a partiular 'map' m being orret, given the agent's urrent state, is
given by the Bayesian rule:
P (mjq; z) =
P (zjq;m)P (mjq)
P (zjq)
(9)
The map is thus understood as a preditor for agent observations given a partiular
pose.
Exploration, in this ontext, is onsidered the attempt to establish the pose q that
maximises the expeted entropy redution in the distribution P (mjq; z).
This hange in entropy is given in terms of the ross entropy:
G =  
Z
m2M
P (mjq; z)log
P (m)
P (mjq; z)
dm (10)
The expetation of the hange of entropy (the term whose magnitude is to be maximised)
is thus:
E(G) =  
Z
z
0
2Z
G dz
0
(11)
13
An environmental map would be regarded as an objet model when not onsidering Bayesian
exploration. However, it is here employed as the both the nal objet model and the sensory ordering
onept through whih novel data is interpreted during the exploratory phase, thereby qualifying as a
pereptual ategorisation for half of the iterative yle.
In fully unonstrained ognitive bootstrapping, however, we would expet to have the potential for
inferene of novel pereptual ategories with the apability of delineating the possibility of partiular
objets, but whih ould not, in themselves, be equated with any partiular objet so oneived. Perept
ategories thus, in general, exist at a meta-level with respet to pereived objets: however, note that
in a hierarhially open-ended ognitive systems perept-ategorisations an themselves beome objets
as further meta-ategorisation are oneived.
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Parameterisation of m is not always obvious; the author, however, onjetures that m
an, at worst, be parameterised as the total set of observations: m 2 Z  Z  : : : Z.
The analysis thus far assumes that pose is known; of ourse this is not the ase for
the autonomous, bootstrapping agent. Rather, the pose must be inferred from the sen-
sory data and the map estimates. That is, the map (whih serves to predit agent
observations given a partiular pose) must itself be used to determine the pose, the tau-
tologial pereptual problem we have identied as neessitating the ognitive bootstrap
mehanism.
The only way to resolve this problem is thus to invoke the a priori ertainty of the
motor-spae of ations, a. The agent's goal must therefore be to selet an ation a that
maximises the expetation E(G) of the whole onguration spae, C:
E(E(G)ja) =  
Z
q2C
E(G) dq (12)
(this need not neessarily be as exhaustive as indiated; posteriors often need only be
partially sampled: this is Monte Carlo updating [73℄, an approah that nds many
appliations within the literature.)
This latter equation onsequently represents, in mathematial terms, a relatively gen-
eralised oneption of ognitive bootstrapping for Bayesian agents, given the impliit
pereptual restritions; in fat, the information-theoretially optimal form of the non-
open-ended variety of ognitive bootstrapping for agents oupying a stohastially-
determined environment.
The most general forms of Bayesian-updating, however, are those in whih we do not
limit the range of parametri possibilities in advane. Hene, rather than regarding un-
sampled parameters as non-existent, we an instead regard them as not yet determined,
allowing for the possibility of emergent models of ognition. Bayesian exploration an
hene be made to simultaneously explore the pereptual spae as well as the environ-
mental spae, beoming, in the proess, entirely autonomous. This type of approah, in
whih the sope of disoverable truth is not limited in advane, in hene resonant with
the mathematially onstrutivist notion of intuitionisti logi [17℄, in whih the law of
the exluded middle is eliminated in favour of temporally-dependant truth values ('true'
being reinterpreted as 'not yet falsied', as bets a nite, embodied, and onsequently
non-omnisient logial agent).
One suh pratial framework for formalising this approah mathematially is that of
the Dirihlet proesses.
6.1.2 Dirihlet Proesses: A Framework for Non-Parametri Bayesian Up-
dating
Dirihlet proesses arise in the study of nonparametri Bayesian theory [34℄ as a means of
determining how new model omponents are generated in response to novel experimental
data. These omponents are hene generated from a innite-dimensional distributional
meta-parameter, G
0
, with a frequeny governed governed by a seond meta-parameter,
.  an, in general, be determined diretly from the experimental data via maximum
likelihood estimation: G
0
has usually to be assumed, though work exists (eg [152, 81℄)
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to suggest that this too may be estimated.
Typially, Dirihlet proesses are employed in the ontext of mixture models (see, for ex-
ample, [112℄, whose terminology we follow), for whih  determines the rate of formation
of mixture omponents. Mixture models are dened as having additive omponents of
idential funtional form, f , but with diering internal parameters, 
i
(whih are hene
drawn from G
0
): they also dier in their external multipliers, 
i
. In experimental se-
narios in whih Dirihlet proesses are assumed to be operating, we thus typially have
N individual measurements, y
i
, drawn from an unknown number of mixtures k. The
probability of eah individual measurement is, for a model of xed k:
P (y
i
) =
k
X
j=1

j
f(y
i
j
j
) (13)
(Eah measurement is assumed to be generated by a single omponent).
A signiant problem is thus to determine the number of mixture omponents k to
onsider in relation to the observed data.
To begin to address this, we rst onsider the Dirihlet distribution. The Dirihlet
distribution is derived from the Polya Urn metaphor, in whih a bag of  balls have
olours labelled j with initial frequeny m
j
. Balls are then drawn at random and
replaed by two balls of the same olour. It is straightforward to show that, for a given
observational history y
1:N
, the probability of nding that the next observation, y
N+1
, is
of olour j is:
P (y
N+1
jy
1:N
) =
m
j
+
P
N
i=1
Æ(y
i
  j)
 +N
(14)
(Æ is the Kroneker delta)
The Dirihlet proess is a ontinuous version of this formula in whih k ! 1 and M
beomes ontinuous, giving the Blakwell-MaQueen formula:
P (y
N+1
jy
1:N
) =
(
1
+N
Æ(y
i
  j) 9l  N := y
l
= j

+N
M(j) y
l
6= j; 81 < l < N
(15)
Hene, in the Dirihlet proess mixture model, for eah measurement y
i
, a orresponding

i
is drawn from G
0
(), whih substitutes for M (the ontinuous base measure in the
Blakwell-MaQueen formulation):
P (
i
= j
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
i 1
; ; G
0
) =
(
1
+i 1
P
i 1
j=0
Æ(   
j
) 9j  i := 
j
= 

+i 1
G
0
8j < i; 
j
6= 
(16)
Combining this with Bayes theorem, we thus have a formula for determining the poste-
rior probability distribution of 
i
given a partiular data instane y
i
:
P (
i
= j
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
i 1
; ; G
0
; y
i
) / f(y
i
j
i
)P (
i
= j
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
i 1
; ; G
0
) (17)
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We an thus begin to appreiate how the Dirihlet proess an be used to onstrain
unsampled parameters in potentially innite parameter-spae models using only the
urrently deteted data. Dirihlet proess are a hene one pratial framework for per-
forming open-ended, non-parametri Bayesian updating of the type required for emer-
gent ognition, nding agent-based appliation in, for instane, environmental topology
mapping within mobile robots in [113℄.
Following this pratial indiation of how it is possible to limit the onstraints inherent
in parametri Bayesian exploration to allow for truly emergent pereptual possibilities
(so that, for instane, a mobile roboti-agent ould determine an appropriate perep-
tual/motor saling parameter to employ on the y), we should now like to look at the
possibility of absolutely unonstrained approahes to Bayesian updating, wherein no a
priori mathematial form is imposed in advane.
6.2 Algorithmi-Information Theoreti Frameworks for Fully
Unonstrained Bayesian Updating
In order to arrive at the most general form of Bayesian updating, we shall rst need
to explore the notion of Kolmogorov omplexity, an algorithmi generalisation of the
onept of informational entropy. In onsequene of this oneptual origin, Kolmogorov
omplexity is often referred to as 'algorithmi entropy' in the literature.
Before dening the quantity formally, a few terminologial determinations need to be
given: l(x) shall denote the number of bits in a given bitstring, x. The equational
form T (p) = x will be understood to state that the Turing mahine, T , with input, p,
omputes x and then halts.
U

is then a dened as a universal Turing mahine if there exists a onstant string (a
ompiler), p
T
, suh that for all Turing mahines, T 2 C, U

(p
t
p) = x.
The Kolmogorov omplexity K(x) of a bitstring x an now be dened, for a xed U , as:
K
U
(x) = min
p
fl(p) : U(p) = xg (18)
The Kolmogorov omplexity is hene the minimum-lengthed Turing mahine that om-
putes x (with respet to U).
We an hene straightaway infer from this that the majority of bitstrings, x, are random,
whih is to say, algorithmially inompressible, sine, for a given n, there are a total of
2
n
programs with  n bits, but >> 2
n
bitstrings with > n bits.
A seondary onsequene of this denition of algorithmi omplexity arises as a onse-
quene of the notion of a ompiler; we nd that for any two universal Turing mahines,
U
1
and U
2
the relationK
U
1
(x) = K
U
2
(x)+O(1) holds. We do not therefore need to worry
about the partiular speiation of U , and the Kolmogorov omplexity of a partiular
bitstring x ahieves a near-universal form.
However, as it stands, this denition of algorithmi omplexity is inomputable for any
given U as a onsequene of the Halting problem. The notion is therefore neessarily
an abstrat one; this does not, though, prevent us from utilising the onept in order to
rene our notion of Bayesian updating:
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6.2.1 The Bayesian Prior Problem
Perhaps the most ontroversial aspet of Bayesian theories onerns the speiation of
the distribution of priors, P (H). In a onstrained environment, however, we are often
justied in assuming uniform prior distributions over partiular parameters suh as the
kernel standard deviation. This is partiularly so if Bayesian updating tends rapidly
towards a onvergent solution independent of the prior distribution.
However, a free-form, open-ended ognitive agent apable of learning omplex and novel
models annot freely make this type of a priori assumption. We have, in the previous
setion, looked at how model order parameters might be made open-ended; however this
tehnique neessarily assumes a xed kernel form. What we would ultimately like to
ahieve is a Bayesian updating system that, in addition to making no prior parameter
distribution assumptions, also makes no prior model assumptions, thereby allowing a
ompletely general form of P (H) to emerge.
One way to ahieve this is to invoke the minimum desription length (MDL) priniple:
6.2.2 Bayes Theory and the Minimum Desription Length Priniple
The minimum desription length priniple asserts that the most plausible hypothesis
for explaining a given set of empirial data, X, is the one that minimises the sum of
the hypothesis's desription length in bits (l(H)) and the data's desription length in
bits when that data is enoded by that hypothesis, (l
H
(X)). In other words, the MDL
priniple asserts Oam's Razor in terms of the total information ontent of both the
model and the model-interpreted data.
If we formalise this more exatly in information-theoreti terms, the desription length of
H is given by the quantity   log P (H), the desription length of X in terms of (ie given)
the hypothesis H is given by the quantity   log P (XjH), and the desription length of
hypothesis H in terms of (given) the data X is given by the quantity   log P (HjX).
Therefore, the MDL priniple states that we wish to obtain the hypothesis H that
minimises the quantity:
  log P (HjX) =   log P (XjH)  log P (H) (19)
whih is equivalent to minimising;
  log P (HjX) =   log P (XjH)  log P (H) + C (20)
for C an arbitrary onstant.
Letting  C equate to the desription length of the data   log P (X) (whih is a onstant
in this senario), we obtain:
  log P (HjX) =   log P (XjH)  log P (H) + log P (X) (21)
Exponentiation of this quantity suggests that the MDL priniple requires that we nd
the H that maximises:
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P (HjX) =
P (XjH)P (H)
P (X)
(22)
This, however, is exatly equivalent to Bayes theorem. Hene, by inversion, the Bayes
approah is simply a restatement of the minimum desription priniple in probabilisti
terms.
Equipped with this reformulation of Bayes theorem, as well our earlier understanding of
Kolmogorov omplexity, it now beomes possible to address the Bayesian prior problem
and propose a form for P (H).
6.2.3 A Universal Prior for Bayesian Updating
Following the desription of Kolmogorov omplexity, we are now in a position to dene
the prior probability of a single piee of data represented by the bitstring X as being
P
U
1
(X), the probability of randomly guessing the program p that omputes it on U
1
(we shall assume a uniform distribution over the binary digits [O; 1℄). This is given, for
equal probability random binary digits, by the Solomono-Levin distribution:
P
U
1
(X) =
X
p
(
p : U
1
(p) = X
1
2
l(p)
)
(23)
From the ompiler theorem we have that adopting an alternative universal Turing ma-
hine, U
2
, modies the above to:
P
U
1
(X) =
X
p
(
p : U
2
(p
T
p) = X
1
2
l(p)
)
(24)
however, by denition;
P
U
2
(X) =
X
p
(
p : U
2
(p
T
p) = X
1
2
l(p)+l(p
T
)
)
(25)
and hene;
P
U
2
(X) =
1
2
p
T
P
U
1
(X) (26)
That is, the two probabilities dier by only a onstant fator (the probability of or-
retly guessing the ompiler, in fat). Probability ratios for individual bitstrings are
therefore independent of the universal Turing mahine hosen, and the prior probability
distribution over the array of possible bitstrings, P
U
is hene universal.
It is, moreover, possible to show [72℄ that P
U
(X) = O

2
 K
U
(X)

, or that the probability
of guessing at random any omputational model of X is essentially equal to guessing its
simplest.
We an hene nd an algorithmi justiation of Oam's Razor by looking at an ex-
tension of the data sequene X, X
0
(suh that X 2 X
0
):
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PU
(X
0
jX) =
P (X
0
)
P (X)
= O
 
2
 K
U
(X
0
)
2
 K
U
(X)
!
= O
 
1
2
K
U
(X
0
) K
U
(X)
!
(27)
In other words, the most probable observational ontinuation of an observed sequene
X is the one with the smallest additional Kolmogorov omplexity; the simplest theory
to t any set of observations is therefore the more likely.
The above strongly suggests the appliation of algorithmi theory for ahieving the most
general form of Bayesian updating/ognitive bootstrapping. However, we are at present
limited by the inomputability of K(X) (although some authors, for instane, [101℄,
would argue that these barriers are not atually appliable to truly ognitive entities).
We therefore turn to a onsideration of how this diÆulty might be overome pratially:
6.2.4 Pratial Implementation of Algorithmi Bayesian Updating
The inomputability of K(X) manifests itself as the failure to halt of U

(p), a situation
that invariably arises as soon as p beomes equal to the index of any program that
inorporates U

itself along with another output. In this ase we have the impossible
situation of U

attempting to ompute its own nal output plus some additional output
value; a situation that annot meaningfully terminate in the result state other than for
ertain inonsistent axiom sets.
We have always therefore to work with a nite temporal resoure in order to pratially
utilise Kolmogorov omplexity. This is aptured by the notion of Levin omplexity [72℄:
K
t
(X) = min
p
l(p) + logT
p
X
: U(p) = X (28)
Here T
p
X
is the number of iterations or omputational steps that the Universal Turing
mahine of index p must undergo before arriving at X (note that this is not now the
output of a halted program, neessarily).
An implementable form of the onditional probability of a sequene X over the universal
prior, P (XjH) an now be determined via Levin's universal searh algorithm, whih
provably ahieves the optimal performane for a xed temporal budget.
Levin's universal searh algorithm thus generates all p in order of inreasing K
t
. Hene
the universal searh implements a series of phases, i, i = 1; : : : k whih run in lexio-
graphi order all self-delimiting programs p of length less than k for 2
i
2
 l(p)
iterations,
where k is the rst suh that the ondition U(k) = X holds.
A pratial implementation of the above is given by [62℄ in the ontext of neural-network
parameterisation. The method is of potentially very muh more general utility, of ourse;
indeed it an be reasonably argued that the Universal Searh method is the most general
model inversion (and hene inferential learning) methodology.
For this general omplexity shema to be appliable to ognitive bootstrapping, as op-
posed to merely objet model regression, we need to revert to our former terminology
and write p = p
T
0
p
0
, that is, we need to deompose the index p into its separate om-
ponents: p
T
0
, the index of the Turing mahine T
0
emulated by the Universal Turing
mahine U , and p
0
, the input to this Turing mahine. Doing so allows us to distinguish
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T0
as the pereptual mehanism by whih the a priori observational sequene X is rein-
terpreted as the pereptual datum, p
0
. Hene Levin omplexity, in minimising p, thus
serves to simultaneously update both the pereptual mehanism and, by impliation,
the pereptual datum (whih is to say, the objet model).
If we hene expliitly inorporate an experimental-validation phase, so that p
0
orre-
sponds, instead, to the alternating sequene [p
0
1
; a
0
1
; p
0
2
; a
0
2
; : : :℄, where the a
n
are the
hypothesis-testing exploratory ations giving rise to pereptual observations p
n
, then
an inrease in Levin omplexity that is log-linear with time would indiate that the
pereptual model has onverged.
More generally, sine the pereptual updating aspet of ognitive bootstrapping is es-
sentially the at of ompressing the interpretative framework of pereption with respet
to the pereptions that this ompression gives rise to, the retention of a high-level
pereption-ation link that is hierarhially derived from the a priori pereption-ation
link allows the ompression to be tested for its generality. Compressibility hene serves
only as the basis for the pereptual updating proess; it is ations (in terms of the
perepts that they give rise to) that serve as validation riterion for the pereptual
updating.
6.3 Summary of Division
We have, in this part of the survey, looked both at the mathematial underpinnings of
the onept of ognitive bootstrapping, and onversely, within the foundational setion,
at the ognitive bootstrap underpinning for the onept of mathematis.
We hene have a two-tier notion of ognitive bootstrapping; in so far as we take the
axiom shema of mathematis to be a given, we have proposed a universal model of
ognitive bootstrapping in terms of agent-based Bayesian updating arried out within an
algorithmi-information theoreti framework, nding an ideal mathematial form in the
notion of Bayesian exploration: on the other hand, in so far as we an regard the axiom
shema itself as subjet to empirial seletion (in Chaitin's model), we an regard the
exerise of mathematis as itself of the form of a ognitive bootstrap. We regard the most
immediately pratially-appliable desription of ognitive bootstrapping for embodied
artiial intelligene (robotis) as that expressed by equation 12, whih aptures the
notion of the non-reinterpretability of a priori pereption/ation ategories that must,
aording to our Kantian analysis, underpin pereptual updating within autonomous
agents.
Similarly, and in keeping with the doument's strutural progression from abstration
towards appliation, for the next part of the survey (in whih we explore the om-
putational perspetive on ognitive bootstrapping), we shall hene onsider the axiom
shema to be exatly the standard Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory, and further
that the ognitive bootstrapping is of a non-universal kind (none of the mehanisms sur-
veyed employ the omputable Levin searh form of Kolmogorov inferene within their
bootstrapping methods). Hene, it remains for the most generally implementable form
of ognitive bootstrapping outlined in this setion to be onstruted.
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Part V
6.4 A Note on Bootstrapping Methods in General Computa-
tional Siene
Bootstrap methods are part of the ommon urreny of omputer siene, partiularly
with respet to issues of language origination. Here, the paradox to whih the boot-
strapping proess is addressed involves the notion of Turing equivalene; one a language
has suÆient expressive power to be determined Turing-omplete, it is apable of ex-
pressing any omputation, and therefore of emulating any omputational language. In
partiular, it is apable of emulating itself. Thus, one a minimal subset of a high-level
language has attained Turing-omplete funtionality, it an then be used to extend itself;
the language has, in a sense, begun to write itself, or self-ompile.
Very often, one this has been ahieved, the original Turing-omplete subset of the
language used to bootstrap the rest of language into existene an be forgotten, or
even omitted. In ertain very-high level languages there is onsequently no trae of the
originary language funtionality, and hene it appears to have 'pulled itself up by its
own bootstraps'.
A similar situation is enountered in the initialisation of omputers with omplex operat-
ing systems; an operating system is required to mediate between hardware and software,
however, an operating system must, as software, rst be loaded on the hardware (re-
quiring a further interfae between hardware and software, and so on ad innitum).
This paradox of innite regression is resolved by having a small inbuilt (ROM-based)
operating system alled the bootstrap loader with just enough funtionality to ahieve
the loading task in hardware. Bootstrap loading, in its abbreviated form, hene gives
us the term 'booting'.
The familiarity of bootstrap ideas within general omputing has meant that they are
naturally applied to the problem of autonomous artiial ageny. The following se-
tions will therefore outline a representative number of suh approahes, in so far as the
resulting system of bootstrapping an reasonably be onsidered ognitive, if only within
its domain of operation.
7 Cognitive Bootstrapping Methods in the Field of
Artiial Intelligene
Various modalities of ognitive bootstrapping exist within the eld of artiial intelli-
gene, but two broad haraterisations are, in partiular, apparent: the embodied and
the disembodied. We have already seen a number of examples of the latter in the og-
nitive linguistis setion of the survey; we should like, in the following setion, however,
to fous on the spei aspet of situatedness within ognitive bootstrapping. That is,
we wish to look at artiial implementations of the ognitive bootstrap that diretly
mediate between an artiial oneptualising agent and the real world by virtue of the
embodiment of the former in the latter.
67
7.1 Robotis
The engineering eld in whih embodied ognitive bootstrapping reeives its most tan-
gible expression is thus robotis; the study of programmable mahine systems. When
this programmability extends to the notion of self-programmability, we are onerned
with the partiular eld subset known as autonomous robotis.
When the goal of an autonomous robot is to onstrut a sensory model of its (presumably
previously unexperiened) environment, we are then impliitly in the realm of artiial
embodied ognition. While early attempts at robotis typially sought to solve this
problem at the sensor level, for instane by using radio markers or range-nding, reent
advanes in the omputer proessing power available for real-time omputation have
allowed robotis to begin to employ ognitive vision methods, for whih the sensory
input onsists of mono-, stereo- or multi-sopi amera feeds.
Environmental modelling in the ognitive vision regime is hene analogous to that ex-
hibited by the mammalian ognitive vision system (partiularly when dealing with with
stereo and multisopi amera feeds, for whih the primary omputational burden is the
three-dimensional reonstrution of the environment from planar projetions). Typial
low-level ognitive tasks thus inlude edge detetion, objet segmentation, motion reg-
istration, and so on, with potentially ever higher levels of ognitive abstration possible
beyond the immediate base-level vision tasks.
The degree to whih environmental ognition an be made fully open-ended is thus
a matter of arhiteture; however, it is neessary, or at least, vastly simplifying, to
inorporate a number of a priori onstraints on the ognitive reinterpretation proess,
the general minimum being the presene of a sensory topology that denes the arena in
whih the autonomous robot is ative as a spae. Cognitive bootstrapping an thus, in its
fuller implementations, be essentially unbounded within the usual Kantian onstraints,
or else an our within presribed limits that go well beyond those required a priori:
both of these possibilities are onsidered in the following setions.
We shall hene set out to review a representative range of ognitive modelling approahes
to autonomous robotis, and shall, in keeping with the overall struture of the survey,
ommene with the most open-ended suh approahes (that is, ones in whih a priori
pereptual preoneptions are kept to a minimum), moving on to the more limited
ognitive bootstrap models, suh as SLAM robotis.
7.1.1 Open-Ended Cognitive Bootstrapping in Autonomous Robots
Hierarhial Perept-Ation Approahes Hierarhial perept-ation approahes
to artiial ognition were rst proposed by [15℄, who employed the term subsumption
arhiteture. This approah was this intended to mimi the onnetion between sen-
sation and ation found in biologial agents, and was primarily intended to overome
the philosophial diÆulties with the onept of representation assoiated with lassial
approahes to artiial ognition. Here, only the external responses of the ognitive
agent to partiular environmental stimuli are onsidered, reduing the possibly subje-
tive onept of agent representation to the set of objetive ations obtained in response
to external stimuli.
The subsumption arhiteture hene admits of hierarhiality, wherein the higher ar-
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hitetural layers ontrol the behaviour of the lower via the mehanism of inhibition,
allowing the possibility of open-ended development of the ognitive agent's responses.
However, the possibility of abstrat symboli inferene in these higher hierarhial levels
is not diretly onsidered by Brooks.
Modayil [91℄ hene proposes a method of bootstrapping progressively higher levels of
symboli representation, up to and inluding the onept of objets, via the lustering of
representations from previous levels within his OPAL arhiteture (Objet Pereption
and Ation Learner). Bootstrap learning thus allows the system to move from egoentri
(view-entred) and alloentri (objet-entred) sub-symboli desriptions to symboli
objet-based desription by asending a four-fold hierarhy; Individuation, Traking,
Image Desription and Categorisation.
Individuation involves the use of oupany grids to lassify individual sensor readings
as either stati or dynami. Clusters of dynami readings are then traked over time to
provide an objet model; stable shape models are then onstruted from the onsistent
aspets of the objets so formed. OPAL is thus apable of autonomously disretizing the
sensory environment into a stati bakground, the learning robot, and a set of movable
objets.
It is then intended that ontrol laws be bound to the objet representations so that the
robot an dene a set of aordanes and thus engage in goal-entri ativity. These
goals an in turn rene the objet desription so as to make them truly agent-relative.
Granlund [47℄ provides a still more general arhiteture for ognitive robotis based on
the notion that sene desription is not required prior to ation. Thus, it is argued that
the failure of onventional ognitive arhitetures is due to the ategori abstration
of objets ourring at an intermediate stage between perept formation and ation
speiation. What is lost in this approah are the ontextual modiers neessary
for preise speiation of agent ation; in short, we gain desriptivity at the expense
of intentionality, the latter being relevant only to an embodied agent in a partiular
ontext
14
.
Granlund hene proposes a bootstrap mehanism for the initial learning of the embod-
ied system based on a pereption-ation feedbak yle. Here, in the learning phase
of the pereption-ation mapping, ation always preedes perept. Thus, the poten-
tially enormous omplexity of the perept domain is limited by onsidering only those
perepts related to ations, whih thus oupy a far smaller state-spae (an idea of
the information-theoreti disparity between these two dierent types of environmen-
tal modelling, the agent-spei and the agent-non-spei, an be found in [97℄). In
the absene of prior sene-knowledge ations are hene driven by biologially-motivated
random exploration impulses (literally random walks in the ation state spae).
The perept-ation mapping an thus be made subjet to various optimisation proe-
dures that allow ompat representation, and impliitly, therefore, generalisation. The
random ations and subsequent ompat perept mappings thus amount to an unsu-
pervised training of the arhiteture. There onsequently exists a natural stopping
riterion for the random ation impulses at the point at whih the ompat represen-
14
A ounter argument to this type of approah, however, is given in [2℄, whih suggests that
agent-based reinforement learning is more eetive when indiret (ie those whih build a full agent-
independent environmental model) than when diret (ie those whih learn diretly from the sensorimotor
experienes and abstrat the environment model).
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tation of the perept-ation mapping no longer undergoes signiant hange (learning
having onverged). At this point the random ation impulses an asend to a greater
level of abstration and operate on the higher-level perept-ation representations that
have been generated by the ompat generalisation. Of ourse, these higher level ation
impulses themselves generate further training data for the largely trained lower levels,
allowing for robust and adaptive learning aross the whole of the hierarhial struture
so formed
15
.
These ompat representations within the hierarhial perept-ation struture are sym-
bols, and orrespond preisely to the symbols employed in verbal ommuniation. Suh
ommuniation an hene be onsidered a low-bandwidth interation between agents
that allows omplex ations to be initiated in one agent by another by virtue of the 'un-
paking' of the ompat representations that takes plae as information travels down the
perept-ation hierarhy from the highest to the lowest levels. Symboli ommuniation
between suh agents is hene always grounded.
Meaningful ommuniation between agents must also presuppose ompat symboli rep-
resentations that are independent of partiular agents' urrent situations, even though
they must be diretly appliable to it. This amounts to a requirement that ommu-
niation is objetive; it must thus refer to objet-entri desriptions. Hene a verbal
instrution from one agent to another might refer to the plaing of one objet on top of
another: it is then for the individual agents to relate this persepetiveless desription to
their immediate experiene of a perspetival olletion of low-level perepts (orientated
lighting-gradients, edges et).
Thus, for a ommuniative agent, the view-dependant desription must o-exist with
the objet-entred desription in a manner that realls the disussion of the relationship
of the transendental unity of appereption to the a priori objet onept set out in
the Philosophy division of this survey. The dierene here is that the objet onept is
derived from the a priori possibility of ompat, generalised objet-perept mappings,
while for Kant the objet onept is itself an a priori onept: Granlund's a priori
ognitive generalisation struture is not, in itself, expliitly geometri.
Granlund further proposes a spei data representation for the perept-ation pair-
ings that naturally allows for these mode separations and generalisations; the hannel
representation, whih ensures a fast onvergene of the learning phase by virtue of its
tendeny to identify loal subsystems.
The ognitive arhiteture thus dened is learly one of ognitive bootstrapping; the
inferred higher-level ognitive hypotheses validate themselves in terms of the lower-level
hypotheses and vie-versa by virtue of the 'ltering-down' eet wherein exploratory
impulses in the onjetural high-level abstrated ognitive ategories (for instane, a
sensorimotor intention suh as driving a ar to a partiular loation) will result in
progressively more ontextualised low-level ations. Hene, the lower-level ognitive
ategories that pereive the immediate loality in terms of edges and verties et, pro-
15
Thus, to give a onrete human example of this type of hierarhial pereption-ation mapping,
we might initially learn to ride a biyle by experiening the way in whih the handle bars and pedals
reat to our ations independently of eah other. Only after the onepts of 'steering' and 'pedalling'
have beome well-established to ognition, having represented the totality of our experiene in the
two respetive areas in a ompat and generalised fashion, an we then proeed to learn a high-level
onept suh as 'ornering', requiring exploration of the spae of possible onjuntions of the onepts
of 'steering' and 'pedalling'.
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gressively ground the abstrat instrution in the real world and allow for the possibility
of empirial validation of the high-level inferenes in a way that would be impossible for
a purely symboli or 'top-down' system.
Sun [133℄, in setting out a foundation for artiial ognitive arhitetures, similarly
argues that human ognition is essentially 'bottom-up' and further, that minimal initial
bootstrap models are neessary to avoid over-representational models that may fail to
generalise.
Stein [131℄ also argues that goal-based behaviour in ognitive robots should be onsid-
ered, not at an abstrat symboli level, but rather at the lowest sensorimotor levels.
Hene, in projeting a goal, a roboti agent should utilise exatly the same exploratory
and learning proesses that it uses to interat with the real world, but instead substi-
tute a 'virtual reality' interfae at the very lowest level of the sensors and atuators.
This virtual reality is preisely the sensory map formed by the world-model urrently
hypothesised to be the most likely. 'Cognition', for Stein, is hene simply the imagined
sensation and ation impliit in traing out an ation path to a partiular goal state in
the world-model.
Stein's MetaToto hene self-trains its higher-level ognitive abilities using only its in-
ternal representations (whih may be independently learned). Thus, for instane, the
MetaToto-styled roboti agent might have an internal perept-ation model of a wine-
bottle and a wine-glass, and proeed to learn the onept of 'pouring' via this simplied
internal model, rather than in the real-world with its attendant omplexities.
Generalisation is thus absolutely impliit in suh a system; MetaToto is apable of
imagining any plausible extrapolation of the urrently experiened portion of the world,
and training itself to behave appropriately in all of these domains. It an thus onstrut
navigation systems that an ope with any theoretial terrain by building alternative
environments using random plaements of existing landmarks and exploring these in
terms of its own sensorimotor responses.
We might speulate (though Stein does not) that there is a Darwinian justiation
for this imaginative self-training; a biologial agent that tests its ation hypotheses in
imagination an rule out potentially unsurvivable ations without endangering itself.
Imaginative agents are thus more likely to prevail and reprodue than equivalent unre-
etive agents. In human terms, this priniple may also relate to the phenomenon of
sleep paralysis, whih we shall treat more ompletely in the disussion and onlusions
setion.
In the newly emerging, biologially-motivated eld of 'ognitive developmental robotis'
Asada et al. [3℄ propose, by analogy with human ognition, that robot design should not
fully embody either the nature or the nurture paradigms. That is, roboti agents should
neither have their behaviour predetermined by a programmer, nor have it derived via
purely environmental learning, sine if either of these strategies are fully impliit no new
knowledge is possible. In the former ase, this is beause hard-oded behaviour impedes
new interation possibilities; in the latter ase this is a onsequene of indisriminate
data olletion whih laks any intrinsi meaning without a set of well dened agent
apabilities to ground it.
Asada et al's proposed ognitive framework thus aknowledges the neessary a priori
struture that must underly any form of ognitive bootstrapping.
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Another framework for open-ended ognitive indution in autonomous robots is set out
by Nagai et al. [94℄. Their entral onern, 'Joint attention', is analogous to the objet
of Steel's 'talking heads' experiment detailed in setion 4, namely the oidentiation
of objets with a supervising agent in a rowded environment. The human supervisor
hene identies an objet by looking at it, and the agent attempts to bring the objet
into the entre of its visual eld on the basis of the supervisor's gaze diretion and the
disriminatory potentiality of the visual bakground. Nagai et al. bootstrap this proess
by embedded only two key mehanisms in the robot: visual attention and learning with
self-evaluation. The former mehanism thus attends to objets that it onsiders salient
within the robot's eld of view, and the latter mehanism determines the suess of the
agent's goals on a statistial basis.
Nagai et al. are able to demonstrate that joint attention then emerges as a higher-level
ognitive onept from these initial bootstrap mehanisms, and postulate that human
infants learn joint attention (whih is an essential prior stage in ommuniation) in the
same manner.
A more omplex framework for autonomous learning in audiovisual environments, one
that employs indutive logi programing to establish omplex temporal protools, is
given in [118℄ and [76℄. Here, symboli desriptions of a ontinuous amera-and-mirophone-
based sensory feed are generated via unsupervised lustering. These symboli desrip-
tions are then passed to a logial indution system in order to generate protool (rule-
based) models. The system is hene apable of inferring the rules of simple visual games
suh as 'snap' and 'paper-sissors-stone', nally substituting a simulated omposite of
the supervising human agent into the visual setting to at out the inferred rules in a
onvining fashion.
PROGOL is hene employed to provide an appropriately generalised rst-order logial
model of the underlying sene desriptors via inverse entailment. Should these symboli
desriptors be too numerous then redundant logial onepts with idential protool re-
lations will emerge, signiantly inreasing proessing time in the indutive logi model,
and requiring more training examples for aurate haraterisation. Should too few
lasses be generated, however, the ne struture of the logial protools neessary for
omplete haraterisation of the game rules will not be available. Hene, some method
of o-evolving logial inferene and symboli desription is required.
What makes the system of [118℄ and [76℄ one of ognitive bootstrapping is thus the feed-
bak that exists between the indutive logi module and the unsupervised lustering of
feature attributes. By omputing equivalene lasses of objets related by idential log-
ial struture, the indutive logial model provides a meta-lustering imperative within
the attribute domain. The system is thus, to a degree, self-foundational in its perept
ategorisations; the initial bootstrap perept lusterings an be overridden in the light
of new pereptual inferenes. (There is not, however, as yet a feature disambiguation
instrution arising from the inverse entailment; lustering is done with a suÆiently
high bias towards over-tting in order to guarantee all of the logial ne struture is
represented at the outset). The system hene onstitutes a two-stage realisation of the
perept-ation hierarhy impliit in self-grounding ognitive bootstrapping.
Self-Modelling Approahes Weng [144℄, in fousing on the problem of autonomous
ognitive development, introdues a novel form of roboti agent, the Self-Aware, Self-
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Eeting Agent. As well as sensing and reating to the environment via the usual
perept-ation strutures, the robot modelling also inludes perept states that relate
to the internal strutures of the agent, states, that is, that do not result in overt ations.
The system thus has internal sensors and internal eetors, in addition to the the usual
external sensors and eetors.
Awareness, Weng proposes, is generated by an agent's onsideration of various ation
alternatives and their possible eets
16
. In order for an agent to improve its overall
performane (in relation to some prespeied abstrat riterion), it must therefore model
it own deision rules and their onsequenes via the internal sensors and eetors. In
this exerise in 'learning how to learn' the system hene beomes self-aware.
Weng goes on to apply this priniple to ognitive vision (as realised in the mobile
robot SAIL), envisioning a ontinuous sensory-motor arhiteture modelled on biologial
systems in whih low-level pre-attentive vision is supervened upon by an attentive system
generated by inhibitory signals from higher levels of the (layered) vision hierarhy. The
system thus naturally allows for reognition of oluded images (for instane) by allowing
seletive fous on dierent parts of the simulated retina (whih onstitutes the lowest
level of the vision hierarhy). The entire ognitive sensorimotor system is thus, in eet,
a very generalised and hierarhial retina.
Hene, beause there exists the apaity for the higher-level retinal omponents to in-
hibit the lower levels, and beause the retinal hierarhy is pyramidal in struture, the
upper levels eetively at as generalised supervisors of the lower levels. In this way,
it is possible for SAIL to 'hain' learned responses together to form omplex and novel
behaviours from previously established lower-level responses. The system hene boot-
straps high level ognitive ategories from an initial pre-attentive world representation
(whih is simply the sensory input). The initial world representation thus has no goal-
related aspets; these are ditated only at the higher-level, in response to environmental
onditions (whih an inluded supervisory aspets).
Weng's model is hene very muh in the onnetionist paradigm of ognitive siene; he
argues that symboli manipulation, if it arises at all, must our within the sensorimotor
system and that this alone is suÆient to aount both for this as well as every other
high-level reasoning task, suh as planning and abstrat reasoning. A very similar
argument is put forward by Blank et al. in [9℄.
A further illustration of the importane of self-modelling in open-ended roboti agent
learning is given by Buhsbaum [18℄, who proposes to utilise an agent's own pereption-
ation models to learn from another roboti agent's experienes, without expliitly hav-
ing to experiene them for itself. She hene employs Simulation Theory, one of the dom-
inant theories of ognitive ageny in ognitive siene, arguing that we make preditions
about another agent's mental states by extrapolating our own behavioural mehanisms
into the other persons sensory spae.
Simulation theory is orroborated by the biologial disovery of 'mirror neurons' whih
similarly at as an interfae between observed and agent-motivated behaviours (and are
disussed in more detail in the nal setion).
In a similar approah, Polih and Gmytrasiewiz [107℄ use Kolmogorov omplexity the-
ory (disussed in the mathematis setion) to allow an agent to model another agent's
16
A view whih may be ompared to that of the phenomenonlogists in Part 1.
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behaviour within a multi-agent environment via Bayesian updating. Using a Kolmogorov
prior ensures that simplest models of other agents are favoured. Their method an thus,
in priniple, be extended to model the agent's own behavioural responses in a ompat
fashion, giving rise to a limited self-model in the manner of Weng, allowing for the pos-
sibility of a fully autonomous ognitive ageny able to asses and update its own learning
apability.
7.1.2 Constrained Cognitive Bootstrapping in Autonomous Robots
Having looked at very open-ended forms of ognitive bootstrapping in autonomous
agents, we now turn to more onstrained forms. We use the word 'onstrained' here
to mean that the bootstrapping is limited in the ognitive ategories the agent is nally
expeted to form; in partiular being limited to graph and geometry-based models of
its immediate environment.
Simultaneous Loalisation and Mapping A partiular sub-problem of roboti
mapping that has reeived muh attention is SLAM (simultaneous loalisation and map-
ping), whih relates to the potentially paradoxial situation of an agent attempting to
determine its loation within a map whilst simultaneously building that map (whih in
itself requires aurate loation knowledge, hene the paradox). This is essentially a
problem of ognitive bootstrapping, albeit within a very onstrained sense: the agent
does not have the freedom to open-endedly generate new ognitive ategories; rather
these are limited to partiular types of geometrial or graph-based models of the envi-
ronment, as well as positional and diretional models of the agent itself. The priniple
ognitive ategory to be bootstrapped is thus the map-relative agent loality, whih
exhibits stohasti unertainty in relation to both the ensemble of environmental map
hypotheses, as well as over the individual map hypotheses themselves.
A detailed survey of the area is given by Thrun [135℄, who argues that the most su-
essful approahes to this problem treat it in Bayesian terms (refer to the Mathematial
Perspetives division for arguments as to why we might expet this to be so). Perhaps
the most general mathematial form given for Bayesian mapping is that proposed by
Endo and Arkin in [32℄), whih uses only sensorimotor information and proeeds as
follows:
Given sensor outputs s
i
for a partiular 'instane' i initiated by the motor ommands
m
i
, an 'event' may be desribed as the triple e
i
= fs
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; n
i
g, representing the partiular
moment that a roboti agent is onsidered (by whatever riterion) to have experiened
an environmental novelty. n
i
is hene a traking number, detailing the number of events
to date (subjet to possible memory limitations). The historial sequene of events
leading up to and inluding e
i
is denoted by the supersripted quantity e
i
(and similarly
for the quantities m
i
and s
i
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The posterior probability of the roboti agent re-experiening the same event as that of
the previous time t
0
is hene given by:
p(e
i
0
js
i
; m
i
) = p(e
i
0
js
i
; s
i 1
; m
i
) (29)
/ p(s
i
je
i
0
; s
i 1
; m
i
)p(e
i
0
js
i 1
; m
i
) (30)
74
/ p(s
i
je
i
0
)p(e
i
0
js
i 1
; m
i
) (31)
/ p(s
i
je
i
0
)
Z
e
i
0
 1
2e
i
p(e
i
0
js
i 1
; m
i
; e
i
0
 1
)p(e
i
0
 1
js
i 1
; m
i
)de
i
0
 1
(32)
/ p(s
i
je
i
0
)
Z
e
i
0
 1
2e
i
p(e
i
0
jm
i
; e
i
0
 1
)p(e
i
0
 1
js
i 1
; m
i
)de
i
0
 1
(33)
(34)
(Applying the Bayes rule and Markov assumption as appropriate).
This quantity then represents the prospet of the robot loalising itself in terms of the
ognitive map. The term p(s
i
je
i
0
) is alled the pereptual model and is estimated via the
dierene between the urrent and previous environments:
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The motion model is then the term p(e
i
0
jm
i
; e
i
0
 1
) and may be estimated (on the as-
sumption of every event having being stored in memory) by:
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(37)
(n and  are normalisation and weighting onstants, respetively)
If the urrent event an then be related to the previous event e
i
0
beyond a ertain
probabilisti threshold (that varies in inverse proportion to i), the system an loalise
itself at that event on a maximum likelihood basis.
This sensor-driven Bayesian model does not, in itself, speify any partiular strategy
for initiating motor ommands m
i
, and an thus serve as the basis for imposing any
appropriate model of intentional high-level motor imperatives, suh as that of Bayesian
exploration as set out in setion 6.1.1. In this way Endo and Arkin's model an be
made into an expliitly ognitive bootstrapping one, without any a priori imposition
beyond a distintion between the sensor-spae and the motor-spae (the motor-spae
linkages are not subjet to unertainty, unlike the sensor-spae linkages; however, the
sensor primitives themselves are free from ambiguity).
In general, however, SLAM proeeds via the building of expliitly spatial environmental
models, rather than ompiling sensory-linkages. A signiant issue in automated robot
mapping is thus the building of an initial model whih an be rened by exploration
of the environment (exploration of the environment being initially arried out in terms
of this model). This, again, invokes the notion of ognitive bootstrapping, in that we
are presented with the apparent paradox of simultaneously updating both the perept-
spae (the map-relative sensor readings) and the objet-spae (the sensor-relative map
hypotheses). The situation is only resolved with a 'bootstrap' pereptual lass that
has the status of an a priori truth (in this ase the agent-relative sensor-geometry
readings). This bootstrap pereptual lass then gives rise to an initial bootstrap map
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hypothesis with suÆient auray to permit itself to employed in order to ahieve
further onvergene.
Thus, for instane, in addressing this issue, Sim and Dudek [126℄ propose to bootstrap
an initial spatial representation of an unknown environment by applying self-organised
maps to a set of monoular images. This provides suÆient registration data to give
rise to a plausible approximation of the agent's environment, from whih a onvergent
model an later be ahieved.
The Spatial-Semanti Hierarhy Expanding on this priniple, Kuipers [67℄ pro-
poses that in order to build an initial model when an agent with unknown sensor on-
guration is deposited in an unknown environment, we must employ a spatial semanti
hierarhy. Thus, the rst task of the agent is to identify distintive states (dstates)
within the sensorimotor interation by whih it an orient itself. It thus intentionally
moves towards optially distintive plaes, plaes in whih there is no aliasing (ambigu-
ity) in the sene desription. Doing so, it may thus be able to asend to the next stage
of the hierarhy, and physially loalise itself within a set of disrete map loations and
possible trajetories. This hierarhial movement thus represents an abstration away
from the the ontinuous sensorimotor spae to a disrete state-spae in whih possible
ations are represented.
The next stage of the hierarhy 'introdues the ontology of plaes, paths and regions
and their onnetivity, order and ontainment relations'. This is the topologial level,
and is thus a symboli generalisation, in that it represents the potentially innite series
of paths between points A and B by a minimal desriptor. This is hene the level of
the spatial semanti hierarhy at whih most planning deisions will our. An optional
metrial level asribes distanes to these topologial representations, providing a global
map within a single frame of referene.
The map formed by the spatial semanti hierarhy is thus the produt of a bootstrap
proess of inreasing ognitive generalisation moving up the hierarhy.
A diret appliation of this abstrat bootstrap methodology to the problem of robot
plae reognition is given in [68℄, where unsupervised learning of lusters of similar
perepts is used to build topologial and asual maps. These maps, ritially, have a
feedbak path to the lustering so that, for instane, luster disambiguation an take
plae. Low-level deisions an thus be reevaluated in terms of higher-level deisions
and vie versa, thereby meeting some of the requirements of a true ognitive bootstrap
mehanism, in whih higher-level pereptual inferenes apable of driving higher-level
motor imperatives are possible.
7.2 Non-Physially Embodied Cognitive Bootstrapping Meh-
anisms In Computer Siene
It is apparent from our survey of ognitive siene that a number of non-embodied
ognitive-bootstrapping mehanisms exist within omputer siene, in whih the domain
of ativity is textual (for instane [96℄). One partiular urrent appliation of these
methods is in the bootstrapping of web-based ontologies, in whih the bootstrapping
agents are 'web-rawling' robots that seek to extrat the essential relations between
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onepts via textual inferene.
In the model of [75℄ a ore domain ontology is pre-engineered, whih allows the web-
agent to infer new relations within that domain. Some of the relations will have the
potential to extend the bootstrap ontology into non-domain-spei areas. These new
ontology elements an hene in turn allow new domains to be explored, and further
non-domain spei relations to be extrated. In terms of the perept-ation model of
ognitive bootstrapping, the perepts in this senario are the web-pages as interpreted
via the urrent ontology: the ations are then the movements between partiular web-
pages (whih an be arried-out in a domain-intentional fashion). High level inferenes
an thus drive the low-level ation proesses, just as in physially embodied ognitive
bootstrapping.
Also within the textual sphere, but implementing the perept-ation yle more ex-
pliitly, Osawa [100℄ proposes that real-time representation of the ognitive inferene
proess will allow for the exible and open-ended ontrolling of subsumption arhite-
tures. In order to demonstrate this priniple, he implements a dialogue-based natural
language interfae based on a two-layer pereption-ation model. Within this model,
inner utteranes are triggered by sensory inputs (the perepts, onsisting of typed user
inputs). The inner utteranes onstitute temporal sequenes of patterns from previous
dialogue examples that the agent realls and displays within the inner world. If these
inner utteranes then prompt ations, in the form of realled patterns of querying, these
are arried out by the interfae as real, rather than virtual textual emanations.
In this way the system an bootstrap inreasingly omplex pereptual representations of
the sensory inputs (as measured by the extent of the inner utteranes whih they trigger),
with an empirial pereptual validation mehanism supplied by the query-responses of
the supervising agent.
Other areas in whih bootstrap ontologial inferene tehniques have been applied are
image ontology [65℄ and gene ontology [141℄. Along with the textual domain, these rep-
resent areas in whih the embodiment of pereption-ation arhitetures (whih we have
established as neessary if there is to be a meaningful riterion for empirial validation
of pereptual updating) an be ommuted to the lesser ondition of loalisation. In
other words, the ognitive agent need not neessarily exist at a partiular loation (in a
physial or abstrat spae), it must only pereive and at at that loation, leaving meta-
pereptual arhiteture to be embodied elsewhere, if neessary. (Hene a web-based
agent may be 'loated' at a partiular web-domain [ie in a virtual spae℄, but embodied
physially at a distint geographial loation).
7.3 Summary of Division
We have surveyed both the open-ended and onstrained variants of the ognitive boot-
strapping mehanism as it has been implemented within the eld of robotis and applied
omputer siene. The onstrained form, limited to xed pereptual-ategory modelling,
has been partiularly suessful in the ontext of simultaneous mapping and loalisation,
whih may be onsidered to serve as a paradigm for the overall approah of ognitive
bootstrapping. Here, a partial environmental map an be used as an orientational per-
eptual ategory in order to bootstrap further renements of that same map by serving
as an approximate guide by whih the roboti agent an manoeuvre into areas in whih it
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an validate alternative map models. A SLAM-based robot thus employs bootstrapping
to overome the paradoxial problem of requiring an aurate map in order to determine
its loation, and an aurate loation in order to build an eetive map.
We have also established that the same mehanism an exist in a non-embodied form,
in partiular as an autonomous ontologial extration mehanism.
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Part VI
7.4 Summary of Survey
In the rst division of this survey, onerning the various philosophial perspetives on
the notion of ognitive bootstrapping, we sought to address a problem whih goes to the
heart of its neessity: the problem of how it is possible for ognition (partiularly a og-
nition apable of modifying its own ognitive ategories) to know, aurately, anything
that exists outside of itself. The original response was that of Desartes; that one must
be septial of any suh external onjetures, the only ertainties being the ognitive
agent's own existene as a thinking entity, and the hene the onsequent ertainty of the
proess of thought. This notion muh later resurfaes in the lassial symbolist approah
to ognitive siene and artiial ognition, in whih the most abstrat and formalised
entities were deemed to be the most ertain, and hene the task of artiial ognition
was inherently a 'top-down' one of onneting logial entities to the raw material of
sensory-data.
In the same vein, Hume argued that external objets onsisting of unities of perepts
do not exist for ognitive agents exept as onjetures, sine they annot, by denition,
be realised (as only individual perepts an).
Kant overturned these notions by demonstrating that the assumption of the existene
of external objets is a prior ondition of ognition. The formal onditions of ognitive
experiene thus demand, but do not onstrain, a range of individual objet possibilities.
These onepts, whih an exist for ognition only as unpereivable relations between
perepts, are validated (or not, as the ase may be) by diret ognitive experiene of
individual perepts in relation to their proposed linkages.
These linkages orrelate diretly with the motor-spae possibilities of the ognitive agent,
whih must hene remain a priori and independent of any proess of ognitive updating.
An autonomous ognitive agent an thus doubt its higher-level pereptions (suh as the
nature of a distant building), and may even update its pereptual mahinery in order
to aommodate this unertainty, but what it annot subjet to doubt is the ation-
based validation mehanism that may be applied to this pereption (suh as, in this
example, the ability to walk around the building in question in order to resolve any
visual ambiguity in terms of the lower-level visual perepts). It is thus impliit in the
Kantian view that meaningful ognitive updating an only exist for an agent in terms
of an a priori perept-ation struture; without it, all pereptual hypotheses, all ways
of interpreting the world, beome equally valid.
This, we argued, provides the basis for the fundamental ognitive bootstrap that oper-
ates between the ognitive agent and the noumenal world that exists beyond it. The
minimal initial pereptual hypothesis from whih we bootstrap higher levels of repre-
sentation apable of overoming the Cartesian gulf between objet and perept is thus
the set of formal a priori requirements of Kantian ognition that unite low-level per-
epts together in syntheti objet unities whose existene is neessary, but whose form
is onjetural, thereby grounding the agent's pereptual framework in something that
exists outside of itself. It thus beomes possible for an agent to oneive higher-level
pereptual hypotheses while retaining a framework for their validation.
Following this exposition of the underlying mehanis of pereptual updating, we then
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went on to look at the hermeneuti irle, the bootstrap mehanism by whih a ognitive
agent gives meaning to the objetive world as a partiular and situated entity. The
ognitive agent goes about this in suh a way as to transend the subjetivity inherent
in the onept of meaning via the use of an iterative proess involving the projetion
of perept hypotheses bak into the environment for validation/falsiation. We then
investigated how the hermeneuti irle speially relates to a pereption-ation-based
ognitive struture via the aount of the phenomenologists.
Following this, in the Cognitive Siene Perspetives division of the survey, we sought to
give an aount of empirial evidene for the existene of ognitive bootstrapping, nding
examples of it within both the symbolist and onnetionist paradigms. We argued that
pereptual updating is meaningful only as a means of ompressing the totality of sensory
inputs. In the omputational linguistis setion, we investigated how the embodiment
of a pereptually self-updating agent naturally gives rise to a language semantis and
syntax when a self-modelling and ommuniative apaity is impliitly inorporated into
its design, emphasised most partiularly by Lu Steel's 'Talking heads' experiment.
In the Mathematial Perspetives aspet of the survey we looked at the underlying
statistial theory behind ognitive bootstrapping in the form of Bayesian exploration,
nding its most general expression and a priori justiation in algorithmi information
theory. We also speulated, after Chaitin, on the possible existene of empirial models
of mathematial progression, in whih axiom seletion is itself approahed via a ognitive
bootstrap.
In the Computer Siene Perspetives division of the survey we looked at atualised
implementations of the ognitive bootstrap mehanism, nding it in a onstrained form
within roboti simultaneous loation and mapping, as well as in more general and open-
ended models of artiial ognition, suh as Granlund's ognitive arhiteture, wherein
the Kantian a priori syntheti onepts an be modelled in a very general way as in-
variant subspaes.
Having ompleted our survey of the four priniple areas in whih the ognitive bootstrap
mehanism is found, we are hene now in a position to give a nal, ategorial denition
of ognitive bootstrapping:
7.5 The Emergent Denition of Cognitive Bootstrapping
At the outset of this survey the term ognitive bootstrapping was intentionally dened
in a relatively loose fashion. With the four subjet areas of philosophy, ognitive siene,
mathematis and omputer siene now surveyed, we are able to provide a denitive and
generalised desription that remains appliable aross all of the elds:
Cognitive Bootstrapping is the iterative mehanism by whih ognition an
beome self-founding without falling into Quine's ontologial relativism, in
whih any world interpretation is equally valid. It thus iterates between
interpretation (in whih perept ategories are applied to the world) and
exploration (in whih sensory-data that has the potential to larify the va-
lidity of the onjetured perepts is sought). Cognitive bootstrapping hene
onstitutes a physially embodied form of the hermeneuti irle.
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Critially, sine the exploratory phase is onduted in terms of the existing
and potentially invalid perept ategories, the initial 'bootstrap' hypothesis
must have a degree of a priori validity in order to allow progressive onver-
gene on an 'objetive' model. Furthermore, there must exist an a priori
riterion of perept-hypothesis validation/falsiation impliit in the boot-
strap hypothesis (suh as hapti ontat in the ase of autonomous visual-
hapti robotis). These a priori perept ategories (often taking the form of
ontat-sensing and motor-spae feedbak within physially-embodied ogni-
tive entities) are thus not admissible to the pereptual updating proedure,
and represent the sole limitations on the extent to whih ognition an be-
ome self-determining (we may hene legitimately doubt the appliability of
our visual interpretation of an objet but not the fat of our hapti ontat
with it, or the motor-impulse involved in reahing out to it).
Cognitive bootstrapping is, we reiterate, thus far more than unsupervised model re-
gression. Unsupervised learning does not, in itself, reinterpret input data in terms of
the hypotheses founded upon them. Rather, it forms hypotheses onerning the input
data on the assumption of their independene to this proess. In other words, they are
not pereptual hypotheses, sine they do not hange the nature of the pereived sensory
data.
Hene, unsupervised learning does not involve overoming the paradox inherent in on-
struting a ognitive agent with unlimited apaity for forming novel perept ategories
with whih to view the world, whih must nonetheless be able to pereive whether these
ategories are representative of the world. Overoming the paradox by bootstrapping re-
quires that we have an initial set of low-level perept ategories that we must assume are
'orret', and then progress from there to higher-level ategories via perept-hypothesis
formation and ation-based testing. This initial ategory set, we argue, is the set of
Kantian syntheti a priori ognitive ategories whih provide a framework in whih
Popperian falsiation of perept ategory hypotheses an be adequately formulated.
We further argue that this retention of the possibility of perept falsiation is the
means by whih it beomes possible to distinguish the perept (and by extrapolation,
the pereiving subjet) from the pereived objet. Without this mehanism a pereiv-
ing subjet ould not distinguish internal and external states with any epistemologial
ertainty.
The question then arises as to what onstitutes the minimal a priori ategory set required
for ognitive bootstrapping; in the artiial ognitive domain the a priori ognitive
ategories at the heart of the ognitive bootstrap need not be struturally idential with
those of humans. For instane, in a ognitive arhiteture suh as Granlund's [47℄, rather
than an objet ategory being imposed a priori, we have instead the broader-based a
priori notion of invariant perept subspaes from whih ompat and invariant symboli
entities of inreasing hierarhial omplexity an be progressively dened, inluding the
syntheti ategory of 'objet'.
The ontext of symbol-hypothesis falsiation in this arhiteture is then the perept-
ation link oupled with an exploratory imperative (even a simple 'random walk' im-
perative will suÆe). Thus, the arhiteture presumes that the output of symbol ma-
nipulation must always result in an ation, the eetiveness of whih the agent must
determine from within the perept spae (whih itself inorporates the higher level sym-
boli entities). Hene, an ation imperative derived at the symboli level (for instane,
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the plaing of one partiular objet on top of another) an only be evaluated as having
been arried-out suessfully by utilising both the higher-level symboli ategories (sine
the imperative was formulated in these terms) and the lowest-level objet ategory (sine
this provides the primary link between the symboli layer and the a priori sensory level
of whih it is an invariant subspae ategory). The symbol system is thus always se-
mantially grounded; the system an spontaneously form and evaluate the suitability of
invariant ategories (whih are always hypothesised), subjet only to the onstraint that
it an not re-evaluate the validity of the a priori sensory level, or the invariant subspae
ategorisation mehanism itself.
There are thus other possible a priori onstraints than those identied by Kant that
may underly the ognitive bootstrap proess in artiial ognitive mehanisms. Other
issues arise in relation to the denition of the onept of ognitive bootstrapping given
above, whih we disuss under their appropriate headings in the following two setions:
8 Disussion of Philosophial Issues
8.1 The Neessity of Bootstrapped Cognition and Embodied
Ageny
Th argument of the Philosophial Perspetives division of this survey with respet to
the fundamental neessity of ognitive bootstrapping may be summarised as follows:
The a priori onstraints on the relationship that exists between ognition and the og-
nized entity were rst set out by Kant. Primary amongst these onstraints is the notion
of the transendental unity of appereption, whih gives ognition its unity despite
hanging pereptions, and whih is hene logially prior to all ognitive experiene. It
then follows from the existene of this unity that there must be objets that exist outside
of ognition, but to whih ognition refers. Kant proves this via a temporal argument:
we are onsious of our own existene (the transendental unity of appereption) as
ourring at a determined point in time. Temporal determinations are relative and pre-
suppose the possibility of permaneny existing for pereption. The permanent annot
only exist within the ognitive agent, sine the agent determines its existene in time
relative to the permanent. This possibility of the permanent objet annot then be
only a ognitive representation whose referentiality outside of pereption an never by
guaranteed; ognition must, in fat, have the apability to refer to external objets as
a neessary preondition of its being. A similar argument in spatial terms implies that
ognitive entities must exist as perspetives on transendental objets.
Cognition thus arises as a syntheti unity out of the fundamental underlying 'noumenal'
material of world, onditioned by it, representing it, but also imposing upon it the a
priori onditions of ognition. The 'objetive' world aessible to ognition is thus
ditated neither entirely by the perept ategories imposed upon it, nor entirely by the
underlying nature of the noumenal world that exists outside of pereption. The objetive
world aessible to ognition is thus, like ognition, of an emergent harater; moreover,
it is neessarily o-eval with ognition, and ognition is neessarily embodied within it,
having a distint loation in both time and spae. The fat that ognitive representation
must exist at a partiular time and plae and yet refer to extended spatial and temporal
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strethes implies that its representation is ompat, a priniple that is reeted in all
of our examples of artiial ognition (for instane Granlund's invariant subspaes, or
Marshall's meta-pereptual lusters).
A further onsequene of this neessarily loalised embodiment of ognition in the ob-
jetive world is that its pereptions must be neessarily subjet to empirial validation;
a ognitive agent ontained entirely loally annot, other than in terms of the a priori
ognitive ategories, onstrain in advane the nature of its pereptions at other times
and plaes. Moreover, sine a ognitive agent determines that a pereption has one
partiular quality and not another, it is thus impliitly presupposed that it might have
hosen otherwise. Cognition thus inherently posits the falsiability of its (non-a priori)
pereptions (a priniple that also applies to the transendental unity of appereption;
a ognitive entity must always be presented with the possibility of its own easing in
order to be present to itself; ognition must therefore always atively sustain itself as a
unity).
We have thus impliitly dierentiated a subjetive and an objetive domain; ognitive
agents must, of neessity, be aware both of their own sensations, and also the possibility
of their own sensations failing to represent the external world.
Hene, in order for a ognitive agent's pereptions to meaningfully orrespond to the ob-
jetive world it must be apable of updating its pereptual ategorisations in the light
of their inappliability. It must hene enat a strategy of ontinuous ognitive boot-
strapping in order to o-preserve the notion of an embodied, loalised agent with an
internalised pereptual domain, simultaneously with the notion of an aurately repre-
sented objetive 'outside' that is ontologially dierentiated from the agent's pereption
of it (a divide that is unbridgeable in dualisti Cartesian thought).
Hene, an agent that is aware in the Kantian sense, must also, of neessity, be an
embodied agent with a bootstrap mehanism for ognitive updating. Any bootstrap
proess must begin with an initiatory set of assumptions (the bootstrap hypothesis) in
order to proeed; we argue here that this minimal set of assumptions is preisely the set
of Kantian a priori ategories underlying ognition.
This is then a distintly stronger motivation for ognitive bootstrapping than that given
at the outset of the survey (namely, that building a ognitive mehanism that fully
repliates human pereption an never be ahieved by an intentional at beause of the
limitations imposed by Russell's paradox; rather we require a self-tutoring, bootstrap
mehanism in order to ahieve human-like ognition). In ombination, the two motiva-
tions would suggest that bootstrapping is an essential onern of artiial ognition.
An alternative, non-a priori, view of the neessity of bootstrapped ognition has also
emerged during this survey in relation to Darwinian natural seletion. It was argued in
setion 3.2.1 that environmental seletion pressures on repliating agents in a rapidly
hanging environment (relative to the evolution rate) will always tend to favour ognitive
arhitetures that generalise to the greatest extent given their initial onguration, and
evolve via a bootstrapping proess toward a loal minimum in the disparity between
internal world model and biologial-survival-relative reality. Human soietal (as opposed
to morphologial) evolution ertainly meets this riterion, with survival demands on
human ommunities typially hanging on generational, rather than evolutionary, time
sales. Here, the means of repliation of human behaviour and understanding is not gene-
based (whih would respond only very slowly to environmental pressures) but rather
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meme-based, that is to say, repliated via linguisti ommuniation, and is hene apable
of far more rapid evolution (see [26℄).
Not neessitated a priori, this linguisti bootstrap mehanism for the updating of ogni-
tive ategories is hene a speially human one (given the very limited or non-existent
language apabilities of animals). Cognitive modelling of this struture from within the
Connetionist shool would thus presumably entre on the dierenes in human ortial
struture with respet to the standard mammalian brain.
Thus, a range of arguments for the inherent neessity of ognitive bootstrap meha-
nisms within general ognition have been brought to bear. We now wish to look at the
impliations that they have for the spei issue of artiial ognition.
8.2 Impliations for Artiial Cognition
We have, in ognitive bootstrapping, desribed a methodology by whih autonomous,
self-updating ognition an attain a riterion for objetive validation of proposed per-
eptual updates. We would now like to disuss whether this objetivity extends to
the ognition so derived. A entral question is therefore whether Kant's transendental
unity of appereption, though by denition not exerieneable as a distint pereption
to the ognitive agent that it denes (being rather the basis of pereptual experiene in
general), an nonetheless be a tangible objet of experiene for another ognitive agent.
It would seem that the answer must be in the aÆrmative; we distinguish ognitive from
non-ognitive entities on the basis of their transendene of partiular spatial relation-
ships. Thus, we do not pereive a partiular ognitive agent at position ~x responding
to a phenomenon at position ~y as being merely a ausal link between spatially distint
entities; rather we pereive it as a tangible ognitive response to the event at ~y. This
distintion is, of ourse, an a priori syntheti onstrut in the same way that \A auses
B" is dierent from \B follows A": that is, in a manner that is not in any way empir-
ially derivable. The ognitive unity of a third party is thus always established by the
observing subjet, and not by any inherent harateristi of the observed party, other
than in terms of what is it is apable of manifesting spatially as being indiative of a
ognitive unity.
Cognitive bootstrapping, as a mehanism for unifying sensory data into referential per-
epts, we have established qualies as an a priori neessity for ognition. This proess
of sensory generalisation an, moreover, be imitated by artiial mehanisms, as we
have demonstrated throughout the survey. It would therefore seem possible that we an
onstrut an artiial mehanism apable of manifesting this generalising apability in
the objetive domain, suh that an observing human agent (that is, one equipped with
a transendental unity of its appereptions) is apable of reognising the general unity
underlying its ations and attributing the syntheti ategory of 'ognitive' to them.
The question then immediately arises as to whether this manufatured third party is
then truly ognitive. In one sense the answer does not greatly matter; even if human
ognitive ageny nally proves to be unmanufaturable in priniple, its inherent riteria
for reognising ognition in a seond party is built on its objetive orrelates; there is no
way to distinguish between the two possibilities empirially. In terms of Wittgenstein's
latter thought [150℄, this funtional equivalene in fat onstitutes an identity; there are
simply no grounds other than the metaphysial for dierentiating the two possibilities;
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it is a distintion without a dierene. Hene, if an agent appears to onrm to the
ategory of 'ognitive' then, quite simply, it is. Our normal, ontextualised usage of
language is, for Wittgenstein, the only basis for meaning.
Conversely, if we were to be onsiously aware of the rules that governed a onstruted
agent's behaviour and further, onsious of our having implemented these rules in the
agent, Wittgenstein's riteria of ognitive awareness would appear to suggest that the
agent ould not then be ognitive in the same sense as ourselves; we would instead
pereive the onstruted agent as onstrained to follow its intrinsi rule-set, and thus in
the ategory of entities that are ated-upon (by ourselves), rather than ating (in the
same manner as ourselves). The agent would thus appear more like an automaton than
a ognitive subjet by our innate riteria of ognition.
If, however, the agent has undergone a prolonged period of ognitive bootstrapping, suh
that we an no longer asertain the rule-set that ditates its spatial behaviour, then,
by Wittgenstein's riteria, we are justied in attributing to it the notion of ognition.
The onept of 'ognition' is thus something that an only be bestowed on an agent by
another agent that is inapable of antiipating its pereption-ation rule-struture.
Consequently, by this denition, any of the open-ended models of embodied bootstrap-
ping detailed in this survey an be onsidered ognitive on the proviso that they have
ahieved the requisite level of omplexity. Cognition, is hene, from this perspetive an
emergent property.
8.3 Self-Objetivising Cognitive Models
Many of the models of ognitive bootstrapping we have explored have inorporated the
onept of self-ognition, the agent's impliit aknowledging of it own ognitive ageny.
This is entral to Kant's oneption of the ognitive agent: it is also entral to many
post-Kantian interpretations (for instane, the Phenomenologists, espeially [85℄). We
also saw in Part 3 that several linguisti models regard the 'I' token as the preursor to
any sort of meaningful ausal ageny.
Kant hene argues that sine a ognitive entity must both unify its pereptual possibles
and be present to itself in relation to this unity, it must exist as a partiular, situated
perspetive upon the objet-onept that represents the unity of it pereptual possibles.
Hene, a ognitive agent is aware of itself positionally, but does not onsider itself as
being simply a position, sine it must also be aware of other possible positions with
respet to the syntheti objet.
A further onsequene of the Kantian view is that, when the ognitive agent attempts
to modify its set of pereptual desriptions of the objetive world
17
, it must, in order
to be apable of falsifying this notion (and thereby assess its objetivity), be able to
impliitly form a 'third-person' view of its high-level pereption-ation expetations in
order to ompare this with atual pereptions. Hene, an agent with open-ended og-
nitive apabilities must, at some level, be able to objetify its higher-level pereptions
in terms the lower-level ones and thus form a self-oneption. At a still more general
17
Suh as when inferring novel high-level ognitive ategories like 'rowds', and allowing this to
atively respeify lower-level ategories, suh as, for instane, appending an additional attribute to the
previous understanding of 'person' to suggest a tendeny to form rowds, suh that, heneforth, any
pereption of a person impliitly inorporates the additional datum 'in rowd' or 'not in rowd'.
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level, a possibility employed by a number of the surveyed artiial ognitive bootstrap
methods is to expliitly model the agent's own learning proess with a view to rening
it: essentially allowing the agent to learn how to learn.
At the less expliit level of ognitive self-representation, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and
Sartre, for the philosophers, and Dewey, Rioeur and Lako for the ognitive sientists,
suggest that the form of our pereptions is ditated by our ation possibilities. Self-
models are thus impliit in our pereptual ategories at the outset.
The extent to whih this latter form of phenomenologial self-modelling is apable of
artiial modelling is open to question; however, the onept of aordanes (Part 3)
would appear to provide one possible avenue of exploration.
An impliation of the more limited form of Kantian self-modelling ognitive ageny is
that ation designations must be made in perept-relative terms:
8.3.1 Relative verses Absolute Ageny
To give a spei example of this notion, rst onsider its onverse: suppose that an
agent without this apability embodies a funtional mapping between the set of its
possible pereptions, fP
1
; P
2
; : : : P
N
g, and the set of its possible ations (of magnitude
O(jN j
2
)) that are apable of linking these perepts together. An agent that employs
perept-relative ation designations, on the other hand, an potentially apply an arbi-
trarily smaller set of linking ations (of magnitude, say, O(j2n < N j
2
)) to the same
pereptual set with the same onsequenes. Thus, if A
xy
is the ation linking perepts
P
x
and P
y
, the total ation set in the former ase is some subset of:
fA
1;2
; A
1;3
; A
1;4
; : : : A
1;N
; A
2;1
; A
2;3
; A
2;4
; : : : A
1;N
; : : : A
N;N
g,
whereas in the latter ase the ation set is a subset of:
fA
x;x n
; A
x;x n+1
; : : : A
x;x+1
; A
x;x+2
; : : :A
x;x+n
g,
(for n < x < N   n and appropriate perept labelling)
Thus, in a sense, the perept-relative agent ats at, or via, x. When the perept states
are expliitly positions in a spae (as, indeed, they are required to be by Kant) and not
the struture-less qualia illustrated here, this analogy beomes exat.
Hene, perept-relative ageny automatially permits low-level self-modelling in that
the perept x an simply be dened as the agent's urrent state. How this might be
aomplished in the ase of non-perept-relative ation ageny is less lear; attempting
to employ the urrent perept state as a desription of the agent (ie as an ative potential)
fails by virtue of the fat that the agent's ations in relation to this perept are unique
to the situation, and the perept is thus absolutely uninformative in relation to them
(and the ation states are by themselves unpereivable).
A further issue is that, in the ase of the non-perept-relative agent, any novel pereption-
ation linkage requires that the whole pereption-ation map be inferred anew. A
perept-relative ageny, on the other hand, an apply its set of ation possibilities to
any existing perept in order to generate a new pereptual experiene beause perept
and ation are largely deoupled. Hene, if this perept turns out to be of a ompletely
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novel kind, the agent is able to aommodate this without having to update its ation
set, or having to ompletely update its pereption-ation mapping (the existing mapping
still has validity over the majority of the pereptual range). Perept-relative ageny an
thus atively explore the pereptual terrain. The only limitation on the agent's ations
is hene the algebrai losure of the ation set, whih may or may not be nite (thus,
for instane, a hypothetial mobile robot might have an ation set onsisting of the two
ation elements; 'Turn 1 degree lokwise from urrent diretion.' and 'Move forward 1
m from urrent position.', giving a nite pereptual range in the latter ation spae,
but a potentially innite one in the former).
The Kantian requirement of the ognitive agent's loalisation in relation to syntheti
objet unities would hene appear to imply a the existene of a set of perept-relative a-
tion possibilities in order that the agent's urrent ation possibilities be represented, for
pereption, via a single perept. In maintaining a non-relative perept desription along-
side the relative ageny, it hene also retains a model of the objetive world alongside
its impliit self-model. Cognitive updating with respet to the agent's ation potential
an thus be distinguished from updating with respet to the environmental model.
9 Disussion of Cognitive Siene Issues
9.1 Overoming the Problem of Pereptual Referene in Open-
ended Cognition
It is evident from our survey of the ognitive siene aspets of ognitive bootstrapping
that any embodied agent equipped with a high degree of ognitive autonomy must
immediately to address the problem of perpetual referene; how an it be sure that its
perept ategories and their updates are meaningful in relation the environment? We
shall here assess how ognitive bootstrapping addresses this point in terms if the two
distint stages of the proess that we have identied:
9.1.1 First Stage: Constrution of the Bootstrap Perept Hypothesis
The onstrution of novel perept ategories in an autonomous agent requires a meha-
nism for grounding these onepts suh that they have atual, referential ontent. This,
we have established is only ahievable via ognitive bootstrapping within an expliitly
Kantian framework. Hene, the initial 'bootstrap' ognitive hypothesis by whih the
autonomous agent rst pereives the world in whih it is embodied must have some
element that is not simply hypothesised to be representative of the objetive domain,
but is rather guaranteed a priori to be be representative.
Examples of this in human ognition are the prior relationships that exists between our
pereption of spatiality and the spae in whih objets are embedded, and, in semanti
bootstrapping, the prior referentiality of the ore voabulary from whih further word-
denitions are derived, suh as those whih make possible learning new voabulary from
a ditionary with meaningful referential ontent, as opposed to merely tautologial or
permutative interrelationship.
We hene agree with Millikan [87℄ that the a priori representativity of the ongenital
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set of human perepts is granted via natural seletion (so that, for instane, if human
beings' innate pereption of ingestability in relation to external objets did not, to some
degree, orrelate with those objets in the environment that met with their nutritional
requirements, then the speies would simply not have proved biologially viable in the
long term). Any artiial autonomous agent needs a similar minimal set of guaranteed
referential perept ategories, but, in the absene of a framework of natural seletion,
these would have to be imposed by their reators.
So, to give a vision-based example, onsider the notion that the two separate images
of binoular vision intrinsially refer to a omposite objet (as opposed to being merely
orrelated sensor streams). Rather than this syntheti onstrut being determined by
the survival value impliit in it (say, for hunting purposes), this notion would instead
have to be imposed by the artiial agent's reators at the outset, given that it annot
be inferred empirially (without invoking some equivalent a priori onstrut for unifying
disrete sensory elements within the the omposite sensory spae).
Thus, the referentiality of pereption must be ensured at the outset prior to any og-
nitive updating. The question then arises of how, within the onnes of these Kantian
restritions, is open-ended ognitive development to be made possible. We therefore now
turn to the question of how the bootstrap hypothesis may be modied while retaining
this referentiality.
9.1.2 Seond Stage: Updating the Bootstrap Perept Hypothesis
The question of how pereptual updating is possible is equivalent to the question of how
a ognitive agent that pereives only what is expressible in its own perept ategorisations
is nonetheless apable of forming a oneption of the referential auray of perepts
that are not themselves given a priori. The answer hinges on the fat that any novel
pereptual hypotheses must themselves omposed of the existing a priori pereptual
ategories, so that any pereptual update orresponds to a oneivable situation in the
extra-pereptual world.
However, while suÆient to ensure the referentiality of the the proposed pereptual
ategorisation, this ompositional strategy does not it itself onstitute a riterion of
validity for the inferred perepts: so far no one inferred pereptual ategory is favoured
over another. For this to be the ase we need a pereptual optimisation strategy and a
pereption-ation link.
We have seen that, in general, the pereptual optimisation strategy adopted by biologial
and artiial agents is one of pereptual ompression; we wish to redue the total sensory
stream into a relatively few signiant data. This, however, is still not suÆient, in itself,
to determine the appropriateness of a pereptual update - after all, it is always possible
to map every perept to a single datum, giving maximal ompression at the expense of
all environmental information. Thus, any novel pereptual inferene must be allied with
an ation omplex within whih this pereptual inferene is sustained. Hene, a novel
inferred pereptual ategory suh as 'is on top of' orresponds immediately to an ation
omplex of the form 'put on top of' by whih the validity of the pereptual inferene
may be tested.
We therefore test hypothesised perept-ation linkages by omparing the urrent objet
hypothesis (the external world as viewed via the andidate perept, existing as a set
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of proposed perept-ation linkages) with the atual perept enountered on applying
exploratory ations. The ognitive mehanism is thus, within the a priori onstraints,
apable of beoming self-foundational.
Furthermore, beause the agent an validate novel perept-linkage hypotheses in terms
of exploratory ations built upon existing perept-linkage hypotheses, it an hene im-
prove upon partially suessful or inomplete models in an ative fashion. The partial
suessfulness of the pereptual model need only be suh as to allow for broadly-aurate
exploratory impulses (for instane, the partial map in a simultaneous loation and map-
ping exerise in autonomous robotis that is suÆient to allow manoeuvring into poorly-
mapped areas in order to update the map). It is hene in this manner that the proess
is a bootstrap; we utilise a perept mehanism of unknown value in order to interpret
the external world in suh a way that we an gain suÆient information in order to
evaluate the worth of that pereption mehanism. If it proves insuÆient to the task of
gathering enough evidene to validate itself, then it automatially fails that validation.
If it proves robust at olleting information, but this information ontradits the perept
hypothesis on a few oasions, the hypothesis may still be retained until suÆient data
is olleted to form a novel pereptual inferene.
Autonomous ognition an therefore simultaneously modify both its world model and
its pereptual mahinery via an iterative proess of bootstrap updating that, by virtue
of its prior grounding, attains a plausible onvergene with respet to both ontologial
spheres.
9.2 Symbol Grounding and Intentionality; Hierarhially
We thus have argued that the a priori nature of the ore pereptual 'bootstrap' ategories
implies that any new perept ategorisations must be made in terms of those bootstrap
ategories, but that these new perept ategorisations an in turn be treated as the
basis for further ategorisations. The perept spae of an agent is thus hierarhial and
bottom-up in nature; novel perepts hene remain grounded in the manner of Harnad
[50℄.
For an autonomous ognitive agent, validation of these novel perept-ation strutures
involves, we have also argued, exploration of the perept domains in the hierarhial level
immediately preeding it. Thus, to give a onrete example, in learning visually how to
play hess through interation with a playing (but not expliitly supervising) agent, it is
neessary to rst formulate the onepts of hess-piee and square before the onept of
valid hess move an be meaningfully inferred via exploratory experimentation in terms
of the former pereptual ategories (and so on to still higher-level oneptualisations like
strategi-position).
For a fully autonomous agent we must suppose that the exploration of the perept do-
mains in the highest hierarhial level is of a random, or, at least stohastially driven,
nature. Only in this way an groupings (lusters or orrelations) of higher level onepts
be found via unsupervised tehniques; the agent has absolutely no basis for knowing in
advane what higher-level inferenes may be valid and hene must explore a represen-
tative sample of the entire spae.
What is of partiular interest in this senario is that while randomised ations at the
lowest level of the perept-ation hierarhy appear to be just that, randomised ations
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at higher levels of the perept-ation hierarhy appear intentional with respet to the
lower levels. Thus, while formation of a relatively low-level onept suh as 'hess-board'
might involve moving hess-piees around at random until the full extent of possible
movement is established, formation of the onept of 'hek-mate' would neessitate
random explorations of partiular ombinations of previously learned valid hess moves
(the onept of 'valid hess move' having been established by unsupervised learning in
relation to the ations of the opposing hess-player, who, we assume, simply reverses
invalid moves).
Hene, the random exploration of the higher-level perept-ation domain implies in-
tentionality at the lower level; the random seletion of the move 'queen's bishop takes
king's rook' from amongst the ensemble of possible valid moves implies the intentional
movement of the bishop to the square oupied by the rook. Thus, an autonomous agent
with no overall goal other than generalised exploration an form an enormous range of
intentional sub-goals by virtue of the hierarhiality impliit in bootstrapped ognitive
struture.
This notion of hierarhially-grounded intentionality would then orrelate with the ex-
istene of the 'sleep-paralysis' mehanism in mammals. Aording to the ativation-
synthesis theory [54℄, during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, randomised neuronal
stimulation is applied to the pons area of the brain as part of its memory onsolidation
ativity. This randomised ativity is interpreted at the pereptual level as dreaming.
Dreaming is hene experiened as high-level visual and auditory stimuli of same sort
that ours in waking life, albeit with an appropriately randomised struture. However,
this imagery is not merely abstrated symbolism, being rather hierarhially grounded in
the perept-ation omplex of the organism. We thus have an innate tendeny to at out
our response to the dream-stimuli in an intentional and physial manner. It is therefore
neessary for the brain stem to atively prevent this motor stimulation from making
the nal onnetion from the lowest-level of the grounded hierarhy to the musles: a
failure of this mehanism results in the phenomenon of sleep-walking.
A similar example of the hierarhial grounding of higher-level visual perepts in low-
lever perept-ation mappings ours in the mirror-neurons of the primate premotor
ortex. It is found [39℄ that these partiular neurons re in response both to motor
ations performed by the primate, as well as to those same motor ations performed
by other primates in the observing primate's visual eld. The high level visual per-
epts orresponding to the observed ation must thus be hierarhially grounded in the
appropriate lower-level ation states.
10 Conlusions
10.1 Summary of Requirements for Cognitive Bootstrapping
in Artiial Cognitive Models
We have thus argued on a number of philosophial and sienti grounds that any
plausible ognitive model is neessarily a bootstrapped one, a ategori denition of
whih was given in setion 7.5. We have also argued that ognitive bootstrapping is a
pratial neessity if we are to build an entity apable of passing as ognitive on our own
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terms (the only possible riterion aording to Wittgenstein), sine Russell's paradox
would appear to render it a formal impossibility that we ould knowingly formulate
the underlying rules (if suh exist) of our own ognition. Moreover, aording to the
Wittgensteinian view, any entity governed by formal rules of whih we were expliitly
aware would not strike us as being ognitive, but rather as an automaton governed
by those rules. The remaining possibility is thus for these ognitive 'rules' to emerge
by interation between the artiial agent and the environment, ommening from an
initial bootstrap set of ognitive rules (for instane the partial set of ognitive rules
that it is possible, as humans, to nitely formulate). Critially, this bootstrap set must
inorporate suÆient a priori struture as to allow for the possibility of pereptual
hypothesis validation via ation-based onsisteny heking.
Disounting the possibility (disussed in detail in the Philosophial Perspetives division
of the survey) that artiial ognition is not ahievable, we shall now look at the formal
requirements imposed on artiial ognitive agents by the understanding of ognitive
bootstrapping at whih we have arrived (and whih are exemplied in various ways by
the artiial agents of Part 5).
10.1.1 A Priori Requirements
It is apparent from our analysis of Kant that a 'blank slate' approah to autonomous
ognition is not possible; we annot simply ollate 'pure', pereptually unmediated, em-
pirial data and hope to infer ategories inhering within it. Certain minimal ategorial
assumptions must be inherently built into pereption in order to dene it as suh, for
example ausality, topology and temporality.
In terms of autonomous robotis these restritions mean that (while it is never mean-
ingful to onsider pure sensory data free of all ategories) we should not, in general,
treat raw sensory data with the most open-ended mahine learning approahes in order
to generate novel pereptual primitives at the lowest level of the ognitive arhiteture.
Thus, we would never seek, for instane, to embed an autonomous robot's stereosopi
amera-feed onsisting of 2  N pixels and T temporal samples within a 2  N 
T vetor-spae and attempt unsupervised statistial pattern-reognition in pursuit of
omplete ognitive open-endedness. Rather, we would utilise the prior knowledge of
three-dimensionality and steresopiality in order, not merely to redue the problem
dimensionality, but also to provide a meaningful framework for the inoming sensory
data, in whih falsiation of novel perept hypotheses is possible. (We an only validate
a onjetured perept lass with respet to some lower-level pereptual domain whose
validity is assumed throughout; not to do so makes pereptual omparison meaningless
[as when attempting to ompare stereosopi objet models without having made a prior
assumption of three-dimensionality℄).
Hene, while we seek to make artiial ognitive bootstrapping as open-ended as pos-
sible, we should not seek to ahieve this at the level of either the motor-spae or of
the sensory data. Rather, the open-endedness should refer to the breadth of possible
meta-ategorisation of the sensory data. Thus, in the manner of Marr's [78℄ three-level
desription of ognition, we seek to build a pereptual hierarhy. While the ognitive
ategory 'objet' may possibly be required a priori
18
we an hene seek to build an
18
Or perhaps some other suitable ompressive relationship between perepts, suh as Granlund's
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open-ended hierarhy of meta-onepts built from suh base ategories (suh as 'objet
adjaeny' or 'objet ontainability'). Very often, these ategories will require a higher
level logial struture (for instane, the move from rst to seond order logis). Thus,
truly open-ended ognition would perhaps require an agent to bootstrap novel forms of
logial inferene, as well as bootstrapping new entities within the logi.
This is beyond the apability of the indutive logi mehanisms disussed in setion
4.3.1, and perhaps requires algorithmi indution methods suh as the Universal searh
of Levin (setion 6.2.4). Alternatively, it may be possible to avoid formal mehanism
entirely, and simply rely on onnetionisti assoiations between simple learning units
without any lear olletive logial desriptivity (setion 3).
10.1.2 A Posteriori Requirements
Beyond the hypothesis generating struture, we also require a mehanism to assess
pereptual hypothesis performane in relation to exploratory ations undertaken with
respet to it. We have here advoated Bayesian theory, not simply beause of its statis-
tial justiation, but also beause of its ontologial neutrality and equivalene (demon-
strated in setion 6.2.2) to minimum desription length theory, and hene to algorithmi
information theory, within whih Oam's Razor nds a formal justiation.
However, this is by no means the only option; almost any inferential, or partial Bayesian
mehanism may be implemented. We would argue, though, that suh systems do not
have the same level of a priori justiation or ontologial freedom, and have therefore
the greater likelihood of failing in novel environments (avoidane of whih is one of
major motivating fators of ognitive bootstrapping).
10.2 Formal List of Requirements for Cognitive Bootstrapping
We are now in a position to tabulate preisely the omponent requirements of an au-
tonomous ognitive bootstrap system as follows:
Neessary Inlusions
1. A Bootstrap Assumption: an a priori pre-ognitive struture apable of guar-
anteeing the validity (referentiality) of the bootstrap entities from whih initial perept
hypotheses are omposed.
(For instane a minimal set of given word meanings from whih sentential querying an
proeed in order to build up a language lexion, or, more fundamentally still, the formal
Kantian a priori requirements of ognition).
2. A Generalisation Mehanism: a ompression mehanism for forming syntheti
perept and objet hypotheses. This must intrinsially favour the greatest ompression
onsistent with the sensory fats (Oam's Razor); see Setion 6 for an a priori argument
as to the validity of this argument in MDL terms.
(An example is Granlund's invariant subspae method [47℄).
invariant subspaes.
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3. A Hypothesis Testing Struture, allowing the ation-based evaluation of perept
hypotheses against empirially well established lower-level perepts. This allows for the
hierarhial building of valid perept-ation hypothesis.
(So that, for instane, a visually-equipped ognitive agent might indutively derive the
laws of hess in terms of its ognitive models of individual hess piees, these ognitive
models having ahieved the status of valid perept hypotheses, though themselves built
on a lower pereption-ation level).
4. Hierarhial Feedbak between perept stages: lower-level perepts have the
apability to be re-validated in terms of higher-level perept-driven ations, as well as
vie-versa (this does not extend to the a priori struture, whih must remain inviolate
throughout). Moreover, the agent an intentionally guide its lower-level perept training
via the inferred higher-levels.
(Thus, arrying out a high-level agent ation imperative suh as 'making oee' simul-
taneously supplies additional training data for the lower-level perept ategory 'up'.
Hene the system ahieves robustness through ontinuously reinforing its pereptual
self-training).
5. Embodiment; the agent must pereptually ategorise the world in whih it is
ative (whih inherently limits its environmental modelling potential, sine it annot
fully model its own ageny [12℄). The agent must hene ompatly represent the world
in a loalised fashion. (It is also an a priori requirement of Kant's that ognition exists
loally within an external world).
(Embodiment hene serves to solve the frame problem by limiting the range of possible
perepts to those relevant to the agent's goals - for instane, survival in a Darwinian,
naturally-seletive environment).
6. An Exploratory Imperative. This predominantly takes plae at the highest level
of the pereption-ation hierarhy, and is randomised in the most unonstrained form
of ognitive bootstrapping. Other variants are possible - for instane an imperative to
explore regions of the perept-ation spae in whih data is poor or absent, or exploration
in terms of very general goals, suh as the long-term survival of the agent.
This is hene the mehanism motivating the perept-ation hierarhy-building, as one-
novel perept onepts beome inreasingly well-established.
Corollary Inlusions
7. Self Modelling - This is impliit to an extent in ognition; an agent must at least
model itself as a partiular positional perspetive on the world as an a priori ondition
of Kantian ognition. It must also impliitly distinguish between internal pereption
and the external world in positing the falsiability of perept hypotheses in respet to
ations, and thus arries an impliit model of itself as a pereiving agent.
This impliit model an be made more expliit if neessary, for instane by projeting
simplied self-models into the agent's world-model in order to rene its learning strategy
(examples of whih are given in Part 5).
8. A Self-Founding Perept Domain. This is a diret onsequene of the fat that
the (non a priori aspets of) existing perept hypotheses may be overridden in the light
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of novel pereptual inferenes, even when these inferenes were made on the basis of
experimentation arried out in terms of the former perepts. The only limits on this
proess are the a priori perept-ation validation riteria.
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